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The New Right Manufactures Misery | Podcast Highlights

Blog Post | Human Development

The New Right Manufactures Misery | Podcast Highlights

Marian Tupy interviews Yaron Brook about the pessimistic populism of the New Right.

Listen to the podcast or read the full transcript here.

Today I’m going to be joined by Yaron Brook, host of the very popular Yaron Brook show and a prominent advocate of free markets, individual liberty, and Objectivism.

Yaron, I want to talk to you this morning about a recent tweet by Matt Walsh, a very prominent American conservative. He’s the host of the Matt Walsh show and appears very frequently on the Daily Wire.

Here is what Matt Walsh posted on his Twitter: “It’s an empirical fact that basically everything in our day to day lives has gotten worse over the years. The quality of everything, food, clothing, entertainment, air travel, roads, traffic, infrastructure, housing, et cetera, has declined in observable ways. Even newer inventions, search engines, social media, smartphones, have gone downhill drastically. This isn’t just a random old man yells at clouds complaint. It’s true. It’s happening. The decline can be measured. Everyone sees it. Everyone feels it. Meanwhile, political pundits and podcast hosts, speaking of things that are getting worse, focus on anything and everything except these practical, real-life problems that actually affect our quality of life.”

So, Yaron, when you first read that tweet, what did you make of it? What was your first reaction?

Well, this was not new to me. I’ve been talking about Matt Walsh and the general populist attitude to human progress for the last 40 years. It’s a theme that the left used to advocate for. Now the populist right seems to have agreed on the idea that the 1970s were some kind of utopia where income was maximal, women didn’t have to work, you could buy a home, and everybody was happy.

I think Matt Walsh is just reflecting that deep-seated pessimism that exists today across the entire political spectrum. And of course, my response is that he’s wrong about almost all of the examples he gives.

Let’s first talk about this concept of American pessimism. What do you attribute it to?

One of my theories is that we’re experiencing a negative emotional contagion driven by competition within the media. We know that each additional negative word in a headline increases the click-through rate by about two and a half percent. And now you have traditional media competing with internet outfits, so if you want to get people’s attention, pessimism sells.

That’s definitely part of the problem, but I don’t think it’s the fundamental problem.

I believe that we are shaped by ideas, and therefore, we’re shaped by our intellectuals. And the intellectual class has completely betrayed Americans. They have rejected capitalism, which is the system that made us rich.

If you were a steelworker in Cleveland and you lost your job in the 1980s, what were you told? You weren’t told what we were told in America traditionally, which was “get in your car, drive to northwest Arkansas, and get another job.” You were told, “No, don’t worry, we’ll write you a check, and we’ll keep you on welfare while we, the intellectuals and the politicians, work on getting your job back.”

This has been the story that politicians have been telling workers for a long time. They’re lying; the steel job will never come back. And they’re destroying the worker’s self-esteem, that self-reliance that’s so core to the American ideal. So, 20 years go by, and the steel job doesn’t come back, and this person and the culture around him develop real resentments against the system.  And intellectuals have told Americans that their job loss is a consequence of capitalism, that capitalism caused the great financial crisis, and that they’re looking for an alternative, something to replace free markets, private property, and the dynamism of the marketplace.

One area in which America really is declining is in education. We have K-12 education that teaches kids to trust their emotions rather than their reason. We saw this maybe 10, 15 years ago with microaggressions and political correctness, and then that evolved into the woke phenomenon, which was all about avoiding hurt feelings or causing offense. So, we’ve created generations of people who are very attuned to their emotions but can’t really think, and as a consequence, rely on their primitive human instincts.

People don’t understand the world because they haven’t been taught how to think about it conceptually, so they revert to perceptions. They’re afraid because perceptions don’t lead them to knowledge, and when people are afraid, they join tribes. There’s comfort in tribes. So, you get tribalism and perceptual-level mentality, and that combination is what drives this spiral of fear and pessimism.

Let me ask you questions specifically about the GOP.

Back in the day, during the Reagan Era, it was all about America being the shining city on the hill. That there was nothing that Americans could not do, and our best days lay ahead. Now all of that seems to be gone. What happened to the Republican Party and the conservative movement?

I think it’s a combination of two things, one ideological and one historical.

Ideologically, the GOP has changed its composition and who it’s trying to appeal to. And I think the change actually happened under Reagan, who made religion a crucial part of what it meant to be a Republican. And I think that religion undermines the ability to think about the future in a positive way. Many evangelicals, particularly when they see cultural phenomena like the gay movement, Roe versus Wade, and immigration, are afraid of the future. That fear was reinforced by three major events.

The first was 9/11, which was completely misinterpreted by the American right. Ultimately, the Bush administration lied to all of us and engaged in endless wars that didn’t achieve any of their goals. So, a lot of American idealism died in Afghanistan and Iraq. And then there was the great financial crisis, which collapsed the image of American capitalism as this amazing economic engine of prosperity. Instead of intellectuals coming out and saying, “Oh, no, you misunderstood. The crisis happened because of particular regulations and the Federal Reserve,” the intellectuals came out and said, “This was caused by capitalism. We need a new model.” And finally, we had COVID, which undermined the concept of America as the land of the free. We got locked up in our homes, and the political and expert class panicked and had no clue what to do except infringe on our individual rights.

Those three crises have led Americans to be skeptical of everything that’s uniquely American, and, in the GOP, revert to a kind of religiosity that they imagine the Founding Fathers had. Michael Knowles, for example, who is also on the Daily Wire, has said, “I want a culture of 1220.” So there’s a certain medievalism in some people on the right today. They long for the certainty of religious dogma and simple life, and none of this exposure to foreign cultures or people with different sexual orientations.

Evolutionary psychologists tell us that there are certain permanent aspects of human nature. And amongst the things evolutionary psychologists say are pretty firm in human nature are tribalism and zero-sum thinking. You already argued that the right is deeply tribalist, and the left is clearly very driven by zero-sum thinking.

So, are promoters of freedom and capitalism simply fighting a losing battle against human nature?

Absolutely not. And the evidence for this is in the work you do at Human Progress. Look how far we’ve come. Look at how rich we are. It’s stunning. We were hunter-gatherers once, and we established cities, agriculture, philosophy, mathematics, and science. Every single step in those achievements was a consequence of the rejection of tribalism and zero-sum thinking. Every single step came from the use of reason. So I think human history repudiates the idea that we have to be tribal and zero-sum.

Now, it’s true that when people don’t think, when they refuse to put in the effort to actually use their mind, the default is zero-sum. Tribalism and zero-sum thinking are defaults people revert to when they’re overwhelmed by emotion. And when you have an educational system and intellectuals who undercut reason and elevate emotion above all, you get zero-sum thinking and tribalism.

To me, it’s all about the intellectuals. The intellectuals shape culture. It’s not an accident that America is a consequence of an intellectual movement called the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment sowed certain ideas, and those ideas flowered into the Industrial Revolution and the great wealth that we have since benefited from. Our intellectual class, though, has worked hard to undermine the Enlightenment for more than 200 years, basically since the Enlightenment ended. It is amazing how much we have progressed despite such lousy intellectual guidance.

So we need a new set of intellectuals who can guide Americans, and really all of humanity, towards an understanding of their own potential as thinkers, as reasoners, as builders and creators. And at whatever intellectual level you have, whatever IQ or whatever measure you use, you can produce, and you can be happy. If we can dominate the intellectual sphere, the world will change. But right now, what’s dragging us down are people like Matt Walsh and other intellectuals who are constantly feeding the public the exact opposite message: defeatism, anti-reason, anti-freedom, and anti-capitalism.

Well, the old intellectual lead has certainly disgraced itself and is on its way out because of Iraq, COVID, the great financial crisis and so forth. The problem is that the intellectuals who are waiting in the wings to replace them are worse. We are talking about people like, I’m sorry to say, Matt Walsh, Adrian Vermeule, and Curtis Yarvin.

Now we have to give the devil his due and talk about specifics. So, Yaron, is food in America now worse than it was in the 1970s?

It’s just funny to me to read something like that.

I mean, in the 1970s, the food was bland, and choices were minimal. Maybe there’d be one Chinese restaurant in the neighborhood. Now, the best of the best different foods from all over the world are available in any major city in the United States. I’m a foodie, so the joy of eating new foods with new flavors and in new combinations is just amazing. And we have restaurants that are super cheap. In LA, you can go buy tacos that are some of the most delicious in the world at a food truck. And if you go into a supermarket, you can get fruits and vegetables that only grow in certain regions of the world all year round, and at very reasonable prices.

So, we have such a variety and such a selection in the United States today, of all the things to pick on, food is comical.

Another point raised by Matt Walsh is air travel.

In the olden days, you simply didn’t travel by air. Holidays would be spent near where you lived. There’s a fantastic bit in Mad Men where these rich guys from New York decide to go to California and fly across the country, and it’s a big deal. The whole Office is talking about it, and they are bringing a bag of California oranges back to New York because you couldn’t get them otherwise.

Now, it is uncomfortable in economy class, yet tens of millions of people take economy class flights every year. They are voting with their wallets. What’s the tradeoff here?

The tradeoff is to get to where you want to go. The ability to travel, the ability to see the world. And it’s unbelievably cheap. In the 1950s and 60s, nobody could afford to take a cross-country trip by air. Today, almost everybody can afford to do that. In addition, air travel was not as safe back then. In America, except for that one accident at Reagan, we’ve had no fatal accidents for like 20 years. So, it’s super cheap, and if you want to pay more money, you can sit in business class and be more comfortable.

And there are discount airlines that specialize in bare-bones service and very uncomfortable seats, yet they’re always full.

There is this meme about the ability of the American worker to support a family on one income. But even today, you can have a 1950s or 1960s lifestyle on one income. It will mean that you are never going to fly across the country. It will mean that you are going to be living in a much smaller home without basic appliances. It will mean that you will have access to 1950s or 1970s health care. So, the point is, people opt to have two-income families because life is just so much more amazing that way.

Matt Yglesias had a really good essay on this, in which he found a house that is the same size as it was in the 1950s—about 1500 square feet, versus today’s over 3000—and yeah, it’s easily affordable on one income. When I grew up, there were six of us, four kids and two parents, with one bathroom. If you want every kid in their own bedroom and bathrooms, two or more cars, and to travel to Europe and see the world, then yeah, you need two incomes.

But there’s something even more important than that: the 1950s really, really sucked if you were a woman. You were stuck at home. You didn’t have many employment opportunities. There was real discrimination against women. And because there were no washers and dryers and dishwashers and all of that, women spent a lot of time taking care of the house.

Now, the opportunity cost for them to stay home is huge. They have an opportunity to build a career, go to school, develop themselves, and pursue the life they want. The consequence of that is two-income families that raise the standard of living. It’s shocking to me that people think that there’s something wrong, A, with women pursuing their own dreams and B, with people actually being richer and living in bigger homes.

You’ve already noted housing, and maybe that is the subject that we can end on.

If you look at what Mark Perry from the American Enterprise Institute calls The Chart of the Century, it shows that housing relative to income is about 10 percent cheaper than it was 20 or 25 years ago. That means wages have been increasing faster than housing prices. So, even though housing is much more expensive than it used to be, wage growth has been higher and, consequently, housing is actually more affordable on average in America.

Another thing that people do not account for is the great improvement in housing. They also focus far too much on particular problems in metropolitan areas such as New York City, whereas in the rest of the country, things are going pretty well. What’s your take on all that?

First of all, there is massive geographic diversity. You can find relatively affordable homes in Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, and in much of the center of the country. Certain metropolitan areas have oppressive laws that have made it very difficult to build, and, as a consequence, rents have gone through the roof. I made a lot of money on homes in California, not because I’m a speculator—I believe housing should be a consumption good, not an investment—but because nobody was building in the neighborhoods that I lived in. Demand was high because of the weather and economic opportunities. So prices just took off. Why isn’t supply matching demand? We know that when demand increases, prices will go up, then supply will enter, and prices will come back down. That doesn’t happen in these areas for political reasons. Homeowners don’t want new houses built, so they vote for people who ensure no new supply is added.

But there are also lots of places in the country where it’s hard to sell a home because nobody wants to live there, or there are plenty of homes. You know, rents and home prices have been dropping significantly in Austin, Texas. During COVID, demand in Austin increased significantly, and supply couldn’t match it immediately because it takes time to build a home. So, prices went up a lot. Then supply came online, and since then, prices have been drifting downwards. And you see that in a number of cities across the country where politics don’t severely restrict housing supply.

The second thing you mentioned is that houses are very different today. They’re dramatically bigger. The average home in America today is over 3,000 square feet with amenities that you couldn’t have imagined in the 1970s. Three-car garages, air conditioning, dishwashers, and so on. The construction quality is also much better. For example, houses are far more resistant to fire. Many more people died from home fires in the 1970s than today because we’ve figured out how to make cheaper fire-resistant materials.

So Matt Walsh could be talking to America about the great successes in GOP-dominated states where housing was deregulated, and rents and house prices are actually coming down. He could be promoting those successes and saying, “Look, if this can be done in Right America, it can also be done in Left America.” But instead, he’s embraced negativity.

The modern American right doesn’t want to highlight those things because that would highlight the successes of freedom and capitalism. The new right are not freedom lovers. Freedom scares them. I think they see that if you advocate for economic freedom, why stop with economics? Shouldn’t individuals be free to make all kinds of choices in their lives? What god to worship or not to worship, who to love. If they can’t tolerate freedom in the realm of personal choices, long-term, they’re not going to tolerate freedom in economic choices. That’s what we’re seeing with the right today. They used to only want to regulate our social choices, and now they want to regulate everything, just like the left.

The great tragedy of America right now is that there’s really nobody in politics who represents freedom in both the personal and economic realms.

Blog Post | Wealth & Poverty

Dinner With Dickens Was Slim Pickins

Claims that characters in "A Christmas Carol" were better off than modern Americans are pure humbug.

Summary: There have recently been widespread claims that Dickens’s working poor were better off than modern minimum-wage workers. Such comparisons rely on misleading inflation math and selective reading. The severe material deprivation of Victorian life—crowded housing, scarce possessions, and basic sanitation problems—dwarfs today’s standards. Modern Americans, even at the lower end of the income scale, enjoy far greater material comfort than the Cratchits ever did.


Christmas is often a time for nostalgia. We look back on our own childhood holidays. Songs and traditions from the past dominate the culture.

Nostalgia is not without its purposes. But it can also be misleading. Take those who view the material circumstances of Charles Dickens’s “A Christmas Carol” as superior to our own.

Claims that an American today earning the minimum wage is worse off than the working poor of the 19th century have been popular since at least 2021. A recent post with thousands of likes reads:

Time for your annual reminder that, according to A Christmas Carol, Bob Cratchit makes 15 shillings a week. Adjusted for inflation, that’s $530.27/wk, $27,574/yr, or $13.50/ hr. Most Americans on minimum wage earn less than a Dickensian allegory for destitution.

This is humbug.

Consider how harsh living conditions were for a Victorian earning 15 shillings a week.

Dickens writes that Mr. Cratchit lives with his wife and six children in a four-room house. It is rare for modern residents of developed nations to crowd eight people into four rooms.

It was common in the Victorian era. According to Britain’s National Archives, a typical home had no more than four rooms. Worse yet, it lacked running water and a toilet. Entire streets (or more) would share a few toilets and a pump with water that was often polluted.

The Cratchit household has few possessions. Their glassware consists of merely “two tumblers, and a custard-cup without a handle.” For Christmas dinner, Mr. Cratchit wears “threadbare clothes” while his wife is “dressed out but poorly in a twice-turned gown.”

People used to turn clothing inside-out and alter the stitching to extend its lifespan. The practice predated the Victorian era, but continued into it. Eventually, clothes would become “napless, threadbare and tattered,” as the historian Emily Cockayne noted.

The Cratchits didn’t out-earn a modern American earning the minimum wage. Mr. Cratchit’s weekly salary of 15 shillings in 1843, the year “A Christmas Carol” was published, is equivalent to almost £122 in 2025. Converted to U.S. dollars, that’s about $160 a week, for an annual salary of $8,320.

The U.S. federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour or $15,080 per year for a full-time worker. That’s about half of what the meme claims Mr. Cratchit earned. Only 1% of U.S. workers earned the federal minimum wage or less last year. Most states set a higher minimum wage. The average worker earns considerably more. Clerks like Mr. Cratchit now earn an average annual salary of $49,210.

Mr. Cratchit couldn’t have purchased much of the modern “basket of goods” used in inflation calculations. Many of the basket’s items weren’t available in 1843. The U.K.’s Office of National Statistics recently added virtual reality headsets to it.

Another way to compare the relative situation of Mr. Cratchit and a minimum-wage worker today is to see how long it would take each of them to earn enough to buy something comparable. A BBC article notes that, according to an 1844 theatrical adaptation of “A Christmas Carol,” it would have taken Mr. Cratchit a week’s wages to purchase the trappings of a Christmas feast: “seven shillings for the goose, five for the pudding, and three for the onions, sage and oranges.” Mr. Cratchit opts for a goose for the family’s Christmas meal. A turkey—then a costlier option—was too expensive.

The American Farm Bureau Federation found that the ingredients for a turkey-centered holiday meal serving 10 people cost $55.18 in 2025. At the federal minimum wage, someone would need to work seven hours and 37 minutes to afford that feast.

A minimum-wage worker could earn more than enough in a single workday to purchase a meal far more lavish than the modest Christmas dinner that cost Mr. Cratchit an entire week’s pay. And the amount of time a person needs to work to afford a holiday meal has fallen dramatically for the average blue-collar worker in recent years despite inflation. Wages have grown faster than food prices.

There has been substantial progress in living conditions since the 1840s. We’re much better off than the Cratchits were. In fact, most people today enjoy far greater material comfort than did even Dickens’s rich miser Ebenezer Scrooge.

This article was originally published in the Wall Street Journal on 12/23/2025.

Blog Post | Human Development

The Pattern Behind History’s Golden Ages | Podcast Highlights

Chelsea Follett interviews Johan Norberg about the conditions that create human flourishing and why golden ages so often come to an end.

Listen to the podcast or read the full transcript here.

Joining me today is Johan Norberg, a historian, commentator, and my colleague here at the Cato Institute. His books include The Capitalist Manifesto, Progress: Ten Reasons to Look Forward to the Future, and Open: The Story of Human Progress. His latest book is Peak Human.

Johan, tell me about what inspired you to write Peak Human?

One reason is that we live in a golden age right now, and I would like it to keep going for a bit longer. I think it’s useful to look to history for clues about how you build and maintain thriving, dynamic civilizations.

What do you mean by the term golden age?

I’m glad you asked. I’m not thinking about mighty empires and territorial expansion. I’m thinking about decent, dynamic, and innovative civilizations that grow and prosper. I’m looking at periods where you saw a great many innovations in different spheres of human experience: cultural creativity, scientific curiosity, technological innovation, and economic growth.

You have this great line in the introduction where you say, “If we discard all the achievements of those who came before us because they weren’t sufficiently enlightened and decent, and they weren’t, we will eventually lose the capacity to discern what is enlightened and decent.”

What did you mean by that?

It’s incredibly easy to dismiss everything that wasn’t up to our modern moral standards, but if we do that, we lose the ability to understand progress. Some of these past civilizations, imperfect as they were, were incredibly important stepping stones on the way to the Enlightenment, to individual rights, and to prosperity.

Let’s walk through the different golden ages you focus on, starting with ancient Athens.

In the 4th century BC, Athens was just one among thousands of different Greek city-states. That was a great thing for them, because they could compare what they were doing with others and learn. And the Athenians, partly because of their bad soil, were a trading civilization that ventured outward to find useful things, which created a spirit of curiosity and innovation. They even created this ancient form of democracy that, while it excluded women and slaves, gave a lot of power to the average man.

Along with all these things—democracy, openness, and trade—they began to experiment with new ideas in everything from architecture to theater to philosophy. I would argue that this was the first civilization where we actually see people saying that it’s a good thing to criticize your forefathers and come up with something original. And if you start doing that, you’ll come up with lots of exciting ideas.

What lessons can we learn from Athens?

One obvious lesson, which appears in all of these golden ages, is that without one strong man in charge, you open up the whole system to experimentation; ideas can come from anywhere in the network. You basically crowdsource your ideas and, while you’ll get more bad ideas, you’ll also get more great ideas that people can build upon.

I think that’s an important lesson for us. When we think of how to move on and find something better, do we create a great big plan telling people what to do, or do we simply allow more people to join in the game?

What brought the Athenian golden age to an end?

The very long Peloponnesian War against Sparta started to erode that sense of openness and curiosity. Thucydides, the great Greek historian, talked about how people on all sides became tribalists, constantly thinking about how to search for scapegoats and traitors rather than new trading partners. Obviously, the strongest example is when Socrates was sentenced to death for his teachings. That’s something that happens by the end of most of these golden ages; once they sour on intellectual openness, they try to impose some sort of orthodoxy and force people to think and behave in the same way.

Let’s move on to Abbasid-era Baghdad and the Islamic golden age.

One thousand years ago, the greatest thinkers in Europe got their best ideas from Arabs, who had far superior science and technology. Algebra, algorithm, arithmetic, average—all those terms come from this melting pot of an empire that was built from northern Africa all the way to Afghanistan. It was a huge free trade area with the same set of laws and the same language, but it was also very open to different peoples and religions. In Baghdad, they invited thinkers from other cultures and from other religions to talk about their ideas, and constantly translated their texts in order to benefit from them. They considered themselves the successors to the Greek philosophical tradition.

It is often said that the end of the Abbasid Caliphate was when the Mongols invaded in the 1250s. However, by the time of the Mongol invasion, the Caliphate had already been in decline for over 200 years. It started losing its way internally because of a fear of religious difference. Not fear of Christians or Jews, but fear of different traditions within Islam. The Abbasids built state-funded schools where teachers simply repeated Sunni dogma. The intellectuals who used to have various, diverse benefactors got government jobs on the condition that they left their critical judgment outside. That began to undermine the dynamic, open-minded intellectual tradition of the Arab world. You can actually see how texts on science and on technology begin to decline in the areas that got these state-run Madrasas.

Tell me about Song Dynasty China. It’s been said that they came very close to initiating an industrial revolution.

Karl Marx talked about how, in the 19th century, there were three major innovations that ushered in bourgeois society in Europe: Gunpowder, the compass, and printing. But the Chinese had those 1000 years earlier. They were the most innovative and wealthiest society on the planet.

How did they become so wealthy? Well, you have to focus on the Song Dynasty. From the 10th century to the 13th century, China had a relatively strong rule of law and free market. Farmers had property rights rather than being feudal peasants. They were very innovative; they borrowed new crops from other parts of the world, created new irrigation systems, and even came up with paper money. So much food was produced during the Song Dynasty that the Chinese population doubled. That led to urbanization and the rise of an early manufacturing economy. They produced so much iron and steel that Europe couldn’t compete for several hundred years. They also experimented with new textile machines in order to automate the manufacturing of textiles. It’s possible that if they had continued that path, they might have come up with some of the innovations that gave us the Industrial Revolution.

Unfortunately, this golden age was cut short. There was a period of war against Mongol invaders, then civil strife, and in the 14th century, the Ming Dynasty took power. They very self-consciously styled themselves as the dynasty that would restore stability in a top-down uniform way, and they wanted to halt economic change. They grounded their amazing armada and restricted international trade. They were almost role-playing a nostalgic idea of Chinese culture, and even forced people to dress like they did 400 years previously. People were bound to their local village and to their professions. All this created stability at the cost of hundreds of years of stagnation. In the end, the greatest civilization on the planet became a relatively poor civilization that was ultimately humiliated by Western colonial powers.

Moving on to Renaissance Italy, which was also an incredible era of human flourishing.

After the long Middle Ages, the Italian city-states began to pick up scientific, technological, and business ideas from trade with the Arab civilization. The Pope didn’t like all this trading with the infidels, but the Italians said that trade should be free all the way to the gates of hell, which I think is a very powerful free trade slogan. This combination of new ideas and new technologies, combined with these fiercely competitive city-states, led to a lot of experimentation and social mobility. And when you have social mobility, people want to show their status, and they did that by funding art. There was an intimate connection between this new capitalist wealth and a spectacular cultural flourishing.

How did it end?

It sounds like I’m repeating the Abbasid story, but it was religious fragmentation. Both the Pope and the Protestants began to think that they had the one true religion, and that the only way to create a harmonious, unified society was to ensure we all thought in the same way. This “competitive fanaticism,” as Stephen Davies calls it, started in the early 16th century and created widespread fear and anxiety. The popes, who used to be very tolerant of the Renaissance humanists and their secular ideas, began to think, “We have lost our way. We have to return to something pure, something strong.” So, they began to purge the dissenters like Galileo Galilei. Over a very short period, you move from a very tolerant, dynamic, and open Italian civilization to a battle over fanaticism, and no matter who wins, they start to purge their societies of this tolerance.

That’s a great segue into the next society you feature: the Dutch Republic.

The Dutch Republic was the great European exception. They were crazy: they thought that people should be allowed to believe different things. So even though there was a Calvinist majority, other Protestants were accepted, as well as Catholics and Jews. So, in the 16th and 17th centuries, the Dutch Republic collected refugees and dissenters from all over Europe, and books that were purged and burnt in other places could be published in Amsterdam. Everyone from John Locke to Descartes moved to Amsterdam to develop their ideas.

Everybody else thought that Dutch society would break down in utter collapse. Instead, the opposite happened. The other great European states broke down thanks to civil strife and religious war, and the only place left standing was the Dutch Republic. And it wasn’t just that they had relative peace and stability; they also managed to build the richest civilization on the planet because of their relative openness, free markets, and rule of law.

The success of the Dutch Republic was an incredibly important lesson for Europeans in the 17th century, and I think it was one of the reasons that classical liberalism began to take off. As our dear colleague Deirdre McCloskey points out, for the first time in Europe, there was a sense that it was not bad to be a merchant or producer. Previous European civilizations did a lot of trade and production, but they frowned upon it. They thought that production and trade should be left to slaves and foreigners because a real gentleman should just own land passively and make war. This begins to change in the Dutch Republic.

What led to the downfall of the Dutch Republic?

That’s a very sad story. One of the great recurring themes in history is that fear and anxiety often create some sort of societal fight or flight instinct. When you think that everything is breaking down, you want to hide from the world behind walls or a strong leader. This is what happened in the Dutch Republic in the late 17th century.

Admittedly, they faced difficult prospects. They were being invaded repeatedly by their neighbors, and in 1672, they were invaded by England and France at the same time. It was an existential moment where almost everything broke down. Unfortunately, the panicked reaction amongst the Dutch people, and especially some of the more radical Calvinists, led to this idea that, again, we have to return to some pure orthodoxy in order to protect what we’ve got. They began to purge their universities of independent thinkers, and they started to hand power to a strong man, the Stadtholder William of Orange, whom they wanted to assume total power. In 1672, rioters lynched their previous prime minister, Johan de Witt, and even ate parts of him. The fact that even the sensible Dutch can go that far in times of trouble speaks volumes about human nature when we’re anxious.

Let’s move to the Anglosphere, the last Golden Age featured in your book.

This is a long story: we’ve got the Enlightenment, the Scottish Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, and the foundations of liberal democracy. But it all starts with a Dutch invasion in 1688. This is the nice ending to the Dutch Republic story: when they feared being surrounded once again in the 1680s by France and England, the Dutch decided to do one last Hail Mary and invade England. However, it’s not a standard foreign invasion; they were invited by the English Parliament; the Whig party wanted the Dutch to protect them against the Stuart monarchs. The Dutch succeeded with this invasion, and many of their ideas were passed on to the English. Ideas about limiting the power of the royalty, property rights, free trade, and free speech.

The rest is history. We get more experimentation, new ideas, science, and technology, and that leads to the Industrial Revolution. It’s not just a British story, of course; it’s a pan-European development, but it is turbocharged in Britain in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Then we get it in America as well, and that changes the whole world. The Dutch ideas that had been transplanted into a bigger British body politic were now transplanted into the American one. And after the Second World War, America decided to be the protector and guarantor of a relatively liberal world order, which is based, I would argue, on Dutch ideas.

With this world order, which makes the world relatively safe for liberal democracies, we see for the first time a truly global golden age. Weird peripheries like Sweden or East Asian nations can suddenly get access to the frontier knowledge and technology. We suddenly move from a world where 8 out of 10 people live in extreme poverty to one where less than one out of 10 people live in extreme poverty. Despite all the problems today, we live in history’s greatest golden age.

How do we ensure that our current golden age doesn’t end?

The first thing is to learn from our mistakes. First, don’t take progress for granted. We take wealth and freedom for granted because we happen to have been brought up in an extraordinarily prosperous world. But that wasn’t the rule throughout history; it has to be fought for. We have to fight for our institutions if we want to continue enjoying their results.

The second lesson is that we have to learn how to count to ten when we’re anxious. As Thucydides, the ancient Greek historian, put it, there are two different mindsets: the Athenian mindset of going out into the world to learn or acquire something new, and the mindset of staying at home to protect what you’ve got. If you do that, you tend to lose what you’ve got because it’s not there. Knowledge, technology, and ultimately wealth are not like piles of gold that just lie around; they have to be constantly regenerated. If we become like Spartans and try to protect what we’ve got by ending openness, trade, migration, and the rule of law, we will lose what we’ve got, as we’ve seen throughout history.

You also have a prediction in your conclusion that future golden ages might be more diluted than in the past.

What sets this time apart from all the others is that we have more golden age eggs in different baskets.

Historically, when Rome or Baghdad collapsed, you could really talk about the end of civilization. You lost knowledge that was only rediscovered thousands of years later. Today, we live in a global civilization, not just when it comes to our values or ideas, but in terms of access to the latest knowledge about science and technology. Even if we failed and stopped producing stuff, others would pick up the torch, and in a way, that’s a relief. We won’t see the complete end of civilization this time around unless we do something really bad.

This also means that I have a hard time thinking that some part of the world could just speed ahead of everybody else, because we can imitate ideas so much faster than we could in the past. The only question is, what do you do as an individual, as a business, as a city, or as a nation? Are you open to those ideas? Are you constantly comparing notes and benchmarking, or do you shut your mind off to all that stuff? That will decide whether or not you help create a golden age, not where you happen to be placed geographically.

The Human Progress Podcast | Ep. 73

Johan Norberg: The Pattern Behind History’s Golden Ages

Johan Norberg examines the conditions that create human flourishing and why golden ages so often come to an end.

The Economist | Leisure

Millennials Spend More Time than past Generations with Their Children

“Americans are having fewer children than ever before. In 2024 the fertility rate was just 1.6 babies per woman, down from 1.9 a decade ago. This is partly because people are becoming parents later in life; some may be discouraged by the costs of housing and child care. Whatever the cause, those who do have children are spending more time with them than previous generations did—and fathers account for much of the recent increase.

The trend is not new. One study found that between 1965 and 2012 the amount of time parents in rich countries spent with their children doubled. Data from the American Heritage Time Use Study, from 1975 to 2018, show that successive generations have devoted ever more time to their little ones. Millennial mothers (born between 1981 and 1996) spent 12% more time caring for children than Gen-X mums (1965-80) did at the same age. The difference between young Gen-X and baby-boomer mothers (1946-64) was 52%. Millennial fathers, meanwhile, spent 6% more time on child care than Gen-Xers did. The biggest jump was between boomer and Gen-X dads: young Gen-X fathers spent more than twice as much time with their kids as their predecessors did at the same age.

Since the pandemic the amount of time fathers spend with children has risen further. According to newer time-use data, men who lived with their partners spent 11% more time caring for children in 2024 than in 2019, and 30% more time doing household chores.”

From The Economist.