01 / 05
Why Your Groceries Are Cheaper than Kevin McCallister’s

Blog Post | Cost of Material Goods

Why Your Groceries Are Cheaper than Kevin McCallister’s

Since 1990, grocery abundance has increased by 43.2 percent and pizza abundance by 285 percent for blue-collar workers. If you were upskilling, it was 186 percent for groceries and 610 percent for pizzas.

Summary: A famous grocery run in Home Alone appears to illustrate how much nominal prices have risen since the film came out in 1990. But a look at sticker prices alone misses the bigger picture. When costs are measured against what people earn, everyday food looks far more affordable than it once did. Thanks to rising nominal wages and ongoing innovation, modern households enjoy far greater abundance, even when nominal prices appear higher at first glance.


In the 1990 movie Home Alone, eight-year-old Kevin McCallister went grocery shopping. He bought a half gallon of milk, a half gallon of orange juice, a TV dinner, bread, frozen mac and cheese, laundry detergent, cling wrap, toilet paper, a pack of army men, and dryer sheets. His bill came to $19.83.

Professor Christopher Clarke at Washington State University does an annual price analysis of Kevin McCallister’s shopping basket and estimates that today’s price for those items would be around 114.5 percent higher ($42.54) than was the case in 1990. But, as my readers know quite well, things can become more expensive and more affordable at the same time. How is that possible? It’s possible because wages typically increase faster than prices. In the past 35 years, blue-collar hourly wages have increased by 207.7 percent, from $10.32 per hour in 1990 to $31.76 today.

Kevin’s basket in 1990, in time prices, would have cost 1.92 hours compared to 1.34 hours today. The time price of Kevin’s basket has fallen by 30.2 percent. For the time it took to earn the money to buy the basket of goods in 1990, you get 1.432 baskets today. Grocery abundance has increased by 43.2 percent.

If you got your first job in 1990 as an entry-level worker and have been upskilling for the past 35 years and are now an average worker, your hourly wage rate increased 511.3 percent: from $6.03 an hour in 1990 to $36.86 an hour today. Your grocery basket time price fell by 65 percent, giving you 2.86 baskets today. Your grocery abundance has increased by 186 percent.

In the movie, the McCallister family also orders 10 pizzas, and the bill comes to $122.50 (plus tip). That would put the time price for 1990s blue-collar workers at 11.87 hours, or about one hour and 11 minutes per pizza.

Professor Clarke did a price check on how much 10 classic cheese and pepperoni pizzas cost at a Little Caesars pizzeria near the McCallister’s home today—it comes to only $98.09 (plus tip). The nominal price has actually shrunk! That would put today’s time price at 3.08 hours for the 10 pizzas, or about 18.5 minutes per pizza. The time price has fallen by 74 percent. That means that for the time it took to earn the money to buy one pizza in 1990 you get 3.85 pizzas today. Pizza abundance has increased by 285 percent. If you are an upskilled worker, your pizza time price fell by 85.9 percent, giving you 7.1 pizzas today for the time price of 1 in 1990, thus increasing your abundance by 610 percent.

Hopefully you didn’t forget to count the kids before taking off on Christmas vacation this year! And remember, life can become more abundant every day if people are free to innovate.

Find more of Gale’s work at his Substack, Gale Winds.

The Guardian | Personal Income

Poland’s Incomes Are Rapidly Catching Up With Western Europe

“Over the four decades since regaining its independence from Soviet-dominated rule, Poland has been transformed. Excluding oil-exporting states and financial hubs, incomes have converged with western levels at the fastest rate in the world; from 40% of the EU average in the mid-1990s to 81% last year…

For years, many Poles chose to emigrate to earn more abroad, in a brain drain accelerated by EU membership. Polish plumbers became shorthand in Britain for foreign labour amid the political battles over EU freedom of movement before the Brexit vote.

Now Britons are increasingly likely to have their taps fixed by Romanians and Bulgarians, after a surge in the number of Polish nationals leaving. In each year since 2021, when Brexit was enacted after a year-long transition period, twice as many Poles left the UK than arrived.

Meanwhile, Germany recorded more non-Germans moving to Poland in 2024 than heading in the opposite direction for the first time on record.”

From The Guardian.

The Economist | Personal Income

Millennials in Most Rich Countries Out-earn Earlier Generations

“The Economist has assembled data on millennials’ incomes for 32 rich countries. In just three of these—Italy, Greece and Japan—are millennials worse off, in terms of inflation-adjusted income, than previous generations at the same age…

Millennials in the remaining 29 countries in our sample have higher real incomes than past generations. In some, including in Australia, Britain and France, intergenerational progress has admittedly slowed. Whereas Gen-Xers did far better than their baby-boomer parents (born from 1946 to 1964), in those places millennials have gained only slightly on Gen X. But in many others, from rich America to fast-self-enriching Poland, the rate of improvement has stepped up.”

From The Economist.

Congressional Budget Office | Income Inequality

Bottom Incomes Rose While Top Incomes Fell in 2023

“In 2023, average income before transfers and taxes rose for households at the bottom of the income distribution and fell for those at the top. Income increased by 5 percent among households in the lowest quintile (or fifth) of the distribution from 2022 to 2023. (All measures of income in this report have been adjusted to remove the effects of inflation.) By contrast, income decreased by 9 percent among households in the top 1 percent. That decrease was largely due to a reduction in realized capital gains. Average income from other sources, on net, remained relatively unchanged among households in the top 1 percent.”

From Congressional Budget Office.

Blog Post | Income & Inequality

Solving the Conundrum of Status Competition

A free-market economy does not abolish the competition for status, but it gives people more places to compete.

Summary: Prosperous societies can produce more educated, ambitious people than established prestige systems can accommodate. When recognition depends on a narrow set of institutions, status competition intensifies and frustration grows. Independent platforms, new institutions, and emerging industries can create alternative paths to achievement. Economic and technological dynamism can therefore ease the pressures of status competition by expanding the arenas in which people can succeed.


The Democratic Socialists of America are having a moment. The group’s membership passed 120,000 members in July, overtaking the Eugene Debs-era Socialist Party of the early 20th century as the largest socialist organization in American history. New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani is a democratic socialist, and DSA candidates won a handful of primary elections over the summer. The DSA’s rise is often attributed to inequality, resentment, or ambition. But critics have pointed out that many DSA members are highly educated or come from wealthy families, so something else must be at play. 

People compete for more than income. They compete for reputation, recognition, influence, and rank. The economist Fred Hirsch described such goods as “positional” in his Social Limits to Growth (1976). More food, housing, or energy can make many people better off simultaneously. Status works differently. Simply handing out more titles within a single hierarchy does not create more prestige, because relative rank within any given ladder is zero-sum.

Joseph Schumpeter identified a related problem in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942). He argued that prosperous societies would educate more people than established prestige systems could absorb. Many would acquire the education and expectations associated with elite positions without obtaining them. Some, he thought, would respond by turning against the source of that prosperity—the free-market system. Schumpeter’s prediction has not aged badly. 

Status competition is most consequential when many people depend on the same hierarchy for recognition, income, or professional identity, especially when alternatives are scarce and exit is costly.

Academia illustrates the mechanism. Scholars compete for jobs, tenure, publications, grants, and recognition within the same institutional system. Years of specialized training can make exit difficult. A scholar who has invested a decade acquiring specialized skills may have few opportunities to obtain comparable income and standing elsewhere.

Relative advantage can be pursued by improving one’s own position or by reducing the standing or opportunities of competitors. The first can involve producing research, teaching, or discovery. The second can involve challenging a rival’s competence or fitness for membership without producing an equivalent intellectual contribution. That does not mean criticism is illegitimate or that every dispute is driven by status. Ideological disagreements can be sincere, and institutions need mechanisms for identifying error and misconduct. The narrower point is that institutional arrangements affect incentives. When one hierarchy controls a large share of available rewards, the potential payoff from influencing membership and advancement within it increases.

For much of the 20th century, journalism operated in a similar way. A small number of newspapers, magazines, and television networks controlled access to national audiences. Losing a position at an important publication could mean losing both income and public visibility.

The internet changed that. Journalists and commentators can now reach audiences through newsletters, podcasts, YouTube, and other platforms. A writer rejected by a newspaper can publish directly on Substack or a personal website and promote work via social media. A broadcaster without a network contract can still reach millions on X or YouTube. Competition for status remains and has arguably grown harsher, but failure in one hierarchy no longer determines a person’s prospects elsewhere.

Academia is beginning to experience the same change. Scholars can reach readers through subscription platforms, podcasts, and online lectures. Preprint servers allow research to circulate before journals approve it. Private laboratories and research institutes offer employment outside conventional departments. Organizations such as Arcadia Science and the Arc Institute are experimenting with funding scientists rather than rigid project proposals, providing multi-year support to follow promising questions without the constraints of predefined deliverables.

Alternative teaching institutions are also emerging outside legacy university systems. The University of Austin—founded as an independent, tenure-free institution dedicated to open inquiry—enrolled its first undergraduate class in 2024. Meanwhile, Peterson Academy bypasses campus infrastructure entirely, offering low-cost, recorded university-level courses that have attracted more than 80,000 subscribers. These institutions remain small, but they do not need to replace established universities to matter. They need only provide credible alternatives for some students, teachers, or scholars.

Those alternatives remain incomplete. Scientific research can require laboratories, equipment, teams, and funding that individuals cannot access or provide independently. Credentials still matter in medicine, law, and other professions. Capital requirements and network effects can also concentrate opportunities.

Government policy can strengthen or weaken this concentration. When research funding, accreditation, licensing, or other forms of authorization channel people through the same institutions and evaluation systems, policy can reinforce common hierarchies. Dispersing authority among independent funders, accreditors, jurisdictions, and institutions can create more routes to advancement.

The objective should not be to eliminate hierarchy. Reputation conveys information. Organizations need ways to identify competence. Competition for recognition can motivate effort and discovery. Relative rank cannot become abundant in the way food or energy can. The objective should be to multiply independent arenas in which people can succeed.

That is one reason economic and technological dynamism matters beyond higher income. New firms, industries, technologies, and institutions create new occupations and forms of achievement. The automobile created the mechanic and the highway engineer. Software created the programmer and the product manager. Each of these technologies built ladders that did not exist before.

Stagnation creates fewer such openings, and collectivist policies tend to yield stagnation, whether they come from the left or the right. Ambitious people must compete for a more fixed set of positions, making success or failure within existing institutions more consequential. A free-market economy does not abolish the competition for status, but it gives people more places to compete.

This article originally appeared in The Dispatch on 9/15/2026.