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The Grim Truth About the “Good Old Days”

Blog Post | Human Development

The Grim Truth About the “Good Old Days”

Preindustrial life wasn’t simple or serene—it was filthy, violent, and short.

Summary: Rose-tinted nostalgia for the preindustrial era has gone viral—some people claim that modernity itself was a mistake and that “progress” is an illusion. This article addresses seven supposed negative effects of the Industrial Revolution. The conclusion is that history bears little resemblance to the sanitized image of preindustrial times in the popular imagination.


When Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber, declared in 1995 that “the Industrial Revolution and its consequences have been a disaster for the human race,” he was voicing a sentiment that now circulates widely online.

Rose-tinted nostalgia for the preindustrial era has gone viral, strengthened by anxieties about our own digital era. Some are even claiming that modernity itself was a mistake and that “progress” is an illusion. Medieval peasants led happier and more leisurely lives than we do, according to those who pine for the past. “The internet has become strangely nostalgic for life in the Middle Ages,” journalist Amanda Mull wrote in a piece for The Atlantic. Samuel Matlack, managing editor of The New Atlantis, observed that there is currently an “endless debate around whether the preindustrial past was clearly better than what we have now and we must go back to save humanity, or whether modern technological society is unambiguously a forward leap we must forever extend.”

In the popular imagination, the Industrial Revolution was the birth of many evils, a time when smoke-belching factories disrupted humanity’s erstwhile idyllic existence. Economics professor Vincent Geloso’s informal survey of university students found that they believed “living standards did not increase for the poor; only the rich got richer; the cities were dirty and the poor suffered from ill-health.” Pundit Tucker Carlson has even suggested that feudalism was preferable to modern liberal democracy.

Different groups tend to idealize different aspects of the past. Environmentalists might idealize preindustrial harmony with nature, while social traditionalists romanticize our ancestors’ family lives. People from across the political spectrum share the sense that the Industrial Revolution brought little real improvement for ordinary people.

In 2021, History.com published “7 Negative Effects of the Industrial Revolution,” an article reflecting much of the thinking behind the popular impression that industrialization was a step backward for humanity, rather than a period of tremendous progress. But was industrialization really to blame for each of the ills detailed in the article?

“Horrible Living Conditions for Workers”

Were horrible living conditions a result of industrialization? To be sure, industrial-era living conditions did not meet modern standards—but neither did the living conditions that preceded them.

As historian Kirstin Olsen put it in her book, Daily Life in 18th-Century England, “The rural poor . . . crowded together, often in a single room of little more than 100 square feet, sometimes in a single bed, or sometimes in a simple pile of shavings or straw or matted wool on the floor. In the country, the livestock might be brought indoors at night for additional warmth.” In 18th-century Wales, one observer claimed that in the homes of the common people, “every edifice” was practically a miniature “Noah’s Ark” filled with a great variety of animals. One shudders to think of the barnlike smell that bedchambers took on, in addition to the chorus of barnyard sounds that likely filled every night. Our forebears put up with the stench and noise and cuddled up with their livestock, if only to stave off hypothermia.

Homes were often so poorly constructed that they were unstable. The din of collapsing buildings was such a common sound that in 1688, Randle Holme defined a crash as “a noise proceeding from a breach of a house or wall.” The poet Dr. Samuel Johnson wrote that in 1730s London, “falling houses thunder on your head.” In the 1740s, “props to houses” keeping them from collapsing were listed among the most common obstacles that blocked free passage along London’s walkways.

“Poor Nutrition”

What about poor nutrition? From liberal flower children to the “Make America Healthy Again” crowd, fetishizing the supposedly chemical-free, wholesome diets of yore is bipartisan. The truth, however, is stomach-churning.

Our ancestors not only failed to eat well, but they sometimes didn’t eat at all. Historian William Manchester noted that in preindustrial Europe, famines occurred every four years on average. In the lean years, “cannibalism was not unknown. Strangers and travelers were waylaid and killed to be eaten.” Historian Fernand Braudel recorded a 1662 account from Burgundy, France, that lamented that “famine this year has put an end to over ten thousand families . . . and forced a third of the inhabitants, even in the good towns, to eat wild plants. . . . Some people ate human flesh.” A third of Finland’s population is estimated to have died of starvation during a famine in the 1690s.

Even when food was available, it was often far from appetizing. Our forebears lived in a world where adulterated bread and milk, spoiled meat, and vegetables tainted with human waste were everyday occurrences. London bread was described in a 1771 novel as “a deleterious paste, mixed up with chalk, alum and bone ashes, insipid to the taste and destructive to the constitution.” According to historian Emily Cockayne, the 1757 public health treatise Poison Detected noted that “in 1736 a bundle of rags that concealed a suffocated newborn baby was mistaken for a joint of meat by its stinking smell.”

Water was also far from pristine. “For the most part, filth flowed out windows, down the streets, and into the same streams, rivers, and lakes where the city’s inhabitants drew their water,” according to environmental law professor James Salzman. This ensured that each swig included a copious dose of human excreta and noxious bacteria. Waterborne illnesses were frequent.

“A Stressful, Unsatisfying Lifestyle”

Did stressful lifestyles originate with industrialization? Did our preindustrial ancestors generally enjoy a sense of inner peace? Doubtful. Sadly, many of them suffered from what they called melancholia, roughly analogous to the modern concepts of anxiety and depression.

In 1621, physician Robert Burton described a common symptom of melancholia as waking in the night due to mental stress among the upper classes. An observer said the poor similarly “feel their sleep interrupted by the cold, the filth, the screams and infants’ cries, and by a thousand other anxieties.” Richard Napier, a 17th-century physician, recorded over several decades that some 20 percent of his patients suffered from insomnia. Today, in comparison, 12 percent of Americans say they have been diagnosed with chronic insomnia. Stress is nothing new.

Sky-high preindustrial mortality rates caused profound emotional suffering to those in mourning. Losing a child to death in infancy was once a common—indeed, near-universal—experience among parents, but the loss was no less painful for all its ordinariness. Many surviving testimonies suggest that mothers and fathers felt acute grief with each loss. The 18th-century poem, “To an Infant Expiring the Second Day of Its Birth,” by Mehetabel “Hetty” Wright—who lost several of her own children prematurely—heartrendingly urges her infant to look at her one last time before passing away.

So common were child deaths that practically every major poet explored the subject. Robert Burns wrote “On the Birth of a Posthumous Child.” Percy Bysshe Shelley wrote multiple poems to his deceased son. Consider the pain captured by these lines from William Shakespeare’s play King John, spoken by the character Constance upon her son’s death: “Grief fills the room up of my absent child. . . . O Lord! My boy, my Arthur, my fair son! My life, my joy, my food, my all the world!” Shakespeare’s own son died in 1596, around the time the playwright would have finished writing King John.

Only in the modern world has child loss changed from extraordinarily common to exceedingly rare. As stressful as modern life can be, our ancestors faced forms of heartache that most people today will never endure.

“Dangerous Workplaces” and “Child Labor”

Dangerous workplaces and child labor both predate the Industrial Revolution. In agrarian societies, entire families would labor in fields and pastures, including pregnant women and young children. Many preindustrial children entered the workforce at what today would be considered preschool or kindergarten age.

In poorer families, children were sent to work by age 4 or 5. If children failed to find gainful employment by age 8, even social reformers unusually sympathetic to the plight of the poor, would express open disgust at such a lack of industriousness. Jonas Hanway was reportedly “revolted by families who sought charity when they had children aged 8 to 14 earning no wages.”

For most, work was backbreaking and unending. A common myth suggests that preindustrial peasants worked fewer days than modern people do. This misconception originated from an early estimate by historian Gregory Clark, who initially proposed that peasants labored only 150 days a year. He later revised this figure to around 300 days—higher than the modern average of 260 working days, even before factoring in today’s paid holidays and vacation time.

Physically harming one’s employees was once widely accepted, too, and authorities stepped in only when the mistreatment was exceptionally severe. In 1666, one such case occurred in Kittery, in what is now Maine, when Nicholas and Judith Weekes caused the death of a servant. Judith confessed that she cut off the servant’s toes with an axe. The couple, however, was not indicted for murder, merely for cruelty.

“Discrimination Against Women”

The preindustrial world was hardly a model of gender equality—discrimination against women was not an invention of the early industrialists but a long-standing feature of many societies.

Domestic violence was widely tolerated. In London, a 1595 law dictated: “No man shall after the houre of nine at the Night, keepe any rule whereby any such suddaine out-cry be made in the still of the Night, as making any affray, or beating hys Wife, or servant.” In other words, no beating your wife after 9:00 p.m. That was a noise regulation. A similar law forbade using a hammer after 9:00 p.m. Beating one’s wife until she screamed was an ordinary and acceptable activity.

Domestic violence was celebrated in popular culture, as in the lively folk song “The Cooper of Fife,” a traditional Scottish tune that inspired a country dance and influenced similar English and American ballads. To modern ears, the contrast between its violent lyrics and upbeat melody is unsettling. The song portrays a husband as entirely justified in his acts of domestic violence, inviting the audience to side with the wifebeater and cheer as he beats his wife into submission for her failure to perform domestic chores to her husband’s satisfaction.

Sexist laws often empowered men to abuse women. If a woman earned money, her husband could legally claim it at any time. For instance, in 18th-century Britain, a wife could not enter into contracts, make a will without her husband’s approval, or decide on her children’s education or apprenticeships; moreover, in the event of a separation, she automatically lost custody. Mistreatment of women, in other words, long predated industrialization. Arguably, it was the increase in female labor force participation during the Industrial Revolution that ultimately gave women greater economic independence and strengthened their social bargaining power.

“Environmental Harm”

While many of today’s environmental challenges—such as climate change and plastic pollution—differ from those our forebears faced, environmental degradation is not a recent phenomenon. Worrying about environmental impact, however, is rather new. Indeed, as historian Richard Hoffmann has pointed out, “Medieval writers often articulated an adversarial understanding of nature, a belief that it was not only worthless and unpleasant, but actively hostile to . . . humankind.”

Consider deforestation. The Domesday Survey of 1086 found that trees covered 15 percent of England; by 1340, the share had fallen to 6 percent. France’s forests more than halved from about 30 million hectares in Charlemagne’s time (768–814) to 13 million by Philip IV’s reign (1285–1314).

Europe was hardly the only part of the world to abuse its forests. A 16th-century witness observed that at every proclamation demanding more wood for imperial buildings, the peasants of what are today the Hubei and Sichuan provinces in China “wept with despair until they choked,” for there was scarcely any wood left to be found.

Despeciation is also nothing new. Humans have been exterminating wildlife since prehistory. The past 50,000 years saw about 90 genera of large mammals go extinct, amounting to over 70 percent of America’s large species and over 90 percent of Australia’s. 

Exterminations of species occurred throughout the preindustrial era. People first settled in New Zealand in the late 13th century. In only 100 years, humans exterminated 10 species of moa in addition to at least 15 other kinds of native birds, including ducks, geese, pelicans, coots, Haast’s eagle, and an indigenous harrier. Today, few people realize that lions, hyenas, and leopards were once native to Europe, but by the first century, human activity eliminated them from the continent. The final known auroch, Europe’s native wild ox, was killed in Poland by a noble hunter in 1627.

Progress Is Real

History bears little resemblance to the sanitized image of preindustrial times in the popular imagination—that is, a beautiful scene of idyllic country villages with pristine air and residents merrily dancing around maypoles. The healthy, peaceful, and prosperous people in this fantasy of pastoral bliss do not realize their contented, leisurely lives will soon be disrupted by the story’s villain: the dark smokestacks of the Industrial Revolution’s “satanic mills.”

Such rose-colored views of the past bear little resemblance to reality. A closer look shatters the illusion. The world most of our ancestors faced was in fact more gruesome than modern minds can fathom. From routine spousal and child abuse to famine-induced cannibalism and streets that doubled as open sewers, practically every aspect of existence was horrific.

A popular saying holds that “the past is a foreign country,” and based on recorded accounts, it is not one where you would wish to vacation. If you could visit the preindustrial past, you would likely give the experience a zero-star rating. Indeed, the trip might leave you permanently scarred, both physically and psychologically. You might long to unsee the horrors encountered on your adventure and to forget the shocking, gory details.

The upside is that the visit would help deromanticize the past and show how far humanity has truly come—emphasizing the utter transformation of everyday lives and the reality of progress.

This article was published at Big Think on 11/19/2025.

Blog Post | Environment & Pollution

What Climate Science Really Says | Podcast Highlights

Marian Tupy interviews Roger Pielke Jr. about the latest climate research and how to think clearly about climate change.

Listen to the podcast or read the full transcript here.

Today I’m joined by Dr. Roger Pielke Jr., a Professor Emeritus at the University of Colorado Boulder, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and author of influential books like The Honest Broker and The Climate Fix. He’s a leading voice on the politicization of science and climate policy, and his scholarship is known for being rigorous, data-driven, and impartial.

I want to spend most of our time talking about climate change and global warming, but let’s start by looking at the extremes in the climate change debate.

People who are critical of the dominant view that climate change is a crisis or even a problem will say things like CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere are much lower than they were in the distant past, or that CO2 is vital for life, it is plant food, so there is nothing to worry about. What is wrong with that point of view?

Science supports global greening and the fact that CO2 levels were higher in the past. Where that goes away from scientific understanding is the “nothing to worry about” part.

The late Steve Schneider, who was a famous climate scientist and climate activist, once said that the fundamental challenge of climate change is that outcomes could be very benign, or they could be very serious, and we won’t know the difference during the time that we need to prepare. So, both extremes—the apocalyptics and the “don’t worry, be happy” folks—are guilty of selectively interpreting evidence. The reality is that both outcomes are in the spectrum of possibilities, but smart decision-making has to consider that entire spectrum, not just one tail of the distribution.

Is there such a thing as an optimal amount of CO2 in the atmosphere?

The simple answer is, as a risk management problem, the emission of carbon dioxide through the burning of fossil fuels has risks associated with change. And those risks could be profound. So, limiting the rate of change is much more important than whether 425 parts per million is better than 350 or 575.

There is also the question of trade-offs. For example, by emitting more CO2 into the atmosphere, we are making the world much richer. So, even if we do emit a lot more CO2, society in the future will be much richer and much more technologically advanced than we are, and they’ll be able to take care of any problems.

Humans are a fantastically inventive species. And it’s absolutely true that fossil fuels, which have the side effect of emitting carbon dioxide, have been central to human progress. One data point, a trend that I don’t think many people are aware of, is that the carbon dioxide intensity of economic activity—carbon dioxide per unit of GDP—has been dropping for decades. So, as we’ve become wealthier, we’ve also become much less carbon-intensive. As a species, we really like getting more output for less input, and we like cleaner-burning fuels. So, if that trend were to continue, we do at some point go over the hump of increasing carbon dioxide emissions, and they start going down.

In fact, right now, over the last decade, emissions have plateaued. There are small increases, but they’re within the margin of error measurement. So, there is a background force of decarbonization that has nothing to do with climate policy. I know it’s not as fast as some would like, and it could be faster, but decarbonization is just a fundamental reality of human civilization.

Now let’s address the other side of the extreme: people who believe that climate change is an existential crisis, and to avert it, we need to shrink the global economy. What’s wrong with that picture?

The big problem with that view is that the vast majority of people on this planet have no interest in degrowth. There are not very many politicians able to win an election by campaigning on making people poorer. The reality is that any successful path to decarbonizing the economy has to be accompanied by greater growth and wealth for most people. There are 5 or 6 billion people who do not enjoy anything close to the energy consumption that people who are watching this podcast get to enjoy every day. So, the world’s going to consume more energy no matter what degrowthers say.

What do you think about the very out-there techno-optimist view, which is that we should aim to have the technological sophistication and wealth necessary to completely control the climate? That’s a kind of sci-fi scenario that I sometimes hear.

I think we should get as wealthy as possible and be able to make our way through a volatile environment as safely as possible. The idea that there’s going to be a control panel where we can perfect climate conditions is science fiction. I have no expectation we’ll ever be doing that. The track record of humans trying to influence ecosystems is horrible.

We hear about this with proposals to “geoengineer” the climate. And full disclosure, I signed onto a geoengineering non-use letter, because it’s the height of arrogance for us to think that we can control the climate system. It’s like gain-of-function research on viruses. Yeah, maybe you’ll learn something, but maybe you’ll kill 20 million people. So, I’m not a big fan of the “control panel” approach to climate.

I want to now turn to specific concerns that people have when it comes to climate change. Let’s start with the rising global temperatures and extreme heat. What does the latest research say about this problem?

What I normally do—and I think this is a good practice in any area where science and politics meet—is I start with assessments that have been put together by authoritative bodies.

In this case, that’s the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which is a sprawling, massive thing. It’s got three working groups and many dozens of chapters and hundreds of authors. But it’s a touchpoint for assessing the science. The IPCC gets some things right and some things wrong. But in general, Working Group 1, with its focus on extreme events, has pretty much called things straight over the past 30 years.

When it comes to extreme heat, the IPCC says that there has been an increase in heat waves around the world. It’s been detected, to use their language, and they attribute that increase of heat waves to human causes, including increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere.

The World Health Organization has argued that with effective adaptation, the number of people who should die from excessive heat is zero. We have air conditioning, we have weather forecasts and good warnings. The challenge is that those adaptations to heat are not well implemented everywhere around the world. If places that are adapted to one level of temperature start seeing a greater frequency of heat waves, they will need to adapt.

The other factor is that ecosystems are far less adaptable than humans are. If it’s 110 outside, I can come inside in the air conditioning. Ecosystems can’t do that. So, material changes in the physical environment can have profound consequences for ecosystems.

Okay, now onto changes in precipitation patterns.

The extreme weather phenomenon the IPCC has the second-highest confidence in is an increase in heavy downpours, which they call “extreme precipitation.”

People have to be careful with that. And the IPCC, to its credit, is very careful. Extreme precipitation is not the same thing as flooding. Here in Boulder, Colorado, if we got 2 centimeters of rain today, that would be extreme precipitation, but it wouldn’t cause a flood. I wish we would get 2 centimeters of rain.

There has been a documented increase in the activity of the hydrological cycle around the world due to increasing temperatures. It hasn’t been detected everywhere, and the numbers are not super large in the context of natural variability, but they’ve been detected and attributed. However, the IPCC has low confidence that flooding has increased globally. Flooding is very difficult to document because we manage so many river basins. We change runoff patterns through urbanization and agricultural irrigation. So, flooding is much more confounded than precipitation itself.

Extreme weather events, especially hurricanes, cyclones, wildfires, and droughts.

We need to take these one by one.

I’ve studied tropical cyclones for 30 years, which includes hurricanes, and the IPCC gets this one right: there is no convincing evidence that there are more hurricanes or more intense hurricanes over the period of record. The IPCC is clear on that, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in the US is very clear on that.

Hurricanes have become a kind of poster child of climate change. They’re very photogenic. Al Gore had one coming out of a smokestack in his famous movie. However, hurricanes are probably one of the worst places to look for any signals of climate change. There are only 60 to 80 hurricanes on planet Earth in any given year. That’s a small number of events when you compare it to the millions and millions of temperature measurements we take every year.

Flooding, as I said, has no detection or attribution. Drought, for most metrics of drought, again, no detection or attribution. The one distinction that the IPCC makes is soil moisture deficits, basically dry land, which is associated with warming more than it is with precipitation. Winter storms, again, no detection or attribution there.

You have to be careful with wildfires because the wildfire record is very confounded by human land management. While we might be able to tease out trends in wildfires, attributing causality is much more difficult. There are some published studies out there that say that warming, particularly in, say, the western United States, has led to an increase in fire-prone conditions. There is also good research that says before the human settlement of North America, the intensity and scale of wildfires were much, much greater than anything we’ve seen, so we actually have a fire deficit.

Moving swiftly onto ocean warming and acidification.

I’m glad you brought those up. Despite all the arguments that have been made over the decades about the surface air temperature and the location of thermometers and things like that, it turns out that the best place to look for a signal of warming is the oceans. Over the last several decades, there have been very good temperature measurements showing that most of the energy imbalance caused by our emission of greenhouse gases is actually going into the oceans.

Onto acidification. So about half of the carbon dioxide we emit is taken up by the oceans, and that changes the chemistry of the oceans. On the one hand, it’s a good thing that the oceans are absorbing carbon dioxide because then there’s less of a radiative effect in the atmosphere. But on the other hand, it means we’re changing the chemistry of the ocean, and that will have impacts on sea life. If you go through all that math, this is one place that takes you to net zero. To stop changing the chemistry of the ocean, we couldn’t just reduce emissions to the amount that the oceans are taking up; we would have to reduce emissions to zero.

My next concern, melting ice and glaciers, is also tied to the rising sea levels and so forth. So maybe you can talk about that.

Runoff from glacial melt and also melt from Greenland, and to some degree from Antarctica, is contributing to sea level rise. That’s tightly associated with warming and has been attributed to human causes. There are also other factors beyond warming. Something I was fascinated to learn about from one of my colleagues at the University of Colorado was that when we put particulates in the atmosphere, and it precipitates out in snow, it changes the albedo—basically, the snow is a little darker because it has soot in it—and the snow melts faster.

Understood. Let’s talk a little bit about the different climate change scenarios. How much warming have we experienced? What are the worst and the best-case scenarios? And what does the most likely scenario mean for the planet?

That’s a great question.

Using a preindustrial baseline of 1850 to 1900, the world has already warmed about 1.5 degrees Celsius.

The projections are, as you say, scenarios. They’re a function of what we think the global population will be, how big the economy will be, where we’re going to get our energy from, and how we apply that energy in the economy. Last December, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change said that the world is headed to 2.2 to 2.5 degrees Celsius by 2100. It just so happens that it aligns very nicely with a paper I did with Justin Ritchie and Matt Burgess.

I call this one of the best-kept secrets in all of climate science.

It wasn’t so long ago that those same types of projections were looking at 4, 5, 6 degrees Celsius by 2100. They’ve come down dramatically, not because of anything to do with the physical science of climate, but because our expectation for future emissions has come down dramatically. There was an assumption that coal, the most carbon-intensive fuel, was going to fuel everything around the world. And it turns out we’re not going in that direction.

Another big factor, and one that really hasn’t made its way into climate projections yet, is the changing projections of the global population. The leading climate scenarios still have 12 or 13 billion people on the planet in 2100. And demographers are now seriously talking about the global population peaking under 10 billion and then going down to maybe 7 billion in 2100. Once that gets factored in, projected temperature ranges are going to drop further.

Climate change has morphed from something that was plausibly extreme—I don’t think existential threat was ever the right language, but possibly extreme—to something that looks a lot more manageable. It’s a troublesome condition that will require a lot of action, but it’s not going to be the end of the world.

So, you actually had a paper some time ago where you nailed the trajectory of global warming with great precision. And that fantastic performance didn’t protect you in American academia. Meanwhile, people who wheel out the RCP 8.5 scenario, where everything is run on coal, get columns in major newspapers.

What on Earth is going on?

Extreme results are a lot more attractive to journals. And if you use an extreme climate scenario, you’re going to get extreme results. Journals like to put out press releases, and so the more shocking the headline, the more likely it is that it’s going to get picked up. At the same time, climate advocacy for decades now has focused on the notion of an existential threat, and extreme studies feed that notion.

Another factor is that the climate community updates its scenarios only every 10 to 20 years. Imagine doing economic policy with data from 2006 in 2026. It’s crazy. The energy system modelers update their energy scenarios every year. That’s one reason why it’s easy, I would say, to come up with better projections than you find in the IPCC, because they’re still using scenarios from two decades ago. If you use a more updated scenario, as we did, for energy consumption, population, and GDP, you’ll be much more accurate than one that was based on 2005 data.

It seems to me that the extreme environmentalist viewpoint has begun to come to an end. The break really came in 2022 with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting spike in energy prices.

Do you agree with that?

Yeah, I think that’s right. The price shock in Europe following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was an eye-opener. People really do want action on the environment and on climate, but they don’t want to do it at the expense of their monthly utility bill.

I don’t think that the extreme environmental movement is going to completely disappear. The concern about overpopulation never really ended; it kind of faded away. I think that’s the best model for extreme environmentalism focused on climate. There will continue to be a segment of people, particularly in the scientific community, who emphasize apocalyptic scenarios and existential threats, but policymakers around the world have become much more focused on the security of energy, the price of energy, and energy access. For a long time, energy policy was discussed as if it were a subset of climate policy, and climate policy was the dominant framing. I think that has now reversed. Climate policy is now rightly viewed as a subset of energy policy. But don’t make any mistake: the radical wings on either side are going to remain with us.

The Human Progress Podcast | Ep. 78

Roger Pielke: What Climate Science Really Says

Roger Pielke Jr. joins Marian Tupy to discuss the latest climate research and how to think clearly about climate change.

Cambridge University Press | Conservation & Biodiversity

Khulan Return to Former Mongolian Range After Long Absence

“The Asiatic wild ass, or khulan, Equus hemionus, is native to the arid landscapes of Central and East Asia. Although the Mongolian Gobi supports the largest population, the species remains threatened by habitat fragmentation, competition with livestock, illegal hunting and climate change. Historically, the khulan ranged widely across Mongolia, including the Eastern Steppe. However, the construction of the fenced Trans-Mongolian Railway in the mid 20th century created a near-continuous barrier to movement, leading to the species’ local extinction east of the railway. In 2019, a pilot conservation initiative removed sections of the fence and documented the first confirmed crossing of the Trans-Mongolian Railway by a khulan in over 6 decades. To assess the current status of khulan east of the railway, we combined GPS data from 29 collared individuals in the South Gobi with distance sampling and opportunistic field surveys. We recorded two confirmed crossings near the Zamiin–Uud border during the winters of 2023 and 2024. Additionally, during field surveys in 2024 we observed 384 khulan in four groups east of the railway. These findings provide the first confirmed evidence of khulan recolonization within their historical range and establish a baseline for future conservation efforts.”

From Cambridge University Press.

The Guardian | Conservation & Biodiversity

Melbourne Zoo Hopes to Safeguard Victorian Grassland Earless Dragon

“The dragons’ lair looks deceptively ordinary: a pair of pale green portables, tucked behind the reptile enclosure at Melbourne zoo.

But the plain exterior belies its hidden treasures. Inside, dozens of Victorian grassland earless dragons, blissfully unaware of their status as Australia’s most imperilled reptile, are basking on rocks, gobbling up crickets or lapping up ‘dew’, expertly misted by their keeper Zac Harkin.

For 50 years these critically endangered creatures were thought extinct. But following their rediscovery in 2023, Zoos Victoria is not taking any chances.

The new dragon conservation centre at Melbourne zoo has room to accommodate hundreds, housed as singles or pairs in open-air glass condos, each one furnished with living plants and artificial burrows made of PVC piping.”

From The Guardian.