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Are the Autocratizers Overtaking the Democratizers?

Blog Post | Democracy & Autocracy

Are the Autocratizers Overtaking the Democratizers?

The decline of democracy in the last decade has largely wiped out the recent 35 years of improvement.

The price of Liberty is eternal vigilance.

Thomas Jefferson

While we are seeing human progress across many well-being indicators, on the dimension of freedom and democracy, the trend is less clear in recent decades. Reports from the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute show three major trends regarding the decline of the global levels of democracy.

First, the global level of democracy, as measured by a population-weighted average level of the V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Indices, has been declining steadily since the 2010s. By 2022, the level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen deteriorated to 1986 levels. In the Asia-Pacific region, the level of democracy fell back to levels last recorded in 1978.

While we can still say that there has been global progress in democracy compared with the early 1970s, when the “third wave of democratization” began, the decline of democracy in the last decade largely wiped out the 35 years of improvement.

Second, the number of countries that moved from democracy toward autocracy (the “autocratizers”) over the last decade is far greater than the number of countries moving from autocracy toward democracy (the “democratizers”). In 2022, there was a record number of 42 autocratizers, containing 43 percent of the world’s population. In comparison, the number of democratizing countries was 14, with only 2 percent of the world’s population. This is a record low number last seen in 1973—50 years ago.

Third, the global balance of power has also been shifting significantly in favor of autocracies. In particular, autocracies accounted for 46 percent of global GDP (in purchasing power parity) in 2022, up from 24 percent in 1992. Trade between democracies was 47 percent of world trade in 2022, down from 74 percent in 1998, with an increasing share of world trade happening with and between autocracies. Democracies’ trade dependency on autocracies grew from 21 percent of world trade in 1999 to 35 percent in 2022. The share of between-autocracies trade tripled from 6 percent of world trade in 1992 to almost 18 percent in 2022.

The Rise of China played a major role in the shifting balance of economic and trade power. In purchasing power parity terms, China’s GDP surpassed the United States around the year 2014, making a closed autocracy the largest economy in the world. As a share of global GDP, China rose from 4.4 percent in 1992 to 18.5 percent in 2022. China also accounts for a significant part of the trade pattern changes, with its share of global trade reaching almost 15 percent and being a major trading partner for many autocracies and democracies.

Political scientists have argued that great powers’ influence on the structure of the international system is important in affecting the trajectories of democracies and authoritarian regimes. The implications of the rise of China for the fate of democracy is still an unfolding story.

Overall, these trends are alarming and worth more attention from people who care about democracy and human progress. The progress of political freedom is fundamental for human progress in other areas. It is, therefore, possible that human progress in general could face decline if the trend of autocratization continues.

While the general trend of human progress in the realm of political freedom still prevails – when we look at it from a time horizon of more than 40 years – we should also recognize that progress in freedom is never guaranteed. Freedom is “fragile” and must be, as President Reagan pointed out, “fought for and defended constantly by each generation.”

Blog Post | Government & Democracy

Why We Should Appreciate Peaceful Transitions of Power

It is no simple matter for a diverse democratic community to sustain itself despite inevitable internal conflicts.

This last U.S. election was unlike any other in contemporary history in one important regard: some no longer felt that the country would see a peaceful transition of power from the incumbent to the president-elect. Many feared that a Trump reelection could prompt mass riots and looting, leading numerous businesses in urban areas to board up their glass doors and windows in preparation for unrest. And even now that Biden has secured a victory—albeit one that may face vote recounts in some states—some commentators worry that some Trump supporters could refuse to accept the election’s results.

While concerns about civil unrest are worth taking seriously, and any purported election anomalies should be fully investigated, we should also take heart in the fact that peaceful transitions of power—once rare—have become more frequent in much of the world. Still, peaceful power handovers are far from the “default.” According to an analysis by The Economist, in the past hundred years, only about half of the world’s countries have managed even a single power-transfer free of coups, civil wars, or constitutional crises. The good news is that once a country does manage to secure a peaceful change of government, the practice tends to become entrenched over time and creates positive momentum for continued peaceful power-transitions.

Consider a long-run historical perspective. Throughout most of humanity’s existence, authority typically changed hands through force. Kings often assassinated their predecessors, even killing close family members of the deposed monarchs, or defeated the prior ruler in battle. Consider ancient Rome during what has come to be known as the Crisis of the Third Century, a period of turmoil and particularly fraught political transitions. Take a moment to think of the fates of the fourteen emperors between Maximinus (ruled 235–238 CE) and Aurelian (ruled 270–275 CE).

After Maximinus’ assassination, the co-rulers Pupienus and Balbinus reigned for three months before their own Praetorian guards murdered them. The next emperor, Gordian III, either died in battle or by treason—the record is unclear. The emperor after that, Philip the Arab, was killed by Decius, who then ruled until he and his co-ruler son Herennius Etruscus both died fighting the Goths. Decius’ other son Hostilian briefly led the empire until he died either from the plague or murder—the record is again unclear. The next emperor, Trebonianus Gallus, was killed by his own soldiers. Three months into his reign, the subsequent emperor Aemilianus was also killed by his own soldiers. Notice a pattern?

The next emperor, Valerian, was taken prisoner by the Sassanids and killed. In some versions of the story, his captors skinned him alive, while in others, they executed him by forcing him to drink molten gold. His son Gallienus eventually fell victim to a murder conspiracy. His successor Claudius Gothicus died of the plague after about a year. His brother Quintillus reigned for a few months before meeting an untimely end. Conflicting reports suggest that he either committed suicide, fell prey to assassination by political rivals, or his own soldiers killed him. The next emperor, Aurelian, was also ultimately murdered by his own people.

The Third Century Crisis serves as an extreme example of one abrupt, often violent, power-transition after another over a relatively short period. But the fact remains that violent government transitions were once ordinary.

The trend of peaceful transitions of power becoming more common throughout the world—although they are still, unfortunately, not the norm everywhere—is related to the global rise of liberal democracy. That system of government is much better at producing peaceful regime changes than authoritarian systems. Among other benefits, the electoral process provides a means for internal opponents of the current regime to seize power without bloodshed. By replacing murder plots with campaign strategies, and assassins with political consultants, a functioning liberal democracy substitutes peaceful persuasion for lethal force.

Unfortunately, the long-term trend of democratization has recently reversed—and for the first time since the dawn of the new millennium, autocracies again outnumber liberal democracies. The Varieties of Democracy Institute at the University of Gothenberg in Sweden now classifies Honduras, Hungary, Nicaragua, Niger, the Philippines, Serbia, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, and several other former democracies as autocracies, when defined as scoring less than 0.5 on the Electoral Democracy Index (scale 0-1). In some cases, such as that of Hungary, the Institute reports that a rise in an illiberal form of populism is behind the change.

Peaceful government transitions via the ballot box should never be taken for granted. Globally speaking, they are far from the norm, even in modern history. Even once a country establishes a tradition of peaceful power-transfers, there are no guarantees that the tradition will continue. In his presidential Farewell Address that precipitated the first peaceful transition of power in the young American republic, George Washington spoke about the dangers of politics revolving around intense warring factions. He described the spirit of factionalism as “a fire not to be quenched,” and warned that it “demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume.”

It is no simple matter for a diverse democratic community to sustain itself despite inevitable internal conflicts. As the United States deals with the aftermath of the election, its citizens should keep the following in mind. A tradition of peaceful power transitions must be treasured, and protected through conscious effort, or, as Washington put it, vigilance.

This first appeared in The National Interest.