Summary: Recent praise for feudalism overlooks the grim reality of life under it. Far from being a system of mutual care, it was defined by hardship, hunger, and oppression for the many and insecurity even for the few in power. History shows that markets—not monarchs—turn self-interest into shared prosperity.

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“Feudalism is so much better than what we have now. Because at least in feudalism, the leader is vested in the prosperity of the people he rules,” declared Tucker Carlson recently on The Tucker Carlson Show. His guest, writer Auron MacIntyre, agreed enthusiastically. Carlson added, “If all your serfs die, you starve.” McIntyre replied, “Yeah. There’s a true incentive to care for those people.”

The conversation sparked ridicule online, but it also reflected a broader, bipartisan trend. As Amanda Mull observed in The Atlantic, social media has grown “strangely nostalgic for life in the Middle Ages.” Samuel Matlack of The New Atlantis noted the puzzling frequency of the argument that the preindustrial past may have been superior to modernity.

Carlson’s reasoning implies that feudal lords, out of self-interest, nurtured the well being of their serfs. Yet the system he imagines has more in common with modern markets than with medieval Europe. Adam Smith explained the principle long ago: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.” If customers are displeased, businesses collapse. Markets channel self-interest into mutual gain in ways that feudalism never could.

History makes that clear. Start with life expectancy. Even kings in the feudal era rarely lived into old age. Between the 11th and early 15th centuries, most European monarchs died young. Alfonso VI of Castile and León, who reached 79, was the outlier. Only a few others across England, Aragon, Germany, and France managed to live into their 60s. For most rulers, living to 70 was unattainable, and commoners fared far worse.

The average European life expectancy in the 11th century hovered around 25 years, driven down by staggering child mortality. Historian Richard Hoffmann notes that of 1,000 children who survived infancy, as many as 250 died by age seven. Only between 40 and 70 percent ever reached adolescence. In contrast, life expectancy in Europe today exceeds 80 years.

Nor were feudal peasant lives leisurely. A persistent myth claims medieval peasants worked less than modern people. This misconception stems from an early estimate by historian Gregory Clark, who suggested peasants worked only 150 days annually, an estimate he later revised upward to about 300. That number is higher than today’s 260 working days, even before accounting for paid holidays and vacation. Serfs’ labor was grueling and often damaging to their health. They were legally bound to the land, compelled to work their lord’s fields in addition to their own, and held few rights against mistreatment.

Another common misconception is that feudal societies provided security in exchange for labor. In reality, medieval Europe was marked by frequent famine, war, and violence. Crop failures were devastating, and local lords often demanded their share of harvests regardless of whether peasants had enough left to survive. Raids and small-scale wars were constant features of life, and the people at the bottom had little protection when armies swept through their fields. Unlike citizens in modern states who benefit from the rule of law and relatively impartial modern justice system, peasants depended on their lords for protection but had no meaningful recourse when those same lords were the source of oppression. For most peasants, daily life combined backbreaking labor with exposure to hunger, violence, and disease, far from the idyllic stability sometimes imagined today. (I explore these harsh realities in my forthcoming book, The Grim Old Days: An Introduction to the Preindustrial Past).

In Russia, where serfdom endured until 1861, abuse could be extreme. Serfs were frequently beaten or killed without legal consequence. The notorious case of Darya Saltykova, who tortured more than 100 of her serfs to death, was unusual only in that she faced punishment.

Material conditions were equally bleak. In 1300, the United Kingdom’s average income was about $1,657 in today’s dollars. That represented one of the wealthiest regions in Europe at the time. Even kings lived in poverty by modern standards, while ordinary peasants experienced deprivation that is difficult to imagine today.

When Friedrich Hayek titled his classic The Road to Serfdom, he did not mean it as praise. He used “serfdom” to warn against a return to systems that crushed freedom and prosperity. Carlson’s romantic vision of feudal life bears little resemblance to the historical reality.

Modern economic systems, for all their flaws, have delivered longer lives, safer working conditions, and unprecedented prosperity. The record of feudalism offers no reason to wish for its return.

This article was originally published at LA Progressive on 9/22/2025.

Summary: Trade has been a driving force behind economic growth, poverty reduction, and rising living standards across the globe. Far from harming the poor, open markets have helped lift billions out of extreme poverty while improving health, education, and life expectancy. History and modern evidence alike show that free exchange expands the economic “pie” for everyone, making prosperity the norm rather than the exception.

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In his book The Rational Optimist, the British science writer Matt Ridley argued that economic progress began when people began to trade. “By exchanging,” he explained, “human beings discovered ‘the division of labour,’ the specialisation of efforts and talents for mutual gain… The more human beings diversified as consumers and specialised as producers, and the more they then exchanged, the better off they have been, are and will be.” For Ridley, “exchange is to cultural evolution as sex is to biological evolution.”

The Scottish father of economics, Adam Smith, recognized the economic potential of trade when he noted that “the liberal system of free exportation and free importation” is “not only the best palliative of a dearth, but [also] the most effectual preventative of a famine.”

While economists disagree on several policy issues, trade is generally not one of them. For example, survey data suggest that 95 percent of economists agree that tariffs tend to reduce economic welfare. Another 90 percent do not think the United States should restrict outsourcing.

You’d never know that by listening to today’s political debates. While protectionism is nothing new, the recent rise in anti-trade policies is an unfortunate setback for the United States and for the world.

Far from a rigged game that exploits those at the bottom, the globalization of the market system has brought global extreme poverty to its lowest levels in human history (Figure 1). That is why the Turkish-American Nobel Prize–winning economist Daron Acemoglu and his coauthors have described the creation of the market system as “one of the greatest achievements of humankind.”

Figure 1. Share of global population living in extreme poverty, including and excluding China.

Note: Extreme poverty is defined as living below the International Poverty Line of $2.15 per day. These data are adjusted for inflation and for differences in living costs between countries. These data are expressed in international dollars at 2017 prices. The data relates to income measured after taxes and benefits, or to consumption per capita.

Furthermore, despite claims to the contrary, the United States’ participation in the global economy has significantly benefited American consumers and workers. Real incomes have not stagnated over the past few decades. They’ve risen, including for those at the bottom of the income distribution (Figure 2).

Figure 2. Real median personal income in the United States

Note: Shaded areas indicate US recessions.

Nor has international trade hollowed out American manufacturing. While employment in the sector has declined as a result of automation and productivity gains, manufacturing output—especially output per worker—has increased.

As Michael Strain from the American Enterprise Institute observes, “America is upwardly mobile, particularly for those nearer the bottom of the income distribution. Incomes aren’t stagnant. Workers do enjoy the fruits of their labor. The argument that life hasn’t improved for typical households in decades borders on the absurd. The game is not rigged. The American Dream is not dead (Figure 3).”

Figure 3. Average real wage at percentiles of the wage distribution

In a 2020 article, I reviewed the scholarship linking trade to economic growth and poverty reduction. Overall, the empirical literature shows that trade reduces poverty predominantly through economic growth. Critics sometimes claim that growth leaves those at the bottom behind. It may improve the average, they say, but only because of large income boosts at the top.

That talking point is simply untrue. Economic freedom, including openness to trade, and growth have been shown to improve incomes across the board. A rising tide truly does lift all boats, not just the yachts of the wealthy. Growth positively touches every tier of the economic ladder. A bigger economic pie means better living standards for everyone involved, making economic growth pro–poor.

The Indian economist Arvind Panagariya has documented trade’s role in the economic success of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea, India, China, and other countries throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Across more than 200 jurisdictions and five decades of data, he found a causal relation between trade and per capita income: the countries that experienced intensive growth always maintained a high and/or expanding trade-to-GDP ratio.

In a new review of the literature, Dartmouth’s Douglas Irwin found the same thing. The empirical research on trade liberalization has been “remarkably consistent” in its conclusion that open trade fosters growth in productivity and, therefore, standards of living (Tables 1 and 2). Tariffs, on the other hand, hold growth, productivity and standards of living back. Previous literature reviews have come to similar conclusions. That is why economists from all sides of the political spectrum come together on trade.

Table 1. Selected studies of trade reform and economic growth.

Despite the populist rhetoric about helping the American workers and consumers, those same workers and consumers end up eating the cost of tariffs in the form of higher prices. The negative effects of protectionism also have a disproportional impact on the poor, who tend to gain the most from trade.

And keep in mind that living standards aren’t just about income. Open market economies have higher adult literacy rates, longer life expectancies, lower infant mortality rates, better environmental stewardship, and greater life satisfaction than closed economies do. As Nobel Prize–winning American economist Robert Lucas wrote, “The consequences for human welfare involved in questions [about economic growth] are simply staggering. Once one starts to think about them, it is hard to think about anything else.”

Table 2. Selected studies of trade reform and industry productivity

Note: TFP = total factor productivity.

Income inequality is a major criticism of an open economy, but, interestingly enough, most studies find no relation between greater economic freedom and income inequality (though the findings are somewhat mixed). It’s worth noting that concerns over income inequality are often concerns over inequality within already rich countries. When it comes to inequality, in other words, it tends to be the global rich arguing with the super global rich (and much of that concern is overblown).

But look at the bigger picture. Overall, globalization has led to both a decline in global poverty and global inequality (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Global income inequality: Gini index, 1820–2020

Note: Global inequality, as measured by the global Gini coefficient, rose from about 0.6 in 1820 to about 0.7 in 1910 and then stabilized around 0.7 between 1910 and 2020. It is still too early to say whether the decline in the global Gini coefficient observed since 2000 will continue.

Income is measured per capita after pension and unemployment insurance transfers and before income and wealth taxes.

According to the 2024 “Economic Freedom of the World” report, the share of income earned by the poorest 10 percent in the most economically free countries is about the same as that of the poorest 10 percent in the least economically free countries. In other words, the income distribution—the slicing of the economic pie—looks the same across countries, no matter the level of economic freedom.

Figure 5. Economic freedom and income share of lowest 10 percent

But the amount of income earned by the poorest 10 percent in the most economically free countries is eighttimes that of the poorest 10 percent and slightly more than the average person in the least economically free countries (Figures 5 and 6). The poor’s portion of the economic pie may be the same across countries, but free countries have bigger pies.

Figure 6. Economic freedom and income share of lowest 10 percent

We did not redistribute our way into riches or plunder our way into prosperity. Instead, the historical shifts both institutionally and culturally in favor of a trade economy led to a radical upsurge in material well-being that the American economist Deirdre McCloskey has aptly labeled “The Great Enrichment”:

In the two centuries after 1800 the trade-tested goods and services available to the average person in Sweden or Taiwan rose by a factor of 30 or 100. Not 100 percent, understand—a mere doubling—but in its highest estimate a factor of 100, nearly 10,000 percent, and at least a factor of 30, or 2,900 percent. The Great Enrichment of the past two centuries has dwarfed any of the previous and temporary enrichments.

It’s not that we suddenly figured out how to slice up the economic pie just right. We made the pie 2,900 to 10,000 percent bigger through commercial exchange. When the pie is bigger, there’s more pie to go around. And we’re all richer for it.

Summary: Despite widespread concern about rising inequality, a more complete look at the data reveals a different story: wealth in Western countries has grown more broadly shared than many believe. Rising homeownership, pension savings, and improved living standards suggest that economic growth has benefited the broader population, not just the elite. To promote continued progress, policymakers should focus on expanding opportunity and lifting the bottom.

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Rethinking the Inequality Story

It is easy to get the impression that inequality in Western societies is out of control. Media and social platforms tell us that billionaires are soaring ever higher while the middle class is disappearing and democracy is under threat. These concerns feel real, especially with expensive housing, rising tech fortunes, and gaps in public services exposed during the pandemic.

But these narratives often rely on narrow or incomplete data. When we consider all the pieces—taxes, transfers, pension rights, homeownership, and people’s changing income over their lifetimes—the picture is more balanced. Western societies are not as unequal as many fear.

This doesn’t mean we should ignore inequality. Some people still live in deep poverty, and extreme concentrations of wealth can distort both markets and politics. But to shape the right policies, we must start with the right facts. Mistaken beliefs lead to harmful solutions—like high wealth taxes and bloated public sectors that risk doing more harm than good.

Instead, we should aim to grow the economic pie while ensuring that its benefits are widely shared. The best way to do this is by lifting the bottom—helping more people build personal wealth and take part in prosperity.

What the Numbers Really Show

The most famous story about inequality comes from economist Thomas Piketty’s “U-shaped curve”: inequality was very high in the early 1900s, dropped after the World Wars, and then rose again after the 1980s. It seems backed by the rise of tech billionaires, stagnant wages for many, and the top one percent’s growing share of pretax income.

But Piketty’s view leaves out several important things. Starting in 1980 is actually misleading. That was a time of unusually low inequality, due to high taxes and strict rules that discouraged risk-taking. Compared to the early 20th century, today’s inequality is far lower. The previous narrative mostly ignores taxes and welfare. Looking only at pretax income misses how taxes and public spending reduce inequality—especially in healthcare, education, and pensions. Finally, it misreads wealth data. Many studies overlook middle-class assets like home equity and pension savings, which are huge stores of personal wealth.

More complete data paints a different picture. Economists Gerald Auten and David Splinter, for example, show that when you account for unreported income, retirement savings, and government benefits, income inequality in the U.S. has barely changed since 1960. And in Europe, the trend is even flatter.

Mass Wealth, Not Mass Disparity

A closer look at household wealth shows some surprising results.

Firstly, private wealth has risen sharply across the West since 1950. But importantly, this growth has been shared. Most wealth is now held in homes and retirement accounts—not in elite corporate shares. Today, 60–70% of households in Western countries own their homes, and most workers have pension savings in funds that track the stock market. This is financial democratization.

Secondly, wealth is less concentrated. In Europe, the richest 1% now hold only about one-third of the wealth share they had in 1910. In the U.S., there has been an uptick since the 1970s, but even there, wealth concentration is closer to its 1960s level than to the early 20th century. The most recent data show that U.S. wealth inequality has actually fallen slightly since the mid-2010s. Thus, the main story is not growing inequality, but growing ownership.

Thirdly, mobility matters. People move between income brackets over their lifetimes. Many in the bottom 10% today won’t stay there long, and some at the top may fall due to job losses or market changes. Also, pension rights and welfare reduce inequality further. For instance, in Sweden, counting public pensions cuts measured wealth inequality nearly in half. In the U.S., if we add Social Security and employer-provided health insurance, middle-class living standards look far better than raw income data shows.

Success at the Top Can Lift Everyone

Some worry that billionaire success is a sign that the system is rigged. But often, these fortunes reflect broad economic growth. Tech giants, for instance, didn’t just enrich their founders—they created jobs, boosted productivity, and expanded the tax base.

Since 1980, life expectancy in advanced economies has increased by six years. High school completion has become nearly universal. Goods once considered luxuries—like personal computers—are now common. These are signs of a system that has lifted the bottom even as some at the top thrived.

Growth matters not just for individuals, but for public finances. Every percentage point added to GDP generates billions in tax revenue. That supports schools, hospitals, and infrastructure. Policymakers should focus on policies that both grow the pie and spread its gains—such as promoting homeownership, making retirement saving easy and cheap, and keeping financial markets open and competitive.

Smarter Taxation and Sensible Policy

Some are now calling for new taxes on wealth, including proposals discussed by the G-20 and the UN. But these taxes are problematic. They often fall on assets that are hard to sell, like private businesses or farms, forcing owners to take on debt or sell prematurely. In Scandinavia, wealth taxes were tried and largely abandoned—they raised little money, were expensive to manage, and drove capital abroad.

A less worse, though far from ideal way to tax capital is through its income: dividends, capital gains, and corporate profits. This approach is more efficient, and it doesn’t punish people for owning assets.

Don’t Misdiagnose the Problem

Focusing too much on inequality can distract from real challenges: slow productivity growth, aging populations, and the costs of adapting to climate change. These issues will require investment and innovation—both of which depend on a healthy private sector.

Overreacting to inequality can also be regressive. Taxing housing wealth, for example, may hit retirees who are rich in assets but poor in cash. Heavy taxes on small businesses might force them to sell to multinational corporations with easier access to credit.

Mistrust also grows when people are told that only the elite benefit from capitalism—even when their own lives are improving. That opens the door to populist promises that often worsen the situation.

A Balanced Agenda for the Future

I believe that unchecked wealth concentration can hurt democracy. But the solution is not to attack wealth itself. It’s to build systems that let more people share in success.

Governments should:

• Support entrepreneurship by cutting red tape
• Keep labor taxes low to encourage work and saving
• Focus public spending on giving people the tools to succeed—especially through education and infrastructure
• Make it easier for households to build personal wealth

This is not a call for total laissez-faire nor for extreme equality. It is a recognition that the most important achievement of Western economies is the broad rise in living standards—not the fortunes of a few billionaires, but the everyday comfort of millions whose grandparents lived without antibiotics, central heating, or higher education.

Before declaring a crisis, policymakers should double-check the data. And they should keep doing what works: protecting markets, encouraging wealth-building, and lifting the bottom.

“The National Statistics Office recently published data revealing that Georgia saw a significant decline in poverty in 2024, with the national absolute poverty rate dropping to 9.4%, down 2.4 percentage points from the previous year.”

From Georgia Today.