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01 / 05
China’s Fertility Flip-Flop Shows the Folly of Legislating Family Sizes

Blog Post | Pregnancy & Birth

China’s Fertility Flip-Flop Shows the Folly of Legislating Family Sizes

Keep central planning out of family planning.

Summary: Recent attempts by the Chinese government to encourage higher birth rates have raised concerns about government interference in personal matters. These new measures continue the pattern of authoritarian regimes enforcing coercive family policies. State intervention in family planning has often resulted in human rights abuses. While some policymakers advocate for incentives to boost fertility rates, a cautious approach that prioritizes individual freedom offer a more effective and ethical solution to addressing declining birth rates.


After decades of the disastrous policy of limiting family growth by force, China, according to news reports, is now pestering its women through text messages and social media to have more babies. This meddling by the state, like past coercion, is counterproductive. China should stop telling couples how many children to have. Keep central planning out of family planning, and families will flourish.

Not content to regulate life outside the household, authoritarians have a long history of intervening in family affairs. The Chinese Communist Party’s recent family-policy flip-flop is unsurprising. Throughout history, communist countries have alternated between coercive measures aiming to produce larger families and ones intended to shrink the average family size. China’s one-child policy, for instance, was in force for 36 years (1979–2015).

Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union financially penalized those without children, enacting a so-called “childless tax” that the country enforced from 1941 to 1990 in various degrees. The tax punished childless men between the ages of 20 and 50 and childless women between the ages of 20 and 45. A decree in 1944 expanded the childless tax to also penalize parents who had merely one or two children.

Communist Romania and Poland (post–World War II) implemented similar taxes modeled on the Soviet law. Those taxes, like their inspiration, lasted until the collapse of the USSR bloc in 1991. Nicolae Ceaușescu’s Romania went furthest of all, enacting strict prohibitions on birth control that resulted in a large number of abandoned children whose parents often could not afford to raise them.

The conditions in the communist nation’s overcrowded orphanages — nicknamed “child gulags” — were nightmarish. Yet signs at the inhumane institutions mockingly boasted, “The state can take better care of your child than you can.”

If communists are consistent on one point, it is that the state knows best. Always. Even when it comes to how many children each couple should bring into the world. Where communists have been inconsistent, though, is on whether that number ought to be higher or lower.

Starting in the 1960s and 1970s, it became fashionable among intellectuals around the world to worry about “overpopulation,” a concept that overwhelming evidence has since called into question. The resulting panic had its darkest manifestation in China’s one‐​child policy, which saw more than 300 million Chinese women fitted with intrauterine devices modified to be irremovable without surgery, over 100 million sterilizations, and over 300 million abortions, an unknown share of which were coerced.

China’s official Xinhua News Agency has boasted that the one-child policy prevented 400 million births. “Excess birth” fines could reach up to ten times a family’s annual disposable income.

Revenue-hungry local officials continued to fine families and enforce childbearing limits even after the country loosened its one-child policy to a two-child policy (2016–2021) and then loosened it further into a three-child policy. As China’s officials grew increasingly concerned about the population’s aging and shrinking, the three-child policy was, at last, rendered merely symbolic in 2023.

Yet China’s vast population-planning bureaucracy remains in place and could easily be reoriented toward attempts to coercively engineer the size of the country’s population upward. In a CCP-run paper, some Chinese academics have called for a tax on childlessness.

And China is not alone. Some Russian politicians also would like to reinstate a childless tax (Russia’s leaders have been toying with the idea for more than a decade).

Today, while unfounded overpopulation fears retain popularity in some circles, plummeting global birth rates have led the pendulum of policy-maker opinion to swing toward the idea that the world might benefit from more, rather than fewer, children. The number of countries with “raising fertility” as an explicit policy objective keeps rising.

Thankfully, in most cases such initiatives do not involve coercion. From South Korea to Estonia, various countries have tried offering government subsidies, expensive new state programs, cash bonuses, or similar incentives to encourage their citizens to have larger families. But an overview of past efforts to alter birth rates, whether upward or downward, shows that such efforts have had lackluster results at best and resulted in tragic human-rights abuses at worst.

Rather than pursuing new initiatives that are costly and questionably effective, and risk wading into the territory of social engineering or worse, policy-makers concerned about birth rates should take a “first do no harm” approach to fertility.

As my colleague Vanessa Calder and I outlined in a recent policy paper, removing government rules and regulations that disproportionately affect families would enhance families’ freedom of choice and may reduce the cost of child-rearing enough to boost fertility. In other words, policy-makers can make it easier for parents to form the families they desire by simply stepping back and removing government barriers to fertility and family life.

The state’s thumb shouldn’t be on the scale of intimate family decisions, one way or the other. Reforming policies that artificially make family life harder offers a better way forward. Hopefully, policy-makers in China and elsewhere will come to recognize that.

This article was published in National Review on 1/18/2024.

Blog Post | Economic Freedom

The False History of American Capitalism | Podcast Highlights

Economist Donald Boudreaux joins Marian Tupy to discuss important misconceptions about American economic history and why it’s crucial to set the record straight.

Listen to the podcast or read the full transcript here.

Today, I have with me Don Boudreaux, a professor of economics at George Mason University. He has a new book out, co-authored with the former senator from Texas, Phil Gramm, called The Triumph of Economic Freedom: Debunking the Seven Great Myths of American Capitalism. It’s a fantastic read, full of information and killer arguments.

We’re going to discuss that book today. But first, Don, why is the study of economic history important?

What we think we know about the past determines how we assess the present.

For example, if we think that in the past, a certain monetary policy did this or did that, that’s going to affect how we think monetary policy should be conducted today. So, in order to make good decisions in the present, we have to do our best to understand how various policies worked out in the past. That’s what we try to do in the book.

Let’s jump in and tackle trusts, or as we call them today, monopolies. We often hear about the power of monopolies in today’s America, but let’s go back to the 19th century. What was the trust problem, and what was the solution meant to address?

Some of the first original research I did as a young scholar was looking into the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. I had a colleague, Tom DiLorenzo, who, in 1985, published a wonderful paper on the origins of the Sherman Act, 95 years after its enactment. Astonishingly, no one in that near century-long period had ever bothered to check what had actually happened to the prices and outputs of the industries that were supposedly monopolized. So, Tom looked at these data and adjusted them for deflation—there was a deflationary period from the end of the Civil War until the early 20th century—and found that in the decade leading up to the Sherman Antitrust Act, the prices of the outputs of these allegedly monopolized industries fell faster than prices in the economy as a whole. Likewise, the outputs of these industries rose faster, and in most cases, multiple times faster than the output of the overall economy.

This is inconsistent with the monopoly story. Monopolies are supposed to raise prices, not cut prices. In reality, there was no monopoly problem in the 1880s; there was a competition problem. We had, for the first time, a fully transcontinental economy, thanks to the railroads and the telegraph, and soon thereafter, the telephone. So, a lot of firms could now take advantage of economies of scale. John D. Rockefeller in petroleum refining, Gustavus Swift in meat slaughtering, James Buchanan in tobacco manufacturing, and so on. And these firms did grow large, but “large” is not an appropriate definition of a monopoly. A monopoly is a firm that can suppress competition, raise prices, and suppress output. These firms did the opposite. They grew big, but they grew big precisely by being so efficient that they could lower their prices and expand their output.

Now, whenever this happens, other producers complain. And in the 19th century, the complaints came disproportionately from local butchers and local cattle raisers. Before the railroad and refrigeration, slaughtering took place locally. So, when the first meat packers set up shop in Chicago and began centrally slaughtering livestock and shipping the meat out across the nation by refrigerated railroad car, they destroyed an age-old line of work. These local butchers and independent cattlemen raised hell, and local politicians listened to them, villainized these firms, and attacked them with antitrust statutes.

Frankly, these early antitrust statutes, and the subsequent ones, were not intended to address what was truly perceived as a problem of monopoly. They were aimed at placating disgruntled producers who had been outcompeted by larger, more efficient, and more entrepreneurial rivals.

You mentioned the D word, “destruction.” The destruction of local butchers by big, centralized butchers. Is that a good thing?

Well, economic growth requires that resources move from where they are less productive to where they are more productive, so change is inevitable if you want economic growth.

Some people might naively say, “Well, look, we’ve had enough growth, let’s just stop now,” and try to freeze everything in place. Now, I’m sure almost everyone alive today is very happy that our ancestors did not settle for the level of economic activity that existed when they were alive. You and I would not be talking over Zoom, and web designers would have eight legs.

However, even if we all agreed to settle for our current level of prosperity, we would still need to allow economic change, because some things are beyond human control. Supplies of raw materials can dry up. Natural disasters can destroy factories. So, we always need people to be able to adjust to the facts on the ground. That flexibility, that entrepreneurial alertness and creativity, is inseparable from capitalism. If you try to freeze our economy in its current pattern, you’ll collapse it. We can either continue to move forward and embrace creative destruction, or we can collapse into destitution.

Yeah, that’s fundamental. There are, in Donald Rumsfeld’s famous words, “unknown unknowns,” and we want to be as rich and as technologically sophisticated as possible when those challenges arise.

Okay, on to the big one, the granddaddy of them all, the Great Depression. Can you steelman the anti-market position about what happened in 1929? What went wrong?

Yes. In the 1920s, a fundamental contradiction of capitalism reached its peak. The rich were getting richer relative to the poor, and rich people spend a smaller portion of their incomes than poorer people. By the late 1920s, you had an increasingly unequal distribution of income, and a smaller portion of that income was being spent. As a result, America’s factories were producing more than America’s factories could sell, and a terrible spiral took place. The factories started laying off workers, which further reduced the income of factory workers, who responded by reducing their spending, which further reduced economic output and employment.

All of this happened when Herbert Hoover was president. And as everyone knows, Hoover was a staunch advocate of laissez-faire. He was a do-nothing president. The Depression happened, and Herbert Hoover just sat in the White House and twiddled his thumbs, hoping this recession would go away. Then, of course, it got worse. By 1932 and 1933, unemployment in America hit 25 percent. Fortunately, the American people elected Franklin Roosevelt, who came to office with a whole bunch of really good ideas and smart advisors. They developed the New Deal, a system of relief programs, and we were able to start recovering. Finally, World War II comes along, there’s more government spending, and we get out of the Depression. That’s the myth.

That’s what a lot of American kids learn at school. But I suspect that you don’t quite agree with that interpretation of the Great Depression.

No, I don’t. Let’s start with the easy one: Hoover was not a do-nothing president or an advocate of laissez-faire. Hoover was the president who signed the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act. He created the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Hoover spent at a deficit during every year of his administration. In fact, one of Franklin Roosevelt’s campaign platforms was that Hoover was too big a spender. Hoover’s administration was the first time, really, that any sitting American president did much to combat an economic downturn. So that’s a complete fallacy.

There are other problems too. In the 1920s—and this is from research done by Simon Kuznets, a Nobel Prize-winning, very respectable economist—the distribution of income did not grow more heavily toward upper-income Americans. In fact, it became a little bit flatter in the 1920s. In terms of spending, the mythical theory says that there just wasn’t enough spending to buy what the factories were producing. But if you look at the data on consumer spending in the 1920s, it was off the charts. It was a boom time for Americans.

What actually happened, and here I’m quite conventional, was bad monetary policy. The Fed was created in 1913 to serve as a lender of last resort. Before the Fed was created, whenever banking crises would happen, they had private arrangements where bank clearing houses would get together and channel liquidity to the parts of the banking system that needed money. And these panics, as they were called, were quickly undone. But after the panic of 1907, people said, “Well, we can’t have this. Let’s get the government to take over this process.” And they created the Federal Reserve.

When the downturn began in August of 1929, the Fed should have stepped in to prevent the money supply from contracting. But the Fed just stood by, and from 1929 to 1933, the money supply contracted by over 30 percent. That is huge. Then, on top of that, you have the hyperactive Hoover, who administered a historically unique level of economic intervention. And then it gets worse under FDR.

The big problem was what the economic historian Bob Higgs calls regime uncertainty. Hoover and Roosevelt became increasingly hostile to businesses and investors throughout the 1930s. Basically, they scared investors off. Well, if you want economic recovery, you can’t scare investors off. You can’t threaten their property rights. You can’t threaten to tax away their earnings. You can’t threaten to control prices. All of this was being done. Roosevelt became a little more friendly to businesses when he needed them to cooperate in the war effort, but there was still concern that after the war, Roosevelt would return to his increasingly anti-capitalist stance. But of course, Roosevelt died in April of 1945, and Truman, for all of his imperfections, was a businessman, and he was perceived, quite rightly, as much less radical than Roosevelt.

Higgs dates the end of the Great Depression as immediately after the war, 1946 or 1947. The war years, we can’t say much about. You’re conscripting people into a military, so unemployment looks low, but that’s not the result of an improved market economy. Prices are controlled. Wages are controlled. Certainly, the standard of living of ordinary Americans back home was falling. So, if you define the end of the Depression as a return to high and rising living standards for ordinary people, you don’t get any evidence of that until the years immediately following the end of World War II. So, the New Deal didn’t cure the Great Depression. If anything, it extended the Great Depression throughout the 1930s. If we’re going to actually rely on data, we must say that the Depression only ended after the end of World War II.

Now on to the final topic, the Great Recession.

The mainstream explanation is that financial deregulation created the housing crisis. Greedy, mustache-twisting bankers lent money to people who they knew couldn’t repay the mortgage loans, which anybody with common sense would know is not a good banking strategy.

In fact, what happened is that starting in the early 1990s, the government became intent on increasing the rate of home ownership. So, the government wanted banks to extend mortgage lending to people that they otherwise wouldn’t lend to, but the banks didn’t want to lend money to people who were unlikely to pay them back. So, the federal government said, look, Fannie and Freddie, increasingly large shares of your portfolio have to be made up of subprime mortgages, or we’re going to do all kinds of nasty things to you.

Say you’re a bank in Omaha, Nebraska, and someone comes to you to borrow money to buy a house. In the past, you’d say, “Sorry, you don’t have 20 percent to put down, and you don’t have a high enough income. I’m not going to lend you the money.” But now, Freddie comes by and says, “I really want to buy some subprime loans from you, so if you make some subprime loans, I’ll buy them from you and relieve you of the risk.” So, when that same borrower comes back, you lend them the money and sell the mortgage to a government-backed firm. Now you’re off the hook, but that bad loan is still out there. The result was that increasingly large numbers of house mortgages were held by people who couldn’t afford to repay them, and so any decline in economic activity, and certainly any decline in housing prices, would put a lot of the homeowners under water, and that is what eventually happened. The house of cards collapsed.

One final question: Why don’t bad ideas die?

There are at least two reasons.

First, if you show me a bad economic idea, I will show you a special interest group that benefits from it. This is what Bruce Yandle called the “Bootleggers and Baptists” idea: when you have a sincere but mistaken belief backed by venal interest groups who stand to gain materially by the maintenance of those beliefs, those beliefs become entrenched.

The second reason is that bad ideas are usually easier to grasp than good ideas. Good ideas tend to involve one or two steps of reasoning beyond the bad idea. And so, to push out bad ideas and replace them with good ideas requires good education. So, all the things that we’re doing, all the blogging and podcasting and tweeting.

It’s a struggle to present good ideas, but we have no choice. We have to keep doing it. And history shows that, if you’re effective at it, you can sometimes push bad ideas aside and replace them with good ideas. But it’s a never-ending battle. It’s not like the bad idea is defeated and then it goes away forever. It’ll always lurk. So, we always have to be at the ready to challenge it with good ideas. And we have to be very patient.

The Human Progress Podcast | Ep. 64

Donald Boudreaux: The False History of American Capitalism

Economist Donald Boudreaux joins Marian Tupy to discuss important misconceptions about American economic history and why it’s crucial to set the record straight.

ABC News | Treatment of Animals

FDA Approves 12-Month Flea Treatment for Dogs

“Dogs across the U.S. could soon get longer-lasting protection against pesky parasites thanks to a new treatment approved by federal regulators Thursday.

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration has given the green light to Bravecto Quantum, the first-ever flea and tick preventative that can protect dogs for up to 12 months with a single injection. The treatment is approved for dogs and puppies 6 months and older.

The new shot is an alternative to treatments that usually need to be given every month or every few months.”

From ABC News.

Al Jazeera | Capital Punishment

Vietnam Ends Death Penalty for Crimes Against the State, Drugs

“The state-run Vietnam News Agency reported on Wednesday that the country’s National Assembly unanimously passed an amendment to the Criminal Code that abolished the death penalty for eight criminal offences.

Starting from next month, people will no longer face a death sentence for bribery, embezzlement, producing and trading counterfeit medicines, illegally transporting narcotics, espionage, ‘the crime of destroying peace and causing aggressive war’, as well as sabotage and trying to topple the government.

The maximum sentence for these crimes will now be life imprisonment, the news agency said…

The death penalty will remain for 10 other criminal offences under Vietnamese law, including murder, treason, terrorism and the sexual abuse of children, according to the report.”

From Al Jazeera.