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01 / 05
Despite Climate Change, Today Is the Best Time to Be Born

Blog Post | Economic Growth

Despite Climate Change, Today Is the Best Time to Be Born

Economic growth will ensure an abundant future.

Summary: Given the choice to be born in 1924, 1974, or 2024, the present moment stands out as the most promising and hopeful era, despite widespread climate anxiety. Advances in technology, healthcare, and economic development have dramatically improved living standards, making now the best time in history to begin a life.


Imagine you could choose a moment to be born, and you were offered three options: a century ago, half a century ago or right now. Let’s assume that, behind your veil of ignorance, you don’t know in advance where on Earth you’ll end up—just when. Which era would you choose? Of course, the thought experiment is not entirely fair, because we already know how the last century unfolded. But still, which year looks like the most auspicious and hopeful one in which to draw your first breath: 1924, 1974 or 2024?

If you were to ask the tens of thousands of activists that are protesting on the streetsgluing themselves to highwaysblocking roads and staging die-ins, I doubt that 2024 would be the most frequently picked answer. According to the founder of environmental activist group Extinction Rebellion, climate change will lead to the “slaughter, death, and starvation of 6 billion people this century.” According to Just Stop Oil, the climate group behind many disruptive actions making news headlines, any further exploration of oil and gas will amount to “genocide” and the “starvation and the slaughter of billions,” and will “condemn humanity to oblivion.” Four in 10 Americans believe that global warming will likely lead to human extinction. Not surprisingly, a quarter of childless adults cite climate change as part of their motivation for not having children. After all, what’s the point of having children if you can’t give them a liveable future? As one young woman put it: “I feel like I can’t in good conscience bring a child into this world and force them to try and survive what may be apocalyptic conditions.”

Better than You Think

Before we consider the future of our climate, let’s get some perspective. Here’s a not unimportant consideration should you contemplate having a baby: What are its chances of dying? Fifty years ago, in 1973, the global child mortality rate was three-and-a-half times higher than today (three times, even in the U.S.), and in 1923, it was almost nine times higher. The distant past was even worse. For all of human history up until the Industrial Revolution, at least three in 10 children died before reaching their fifth birthday. In the past half-century, extreme poverty has also been slashed, for the first time in history: While nine out of 10 people were extremely poor before the Industrial Revolution, today the proportions are inverted: Fewer than one in 10 falls below the absolute poverty level. In almost every respect, the world is a much better place to be born right now than at any previous time in history.

So far, so good. But of course, all of this still leaves open the possibility that our hard-won progress will soon be swept away by catastrophic global warming. Progress is not something that is mandated by the laws of nature, and there is no guarantee that it will continue indefinitely in the future. And yet, such a catastrophe is extremely unlikely. In fact, it is doubtful whether any of our recent victories over poverty and child mortality will be lost again, let alone slide back to the levels of 1973 or 1923. The opening line of David Wallace-Wells’ “The Uninhabitable Earth,” the most-read essay in the history of New York magazine, reads as follows: “It is, I promise, worse than you think” (in his subsequent book, he ups the ante, writing that it’s “worse, much worse” than you think). However, if you’re like most people—eight in 10 consider climate change a “catastrophic risk”—the reality about global warming is in fact much better than you think. If you have consumed an unhealthy dose of doom porn about the climate, you have likely ended up with a view of the future that is much more bleak and terrifying than what is scientifically plausible. In fact, I hope to convince you that this the greatest time in human history to be born. We ought to face the future with abundant optimism—thanks to science and human ingenuity.

Predicting the Future

It’s hard to make predictions,” quipped the physicist Niels Bohr, “especially about the future.” Scientists are studying a range of climate scenarios, with different emission scenarios and assumptions about the sensitivity of our climate to greenhouse gas emissions. These predictions are continuously honed and improved over time, as we learn more about the behavior of our climate systems and the policies and commitments of various nations.

But here’s a fact that you may never glean from reading climate doomer literature, even though it is also solidly based on the scientific consensus as documented in the successive reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change: A temperature increase of 3 degrees Celsius—slightly more than we expect right now—will most likely reduce global GDP by only a couple of percentage points. That is not an absolute reduction compared to today, mind you, but compared to a hypothetical future without climate change: In all likelihood, our prosperity will keep growing and child mortality will keep falling, just by a bit less than in a counterfactual world without global warming.

But how can this be? Predicting the future of our global climate system is one of the most impressive scientific achievements of our time, but that by itself tells us precious little about how human societies will respond and adapt. Complicated though our climate system may be, and with all due respect to climatologists, human societies are far more complicated and less predictable. If we want to know how much damage climate change will cause—and whether it will be better or worse than you think—we should first and foremost listen not to climatologists, but to climate economists.

The main reason why climate economists expect that the negative effects of climate change will be overwhelmed by positive developments is human ingenuity. Our species has always developed smart solutions to protect us against the natural elements, populating many regions on Earth that would be “uninhabitable” without technology, but especially over the past two centuries, our mastery over nature has achieved spectacular successes. The best illustration is the one that is on every climate catastrophist’s mind: natural disasters. Despite what everyone believes and what every sensationalist news headline is telling you, global deaths per million people due to natural disasters have fallen by a factor of 100 over the past century. Mother Nature has become more violent and capricious in recent years (at least when it comes to hurricanes and floods, though not to earthquakes or volcanic eruptions), but that makes our achievement all the more impressive.

If you compare different countries and time periods, you will find time and again that the very best protection against natural disasters—whether caused by global warming or not—is economic growth and development. Material and economic progress is what allows us to build dikes, sturdy houses, hospitals and hurricane shelters, install air-conditioning and tsunami alarms and build infrastructure for early warning and evacuation.

On the remaining occasions when the news reports a flood or hurricane that has caused tens of thousands of casualties, the explanation is almost always poverty and, thus, lack of resilience. For rich and resilient countries, a heat wave or hurricane is usually little more than an inconvenience or manageable nuisance at worst, but for poor countries it can mean starvation, homelessness and death on a massive scale. In 2010, a 7.0 magnitude earthquake in Haiti killed more than 220,000 people. Six weeks later, Chile was rocked by an earthquake that released 500 times more energy than the one in Haiti. The Chilean quake resulted in 500 casualties—still tragic, but a fraction of the Haitian death toll. The main difference? Haiti is one of the poorest countries on the planet, while Chile is now a high-income country. As soon as Haiti becomes rich and prosperous—and we should urgently help it do so—it will become as resilient against nature as we are (this, incidentally, is one of many reasons why we should never allow advocates of “degrowth” anywhere near the levers of political power).

Status Quo Bias

The enormous benefits of economic growth have been on full display for two centuries, but because human ingenuity and technological innovation are inherently unpredictable, the climate debate suffers from a persistent status quo bias—the tacit or explicit assumption that human societies will just passively suffer rising sea levels, intensifying heat waves and extreme droughts, stuck at our current level of wealth and technology. But consider that even today, millions of people are living in regions that would be “uninhabitable” without modern technologies like air-conditioning, irrigation and dikes. Much of California, for example, was “arid beyond habitability” before visionary engineers turned all that inhospitable wasteland into “one of the world’s most vibrant economies.” When the founding father of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, was asked what enabled the economic miracle of the tropical city-state (its GDP per capita is 65% higher than the U.S.’s), his answer was simple: modern air-conditioning. Even in the U.S., cities like Phoenix or Las Vegas would be virtually uninhabitable without artificial cooling.

The immense benefits of human innovation are just as apparent at the opposite end of the temperature scale: Four million people currently live above the Arctic Circle, where winter temperatures can kill any human being without sufficient protective technology—from clothes to insulation—within an hour. In 2021, The Lancet published a studythe first overview of the global mortality burden of extreme temperatures—showing that extreme cold still kills nine times as many people as extreme heat, and that the region with the largest rate of cold-related deaths is … sub-Saharan Africa. That sounds bizarre, but it drives home the overwhelming importance of adaptation: Sub-Saharan Africa is the poorest region on the planet, which makes it more vulnerable to cold even than rich countries in the Arctic North, even though Africa is of course much warmer overall.

Another popular source of climate catastrophism stemming from the status quo bias is food production. Will rising temperatures, increasing droughts and weather extremes lead to simultaneous harvest failures, and even to “billions of deaths,” as Extinction Rebellion and Just Stop Oil claim? Here again, it is beyond dispute that climate change will cause some damage to food production systems, at least in some regions, compared to a world without climate change (though it will definitely also benefit some regions). But in any tug-of-war between the climate and human ingenuity, you would be well advised to bet on the latter. In the past half-century, artificial fertilizer, irrigation, genetic modification and mechanized harvesting have made agriculture far more resilient against weather extremes, quadrupling global food production even as the Earth was warming by 1.2 degrees Celsius. Thanks to the globalization of our food system, famines are now mostly a thing of the past, and the only ones that remain are caused by political conflict and mismanagement.

It is extremely unlikely that rising crop yields will suddenly start falling, because there is still tremendous room for improvement, especially in developing countries. If you take into account all the factors affecting the future of food, the (real) negative impact of global warming will in all likelihood be completely swamped by technological progress. A study from the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations forecasts that global food production will increase by another 30% by 2050, after taking into account climate change. According to a meta-analysis in Nature, by 2050 average caloric intake is expected to increase, and undernourishment to decrease, at all socioeconomic levels.

And bear in mind that such projections still rely on conservative assumptions, not accounting for game-changing technologies like precision fermentationcontrolled-environment agriculture and lab-grown meat, which have the potential to make food production completely independent of outside weather conditions. There is simply no mainstream model in climate economics that predicts an absolute rise in hunger and malnourishment, let alone a return to the levels of starvation from a century ago.

Misleading “Tipping Points”

But what about the potential of “tipping points”—the positive feedback loops in our climate system that could suddenly trigger catastrophic warming, and which understandably loom large in the imagination of climate catastrophists? As our understanding of the global climate is improving, the list of these theoretical tipping points is changing over time, with some falling off the list and others being added. Notable tipping points include the thawing of Arctic permafrost (releasing huge quantities of methane), the collapse of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, or the dieback of boreal forests. While tipping points evoke the image of teetering on the balance of a ravine and suddenly slipping off, the concept has a more restricted or technical definition (or range of definitions)—namely a nonlinear process that becomes self-reinforcing after being pushed beyond some point, even if the original cause ceases to operate.

It is, in fact, misleading to portray such tipping points as abrupt or sudden. Many theoretical tipping points are only “sudden” on a geological time scale and would take decades, centuries or even millennia to unfold (even a millennium is still a blink in the eye of geologists). In its sixth assessment report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change writes that “there is no evidence of abrupt change in climate projections of global temperature for the next century.” What compounds the confusion is that tipping points are often confused with the political thresholds of 1.5 or 2 degrees of warming, as written down in the Paris agreement. This has given rise to unscientific deadline-ism, where climate hucksters say the game for humanity is over once we reach 1.5 degrees Celsius of warming. But the risk of reaching specific tipping points increases with every increment of warming. For some of them, we might already be entering the danger zone, while other tipping points are only expected to occur at around 4 or 5 degrees of warming (with large margins of uncertainty).

For all these reasons, climate scientists such as Seaver Wang have argued that we should discard the concept of tipping points altogether—not because there’s no such thing as a “tipping point,” suitably defined, but because the metaphor speaks to a popular but inaccurate understanding that “the climate system is on the verge of very unstable, self-reinforcing, and abruptly rapid disaster.” Even climate scientists who don’t agree with Wang should make clear to the public that a “tipping point” should not be equated with some irreversible point-of-no-return or “game over” situation. That’s because, again, no matter how accurate your model of the climate system is, it cannot predict the evolution of human ingenuity and adaptation. Even speculative projections of extreme climate scenarios with multiple dramatic tipping points provide no basis for confident predictions about “billions of deaths” or “collective suicide.”

Why So Gloomy?

More and more climate scientists are starting to push back against excessive doomism and especially defeatism about the climate, but frankly, they should shoulder some of the blame for misleading the public. For years, serious scientific publications have tended to focus on the most dramatic predictions and outlier scenarios. The most extreme one (known to insiders as “RCP 8.5”) imagined a century-long frenzied global coal orgy that was never even remotely plausible, but that was nonetheless often misleadingly represented as “business as usual.”

If such a dramatic rise in coal consumption was ever in the cards, we now know it’s a complete fantasy. Electric cars are finally going mainstream, coal is being replaced by much cleaner natural gas, solar panels and batteries have achieved spectacular cost reductions and many countries are reconsidering their distaste for nuclear energy. Most importantly, dozens of countries are now achieving absolute decoupling of carbon dioxide and economic growth: Their economies are still growing, but their emissions are steadily going downward. Just a decade ago, the world was still on course for 4 or 5 degrees of warming, but thanks to our climate efforts we are now heading for “only” 2.6 to 2.9 degrees Celsius—still a worrying prospect indeed, but already dramatically better than before. Even David Wallace-Wells has started to strike a more hopeful tone since he published his catastrophist essay in 2017.

As a recent commentary in Nature argued, climate scientists have often failed to communicate that many dire warnings about damages from climate change refer to the additional risk from climate change in the total balance. But since economic growth and material progress are powerful tides that lift all boats, we should still expect the overall scales to tilt in a positive direction. Poverty and mortality will likely keep falling while wealth will keep increasing—only somewhat less so than in a world without global warming.

Most of all, climate scientists are guilty by omission: Too often, they have remained silent while their work was being distorted in the media, with hysterical warnings about “12 years to save the planet” or “collective suicide.” Perhaps they have turned a blind eye to these alarmist distortions because they believed—understandably but wrongheadedly—that stoking climate fears was necessary to raise public awareness and spur people into action.

But now we have a society that is suffused with climate dread and anxiety, with millions of people thinking that children no longer have a future. Even more importantly, our climate fears are causing real and material damage abroad. Many Western nations and institutions like the World Bank and the European Union have become so terrified of climate change that, pressured by Western nongovernmental organizations, they have resolved to choke off any funding to fossil fuel projects abroad, even in poor nations that direly need it. In effect, they think that climate change will be so catastrophic for future people that it trumps everything else, including economic development of poor people alive today. This is the “height of injustice,” as another commentary in Nature put it. Or in the words of the vice-president of Nigeria in Foreign Affairs: “A just global energy transition cannot deny African people their right to a more prosperous future.”

The Best Moment in History

Let’s think back to our thought experiment. When would you prefer to be born? Anthropogenic climate change is a serious global challenge, but this is not the first time humanity has had to deal with one of those. Fifty years ago, people were not worried about rising temperatures, but other global threats instilled fears and apocalyptic predictions, including deadly ultraviolet radiation (because of the growing hole in the ozone layer), mass famine (because of overpopulation) and catastrophic pollution of air and water (because of industrialization and overpopulation). If these threats no longer hold sway over our imagination, that’s because they have been pretty much solved since then, at least in rich countries, through ingenious innovations and without sacrificing our standards of living.

It’s true that, as global challenges go, phasing out chlorofluorocarbons in spray cans and refrigerators is a piece of cake compared to phasing out fossil fuels, which permeate our whole economy and have a gazillion useful applications. But then again, our starting position is much stronger than ever before in history, because our resilience and resourcefulness have never been greater and will continue to grow. If you doubt the ethics of putting a new life on the planet in the year 2024, you should realize that by that standard, it has never ever been ethical to make a baby, anywhere. Bringing a life into the world has always been an act of hope, often against all odds.

But now that we have finally escaped from thousands of years of drudgery and suffering and entered an age of abundance, it would be bizarrely self-indulgent to imagine that today, of all times, is the wrong moment to be born. The words spoken by Barack Obama in 2016 still ring true today, no matter how bad climate change might turn out to be: “If you had to choose one moment in history in which you could be born, and you didn’t know ahead of time who you were going to be, you’d choose right now.” Though we can only ever see the future through a glass darkly, even with our best scientific models, the year 2024 promises to be the best moment in history (thus far) to bring a child into the world.

This article was published in Discourse Magazine on 1/13/2024.

Blog Post | Population Growth

No, Prosperity Doesn’t Cause Population Collapse

Wealth doesn’t have to mean demographic decline.

Summary: For decades, experts assumed that rising prosperity inevitably led to falling birth rates, fueling concerns about population collapse in wealthy societies. But new data show that this link is weakening or even reversing, with many high-income countries now seeing higher fertility than some middle-income nations. As research reveals that wealth and fertility can rise together, policymakers have an opportunity to rethink outdated assumptions about tradeoffs between prosperity and demographic decline.


For years, it was treated as a demographic law: as countries grow wealthier, they have fewer children. Prosperity, it was believed, inevitably drove birth rates down. This assumption shaped countless forecasts about the future of the global population.

And in many wealthy countries, such as South Korea and Italy, very low fertility rates persist. But a growing body of research is challenging the idea that rising prosperity always suppresses fertility.

University of Pennsylvania economist Jesús Fernández-Villaverde recently observed that middle-income countries are now experiencing lower total fertility rates than many advanced economies ever have. His latest work shows that Thailand and Colombia each have fertility rates around 1.0 births per woman, which is even lower than rates in well-known low-fertility advanced economies such as Japan, Spain and Italy.

“My conjecture is that by 2060 or so, we might see rich economies as a group with higher [total fertility rates] than emerging economies,” Fernández-Villaverde predicts.

This changing relationship between prosperity and fertility is already apparent in Europe. For many years, wealthier European countries tended to have lower birth rates than poorer ones. That pattern weakened around 2017, and by 2021 it had flipped.

This change fits a broader historical pattern. Before the Industrial Revolution, wealthier families generally had more children. The idea that prosperity leads to smaller families is a modern development. Now, in many advanced economies, that trend is weakening or reversing. The way that prosperity influences fertility is changing yet again. Wealth and family size are no longer pulling in opposite directions.

This shift also calls into question long-standing assumptions about women’s income and fertility. For years, many economists thought that higher salaries discouraged women from having children by raising the opportunity cost of taking time off work. That no longer seems to hold in many countries.

In several high-income nations, rising female earnings are now associated with higher fertility. Studies in Italy and the Netherlands show that couples where both partners earn well are more likely to have children, while low-income couples are the least likely to do so. Similar findings have emerged from Sweden as well. In Norway, too, higher-earning women now tend to have more babies.

This trend is not limited to Europe. In the United States, richer families are also beginning to have more babies than poorer ones, reversing patterns observed in previous decades. A study of seven countries — including the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Australia — found that in every case, higher incomes for both men and women increased the chances of having a child.

This growing body of evidence challenges the assumption that prosperity causes people to have fewer children. 

Still, birth rates are falling across much of the world, with many countries now below replacement level. While this trend raises serious concerns, such as the risk of an aging and less innovative population and widening gaps in public pension solvency, it is heartening that it is not driven by prosperity itself. Wealth does not automatically lead to fewer children, and theories blaming consumerism or rising living standards no longer hold up.

Although the recent shift in the relationship between prosperity and fertility is welcome, it is not yet enough to raise fertility to the replacement rate of around 2.1 children per woman — a challenging threshold to reach.

But the growing number of policymakers around the world concerned about falling fertility can consider many simple, freedom-enhancing reforms that lower barriers to raising a family, including reforms to education, housing and childcare. Still, it’s important to challenge the common assumption that prosperity inevitably leads to lower birth rates: Wealth does not always mean fewer children.

This article was published at The Hill on 6/16/2025.

World Bank | Quality of Government

Côte D’Ivoire’s Land Reforms Are Unlocking Jobs and Growth

“Secure land tenure transforms dormant assets into active capital—unlocking access to credit, encouraging investment, and spurring entrepreneurship. These are the building blocks of job creation and economic growth.

When landowners have secure property rights, they invest more in their land. Existing data shows that with secure property rights, agricultural output increases by 40% on average. Efficient land rental markets also significantly boost productivity, with up to 60% productivity gains and 25% welfare improvements for tenants…

Building on a long-term partnership with the World Bank, the Government of Côte d’Ivoire has dramatically accelerated delivery of formal land records to customary landholders in rural areas by implementing legal, regulatory, and institutional reforms and digitizing the customary rural land registration process, which is led by the Rural Land Agency (Agence Foncière Rurale – AFOR).

This has enabled a five-fold increase in the number of land certificates delivered in just five years compared to the previous 20 years.”

From World Bank.

Blog Post | Economic Growth

Progress, Classical Liberalism, and the New Right | Podcast Highlights

Marian Tupy interviews Tyler Cowen about the New Right, the relationship between freedom and progress, and whether classical liberalism is equipped to meet today's political challenges.

Listen to the podcast or read the full transcript here.

Tyler recently wrote a Free Press article titled “Is Classical Liberalism for Losers?” I’m delighted that he agreed to discuss it with me today.

Let’s start with the basics. What is classical liberalism?

Everyone has a different definition. I can tell you mine. If you believe in capitalism, limited government, free trade, sound money, free speech, toleration, and want to do your best to bring about peace, I would consider you a classical liberal.

Now, which of those get emphasized and to what degree? You’ll find differences of opinion.

What distinguishes classical liberals from conservatives and American liberalism?

These words can be so confusing. When I hear the phrase “American liberalism,” I think of a turn that happened in the 1930s with the New Deal and somewhat earlier with the progressive movement, where people who were broadly liberal fell in love with the idea of expanding government as an alternative means of realizing liberal ends. American liberals and classic liberals have a fair amount in common. They both believe in democracy and some form of capitalism. But American liberalism has much more faith in government, does less public choice analysis, and is less suspicious of concentrated power.

Conservatism used to be simpler than it is today. We’re now in the age of Trump, who I would say is not conservative at all. The conservatism I grew up with was religious. It was socially conservative, with particular views on abortion, gay marriage, and social norms, and it often wanted to use the government to enforce those norms. Furthermore, it tended to be hawkish on foreign policy. Now, it’s all so muddled. I’m not sure who it is I should call a conservative. In many ways, the people I used to call American liberals have become the new conservatives. They want to bring us back to what America was under Obama and undo some of these recent Trump revolutions.

What about practical differences? For example, in your article, you note the different way in which classical liberals and non-classical liberals perceive the use of force and the power of the state.

Classical liberals recognize that some government coercion is necessary to enforce property rights and finance some number of public goods. You can debate what those goods are, but there’s going to be some coercion. You’re just very suspicious of that coercion, and you want to keep it to a minimum because you think it corrupts both individuals and institutions.

So classical liberals are not comfortable wielding power, but don’t classical liberals need a strategy to dismantle the administrative state or greatly reduce its power? Otherwise, classical liberal efforts in politics will always be ineffective.

Well, first, the word strategy always makes me nervous. The notion of an aggregate strategy in the sense that maybe the Democratic or Republican party would have one is a mistake. The classical liberal vision has never been, well, we’ll keep on electing our governments for 20 years in a row, and by the end of the 20 years, they’ll have made all the changes we want. Frankly, I don’t think that’s realistic. In history, there are these periodic classically liberal moments. The American Revolution and the collapse of communism would be two of the most visible. They come along every now and then, and they achieve tremendous good when they happen. They’re motivated by classically liberal ideas, but they’re not some kind of continual rule where you just push everything you want through by force. Every now and then, you get your way, and I’m prepared to live with that. I don’t think we’re going to do any better. But still, those revolutions, like the abolition of slavery, can do so much good. We should just totally be on board with trying to bring them about.

Classical liberalism and the industrial revolution seem to be coterminous over the last 250 years. How much of a credit do you give to classical liberalism for the Great Enrichment?

Quite a bit.

Look at the recent example of Poland. It was very poor when communism fell. Now, it’s approaching the living standards of England. It will bypass Japan in a year or two if trends continue. It’s not exactly classical liberal, but it kept capitalism and trade, and it’s part of the EU. Ireland, when I was a kid, was thought of as a third-world country. In some sense, it was. Now, it’s a stable democracy at Western European living standards. What’s making it work is this mix of capitalism, democracy, and toleration.

We must also explain the mechanism through which classical liberalism in economics produces prosperity. Is it simply that classical liberalism gives people the freedom to do what they please with their lives?

While that’s broadly true, I’m not satisfied.

If you look at Latin America, which has seen a lot of liberalization, there’s still some way in which they have failed to solve their human capital problems. I’m not saying I blame classical liberalism for that, but I’m also not sure liberalism has solved that problem. It’s partly social. It has something to do with family relations and family structure. Some East Asian economies that were more interventionist did very well on that problem, but Mexico hasn’t, even though Mexico, in some dimensions, had a smaller government. So, there’s this other element, you could call it culture, family, or society, where you’ll do much better if you have the right cards in your hand.

There are alternative explanations for the Great Enrichment out there. For example, you have somebody like Gregory Clark, who emphasizes the importance of higher IQ amongst the upper classes in England. You have Joe Henrich, who discusses the role of the Catholic Church in banning cousin marriage and basically creating the nuclear family. You have Max Weber and the Protestant work ethic. Why not those other explanations? Why classical liberalism?

Well, I have particular opinions about each of those. On Greg Clark and IQ, I’m simply not convinced by his data. If you look at England today, especially northern England, it seems somewhat below average in conscientiousness. Where did all those genes go? Did they all go to the United States? I’m not sure.

However, I don’t think it’s correct to say classical liberalism is at the root of the success. If anything, classical liberalism was a result of earlier successes. It was a kind of luxury good that people figured out once they got a bit wealthier and a bit more educated.

There’s something fundamental that happened in England that started being measurable between 1620 and 1640 before classical liberalism was that big. It’s some mix of relatively free labor markets, protection from outside invaders, a strong enough nation-state, enough market incentives, something else cultural, hard to put our finger on, and they just got some economic growth that didn’t stop. They get a scientific revolution. And then intellectually, they do great things with that. Classical liberalism is part of the intellectual explosion from the scientific revolution. But the economic growth predates it, in my opinion.

Let’s bring it back to the United States and talk about the techno-optimist titans of Silicon Valley who have risen to prominence over the last few years. Are they classical liberals? And why do you think they have moved from their previously held center-left position?

Well, they’re generally very eclectic thinkers. I’m not sure they were ever center-left in the traditional sense. I think just being in California and having to live under the reign of the woke led to an intellectual rebellion. But I don’t think there’s any easy categorization of where they have ended up as a group. As a group of people, if I had to generalize, they simply change their minds a lot based on data. It’s mostly a good thing. I’m not sure many will ever be classically liberal with capital C and capital L, but they’ve all been exposed to classical liberal ideas and have learned a lot from them.

Many classical liberals are wondering if the cooperation of the Silicon Valley titans with the Trump administration will lead to greater rent-seeking or move society toward greater freedom. What is your impression?

In general, sincerity is underrated as a political motive. However, if you’re asking me to predict what we will actually get from the Trump administration, in some key areas, we will get more freedom. We will also have more corruption and rent-seeking. We’re going to get the bundle of both.

Increasingly, both left and right deny that we Americans are better off today than in the past. Conservatives point to the 1950s, while progressives point to the 1970s as the golden age. Are they right?

No. They’re just wrong. I lived in the 1970s; it was fun, but it was much worse than today. There’s no serious comparison. And I don’t just mean life expectancy, but actual crime rates, what you could afford to buy, how much you could travel. Again, it’s not close.

Let’s assume that we are right that life in America today is much better than it was. We still have to explain why the public perception is so negative.

My thinking is that people prioritize bad news, and we are living in a hyper-competitive news environment. If you want to grab those eyeballs, you have to offer them the worst possible news first. Do you agree?

I agree with that, but I would add that there are a bunch of things that have gotten worse. Deaths from addiction have been rising substantially for quite a while. Teenage mental health is harder to measure, but I suspect it’s worse than it was, say, 20 years ago. A lot of what we build is uglier than in the earlier part of the 20th century. So, some of the negative impressions are true. I just think it’s easier to focus on the bad things than the good ones.

If the news cycle continuously delivers bad news and ignores the good news, is that a market failure? Or is it simply a reflection of human nature?

People often want to read about the bad as a kind of talisman so that they feel protected and that their expectations cannot be dashed on the rocks. Individually, that might be rational, but collectively, the result is people are too pessimistic about their society.

If you write a book saying things are fine, it’s not going to be a best-seller, even if you’re correct. One reason why is that when people have something good, they become anxious because they’re afraid of losing it. So, the way they protect themselves psychologically from that fear is to anticipate that loss and play it out in their minds. Then they feel they’ve done what they can to protect against it. They use things like books and clicking on media stories as a way of producing those psychological defenses.

Critics say that classical liberals are temperamentally incapable of putting up much of a fight when faced with threats from the far left. How do you answer that criticism?

The far left does not rule many countries. There are plenty of things they do in media and academia that are bad, but the American center has done pretty well against the far left. I don’t like a lot of what the far left has done, but it’s not like they’ve taken over everything. It’s just this Trumpian talking point to justify using power to restructure society and the economy toward their own ends. It’s not nearly as bad as those people would have you believe.

It was very interesting that the right in the United States had a complete meltdown right at the time when they were beginning to get some serious successes in public policy, such as, for example, a reversal on Roe v. Wade, a greater degree of educational freedom, and so forth.

Yeah, there’s this tendency on the right to tell people that Harvard is totally corrupt and worthless, and we could just destroy it, and nothing would be lost. I would say that many of the charges against Harvard are correct, but at the end of the day, there’s tremendous value coming out of Harvard, and you don’t want to wreck that.

The current right is not able to bring itself to that point. They’ve talked each other into a state of negative emotional fervor. There’s just this massive collective cognitive defect. You see it also with vaccines. They just all have to be so terrible. They’re killing all these people through heart conditions when we know scientifically that Covid is more dangerous for your heart than the vaccines are. It’s the same pattern again and again. It’s destructive politically and even personally. You see a lot of people on the right driving themselves crazy with these different worries. And often, there is something to the worry, but they just go off the deep end with it.

Is the future of American universities Hillsdale College, meaning not taking any government money? It seems to me that so long as Harvard and other universities take government money, they will be subject to political pressure. That cat is out of the bag.

I don’t think there’s room for many Hillsdale colleges. If you have a small number, they can raise a lot of money on the grounds that they don’t take government money, and I’m all for that. That’s a great business model. But you can’t have 50 schools doing the same thing. There are not enough right-wing donors to go around. So, I think the current model of Harvard will remain. Harvard and other such schools will just be tortured for decades to come, and they’ll be less effective, and their energies and attention will be drained. And that’s all unfortunate. I don’t favor torturing them, but I do recognize that, in large part, they’ve brought it on themselves by viewing themselves as an agent of political change.

Another criticism levied against classical liberals is that liberalism is so free, so open, and so tolerant that it is vulnerable to people who seek to destroy it. How should classical liberals deal with people who refuse to play by civilized rules?

Freedom does mean that Marxists and Kanye West will have freedom of speech. You’ve got to deal with that. You’re not going to get more of what you want by trying to ban those people; it will be used against you. So, there’s this perpetual struggle for more liberty or less liberty. I’m mostly optimistic. I worry about a major war coming to the world, but if that does not happen, the chances are quite good that we will end up as a somewhat freer society over the next several decades.

If you live, for example, in Britain and you encounter men marching through the streets calling for Sharia or advocating for the slaughter of the Jews, is there a space for more than just offering better arguments? In other words, are we destined to live with people who, if they gained power, would bring out the end of the freedoms we cherish?

Well, ethnic enclaves, in some instances, can be quite harmful. I sometimes say the problem with Northern England is it doesn’t have enough suburbs and enough cars. If you have Muslim migrants from, say, Pakistan, put them in the suburbs. It’s what the US has done. We don’t have Pakistani ethnic enclaves. Pakistani per capita income here is quite robust. Assimilation has gone pretty well. I know there are some other differences between the two societies, but this ideal of the European city, where you’re in the center, everything’s walkable, and everyone’s together, can be pretty crummy when you take in a lot of migrants quickly. Northern Virginia is a much better model than, say, Bradford or Birmingham.

Why are Americans so much better at assimilating foreigners than Europeans? Is it the nature of the immigrants themselves, how they are being assimilated, or a combination of the two?

Well, it might be both, but if you take people from India in America, I believe the median household income is $150,000, which would be the highest for any group in human history. The second wealthiest group would be Iranian Americans, who are, I think, in the range of $120,000-$130,000 a year. Some of those are Jews, but mostly they’re Muslims. So it’s selection from within those groups.

Also, the fact that America is more religious than Western Europe actually makes us more hospitable to Muslims. Protestantism and Islam have some funny things in common. And we have freer labor markets. And the US is just a big country where it’s easier to spread out. Suburbs and cars are very healthy things that help people ease their way into a new country. I would say it’s all those factors and more.

Is the fact that we are getting the top of the crop the reason why we are doing better in terms of assimilation?

Well, we’re not always getting the top. There’s a lot of evidence that there’s not, on average, much positive selection from Mexico. We’re getting a typical selection. Many Mexicans have come, and it’s not really the elites who move here; they live in Mexico City. But even then, assimilation has gone reasonably well. It’s been a bigger problem with Central Americans than with Mexicans. So there are a lot of complex factors here, but it seems we do assimilation better even when we don’t have positive selection on our side.

I would also like you to address a criticism of classical liberalism made by Patrick Deneen, who believes that classical liberalism is unsustainable because it depletes the moral and cultural capital it inherited from pre-liberal traditions. So, as classical liberalism progresses, it undermines the very conditions—such as trust, civic virtue, and shared norms—that allow classical liberalism to function in the first place.

What do you think about that?

What’s the evidence? The forms that trust takes always change. We live in a world where you stay in an Airbnb or walk into an Uber and don’t think twice about it. That’s a form of trust. At the same time, the people who live across the street from me, I couldn’t tell you what their names are. I do kind of trust them just because they’re in the neighborhood, but who knows?

If you ask, “Do we see the Western world collapsing because there’s not enough trust?” I don’t see that. I do see a huge problem in our politics, and I don’t know how to fix that, but I also see a lot of ways in which trust keeps on going up.

The Human Progress Podcast | Ep. 62

Tyler Cowen: Progress, Classical Liberalism, and the New Right

Tyler Cowen joins Marian Tupy to discuss the New Right, the relationship between freedom and progress, and whether classical liberalism is equipped to meet today's political challenges.