01 / 05
The End of the Housing Affordability Crisis

Blog Post | Housing

The End of the Housing Affordability Crisis

The decline of housing affordability has been a policy choice.

Summary: Americans have enjoyed extraordinary gains in material abundance, yet housing in recent decades stands out as a stubborn exception. Home prices in many parts of the United States have risen faster than incomes, placing growing pressure on renters and first-time buyers. The problem is not an inevitable market failure but the predictable result of supply constraints—especially land-use regulations—that can be reformed to increase affordability.


Americans have seen tremendous advances in the availability and abundance of material goods. As Marian L. Tupy and Gale Pooley from the Cato Institute have shown, the most basic necessity of food became eight times more affordable over the 100 years up to 2019, relative to average wages (the food inflation after 2019 set us back a little bit, but the long-run trends are still quite favorable). This increasing abundance is not limited to food alone, as a wide variety of finished goods have become much more affordable in recent decades.

These positive trends are well known for goods and even some services, such as cosmetic surgeries, but a common objection, both on social media and in real life, is: What about housing? That is a fair question, considering that Americans spend about 25 percent of their pre-tax annual income on housing, which has been a fairly constant share of their income for most of the past 125 years. Given the large share of the budget that housing costs represent, and the failure of housing to decline as a share of the budget as other necessities did, it is worth investigating the problem further.

On housing, the critics do have a point: Housing costs across the US and many other nations have quickly outpaced income growth in recent years. While we shouldn’t be nostalgic for the housing of the 1950s—houses were about half the size of today’s and had fewer amenities we now consider standard, such as air conditioning—nostalgia for the housing of 30 years ago might be justifiable.

Since 1994, two common measures of housing prices, the Case-Shiller Index and the US Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Median Sales Price data, have increased faster than most measures of income, including median family income and average wages. And unlike the change since the 1950s, the recent increase in housing prices can’t be primarily explained by houses getting bigger: The median square footage of new homes sold has increased only 16 percent since 1994 and has even been falling in the past decade.

Even more so, to the extent housing has become more expensive relative to wage growth in recent years, the trend could worsen over the next 30 years—unless we quickly change policy to allow the supply of housing to increase.

It may seem puzzling that housing could remain roughly the same share of income on average in the US, even as housing prices have increased faster than incomes in recent decades. This seeming puzzle can be resolved by thinking about two different kinds of households: renters and homeowners. While renters and homeowners may certainly be different in many ways—renters tend to be younger, poorer, and so on—there is a fundamental difference in how they experience increases in the price of housing. Renters are typically subject to new market-rate rents on a regular basis, often annually. However, if homeowners remain in the same house they are generally insulated from these changes, with only insurance and property taxes possibly increasing annually, not their principal and interest on the mortgage.

These intuitions are borne out in the data. According to the BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey, in 1984 the share of income that renters spent on housing was about 30.4 percent, which rose over the next four decades to 34.4 percent. Homeowners saw the opposite pattern, with the share of their income spent on housing falling from 27.7 percent in 1984 to 22.6 percent in 2024. The overall average has been fairly stable, but the experience of renters and homeowners has diverged.

The Facts of Housing Unaffordability

Historically, the rule of thumb in the United States is to spend no more than 30 percent of income on housing—though as we saw above, on average Americans spend less than that. But averages can obscure cost burdens for some households. According to an analysis of the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey data by Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies (JCHS), fully one-third of US households spent over 30 percent of their income on housing, and 16 percent of households spent over half of their income on housing in 2024. The number of cost-burdened households has been steadily rising in recent years, as the price of both homes and rentals has increased faster than incomes in most of the US.

We can see the problem of rising home values relative to income by looking at another rule of thumb: Home prices should be in the range of three and five times a household’s annual income. In 1994, out of the United States’ 387 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), 263 had median home prices that were less than three times the median household income (the data once again come from Harvard’s JCHS). Only 12 MSAs in 1994—mostly in California and Hawaii—had ratios above 5.0.

Fast-forward to 2024, when there were 114 MSAs above the 5.0 ratio of median home prices to income, and those were scattered all over the country. Instead of being in just California and Hawaii, they were also in previously affordable states such as Montana, Wisconsin, North Carolina, and Arkansas. In 2024, the number of MSAs with price-to-income ratios below 3.0 had dwindled to just 32, many of them in the dying Rust Belt. And you don’t even need to go back to 1994 to see the dramatic change. As late as 2019, there were still well over 100 MSAs with a price-to-income ratio below 3.0.

While the majority (241 MSAs) are still within the suggested range of three to five times a household’s income, many are pushing toward the upper end of that range. Given the trend—the median ratio crept up from 2.65 in 1994 to 4.27 in 2024—it is not unreasonable to expect the ratio to continue to increase, absent any changes in policy.

The challenge of housing affordability is not unique to the United States. Using the home-price-to-income ratio from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), since 1994 the US saw home prices increase by 20 percent more than incomes did, meaning that housing is more expensive in real terms. Some other countries were in a much worse situation: Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom all had over 80 percent increases in the ratio of housing prices to income. Not every country followed the same pattern, though. In New Zealand, the price-to-income ratio rose by 126 percent between 1994 and 2021. The ratio declined to 80 percent in 2024. And Japan’s price-to-income ratio fell by 25 percent from 1994 to 2024. However, even Japan has recently seen a modest increase in the ratio, by about 14 percent in the past decade. We’ll look at New Zealand and Japan in more detail below.

The Fix for Housing Affordability

But something can be done. While there have been several political solutions proposed, most of those focused on the demand side, such as subsidies to homeowners or renters. Those kinds of solutions are suboptimal because they increase demand, which will only further increase prices if supply does not also increase. The real problem is on the supply side: There is not enough new housing being built in the places people want to live and of the size people want. What is preventing additional building? In most of the US, it is land-use restrictions such as zoning and other policies that limit the density of new homes. Australia and countries across Europe have implemented similar policies that limit the construction of housing in various ways, primarily in the first half of the 20th century. Price increases did not show up immediately, because in most places restrictions were not binding constraints; there was plenty of land in favorable locations until recent decades.

A major restriction on the supply of housing comes in the form of single-family zoning, which prevents multifamily housing (everything from duplexes to skyscraper apartments) from being built in residential areas. A 2019 analysis by the New York Times found that about 75 percent of residential areas in US cities are reserved for single-family homes. In some cities that figure may reach over 85 percent. Of course, most families probably aspire to eventually own a single-family home, but the zoning laws force most land to be dedicated to this form of housing for everyone. That contributes to making housing unaffordable for many younger families today.

Land-use restrictions limit supply in ways that go beyond merely proscribing that most lots be reserved for single-family homes. For example, regulations will often require lots to be of a minimum size, which is counterproductive because land area is often the most expensive part of the property in urban settings, and the regulation forces families to purchase more land than they want. Regulations also set a maximum amount (a common range is 40–60 percent) of the lot that can be covered by the building itself, essentially forcing homes to have large lawns. Again, many families might want a large lot with a large lawn, but these regulations require it for everyone. The problem is that the less land dedicated to the home itself, the less land there is for other homes in the same area. These rules preclude single-family home types that were common in the past in large American cities, such as row houses or townhouses, which typically occupy most of the small lots they sit on.

Zoning Reforms Work

Would reforming land-use regulations really increase the supply of housing and make it more affordable? The available evidence indeed suggests it would.

One example of reform is New Zealand’s largest city, Auckland, which in 2016 reformed residential zoning to allow for more intensive housing—duplexes, triplexes, townhomes, and the like—on most residential land. This process is referred to as “upzoning.” The results were staggering: As documented in a paper published in the Journal of Urban Economics, construction boomed, with permits doubling in five years. The economists who studied this reform found that rents were 26–33 percent lower than they would have been without it. Rents kept skyrocketing in the rest of New Zealand but stabilized in the parts of Auckland that were upzoned. As mentioned above, New Zealand is notable for seeing its home-price-to-income ratio fall after 2021: As rents stabilized and incomes continued to grow, the ratio declined.

Another example comes from Houston, the fourth-largest city in the US. Houston has long been known as the shining example of a major US city that never adopted citywide zoning, even though some neighborhoods have private deed restrictions that incorporate features similar to zoning. But despite eschewing traditional zoning, Houston still has land-use regulations of various sorts. For example, like most cities, Houston prescribed a minimum lot size of 5,000 square feet. Because people would’ve been paying for more land than they needed, alternate forms of housing such as townhomes were less likely to be built.  First in 1998 and then in 2013, Houston reduced the minimum lot size to just 1,400 square feet in parts of the city. As Mercatus Center economist Emily Hamilton shows, there was a boom in construction following the reforms. Despite adding over 1 million people between 1970 and 2020, Houston still managed to have median home prices below the national average.

If Houston and Auckland demonstrate the power of local reform, Tokyo shows what is possible when a nation treats housing as essential infrastructure rather than a matter set by local competing interest groups. As urban scholar André Sorensen details in The Making of Urban Japan (2002), the country stripped municipalities of the power to block code-compliant projects, effectively turning zoning into a national “right to build” rather than a discretionary local negotiation. The results of this policy choice are astonishing. According to a 2016 analysis by the Financial Times, the city of Tokyo consistently builds more new housing each year than the entire state of California or the whole of England, despite having little empty land to spare. By removing the “veto points” that plague Western cities, Tokyo has achieved the status of a growing, vibrant mega-city where rents have remained flat for decades.

Allowing the Market to Increase Supply Keeps Housing Affordable

As families become richer and the population grows, there is increasing pressure on housing prices in desirable locales. The natural market response to increasing prices is to increase supply. Unfortunately, in much of the US and the rest of the developed world, governments have put artificial barriers in place to prevent this market response. While the housing shortage was created by the political process—through the establishment of zoning and other land-use regulations—the solution does not need to come from governments in the form of subsidizing demand. Instead, to unleash the forces of the market and human initiative, governments need to ease regulations on supply.

Land-use regulations are not the only interference in the market process that makes housing less affordable. Some forms of trade policy and protectionism can also harm home prices. For example, the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) estimates that recent tariff increases for lumber and other inputs can add at least $10,000 to the average price of a home. Even more costly are building regulations, which the NAHB estimated could exceed $90,000 for a typical home in 2021 and were around 40 percent of the cost of multifamily housing such as apartment buildings. While not all of these regulations could be eliminated immediately, the best thing governments can do to address the affordability issue in housing is to figure out how they can get out of the way.

Manhattan Institute | Economic Freedom

Idaho Nearly Halved Its Regulatory Code

“For decades, most state regulatory systems have operated on autopilot. Once a rule is adopted, it usually stays in force unless someone can marshal the time, political will, and technical knowledge to repeal it. That default favors regulatory accumulation. Agencies add rules to address new problems, implement new statutes, satisfy federal requirements, or respond to isolated incidents. But old rules rarely receive the same scrutiny. Over time, the regulatory code grows not because every rule remains necessary but because inertia protects what already exists.

Idaho broke that pattern. And that state’s example can teach a lesson to states all over the country.

Beginning in 2019, Idaho used two related mechanisms to reset and then review its entire administrative code. First, after the legislature did not enact the customary bill extending existing rules, Governor Brad Little directed agencies to republish only the subset of rules considered necessary to that agency. But crucially, these were retained as temporary rules.

Second, the governor issued Executive Order 2020-01,[1] which required executive-branch agencies to review and generally repeal and replace each remaining rule chapter on a staggered five-year schedule covering 2021–25, with a legislative review concluding in 2026.

This issue brief refers to these combined steps as Zero-Based Regulation (ZBR). Through these two steps, instead of asking only which regulations should be repealed, Idaho required agencies to justify which provisions should remain. That shift produced one of the most dramatic state-level regulatory reductions in recent memory: by the end of the ZBR cycle on July 1, 2026, Idaho had eliminated roughly half (49.1%) of its regulatory code. Regulatory volume fell in each of the eight annual code publications from 2019 to 2026 under ZBR.”

From Manhattan Institute.

Blog Post | Economic Freedom

How Pessimism Puts Progress at Risk

There are dangers in believing the myth that everything is getting worse.

Summary: Humanity enjoys unprecedented prosperity and longevity, yet many people believe the world is getting worse. That misdiagnosis risks fueling populist policies, from tariffs and immigration restrictions to wealth taxes and hostility to technology, which threaten the freedom and openness that made modern progress possible. Sustaining progress requires recognizing its achievements and defending the principles that made them possible.


It was not in his celebrated oath but rather in Of the Epidemics that Hippocrates wrote: “As to diseases, make a habit of two things—to help, or at least to do no harm.” 

That principle reflects a basic truth of medicine: The misdiagnosis of a disease can be worse than no treatment at all. A serious illness—thought to be something minor—can progress untreated until the patient suffers serious damage or mortality. And mistaking one condition—or no condition at all—for another can result in treatment that is ineffective at best and dangerous at worst.

The same logic applies to what is happening today in the United States and other major countries around the world. At a time of unprecedented prosperity, technological advances that continue to make lives better and longer, and unparalleled distributions of these benefits to every corner of the globe, we endure a constant drumbeat of negativity that tells us this progress is an illusion. The public is persistently told that “the system is rigged” against them, that they are becoming poorer rather than richer and that their children will be the first generation in centuries to be worse off than their parents. The “American carnage” cited by US President Donald Trump in his first inaugural address is the very embodiment of this mindset.

It’s not true. By virtually any measure—income, longevity, hours at leisure, the harnessing of technology for convenience and entertainment, and the diminishment of extreme poverty around the world—today is the best time ever to be alive as a human being nearly anywhere on the planet.

In other words, humanity today is in better health than it has ever been. Populists, in response, are recommending chemotherapy.

And like any misdiagnosis, this one carries big risks of doing harm. It has stoked a populist backlash threatening to move us away from the freedom and openness that have been the engines of our success. It also increases the likelihood that we will double down on bad policies and unhelpful government interventions that are themselves the source of many economic challenges.

Age of Abundance

Humorist P.J. O’Rourke was fond of reminding us that the ordinary men and women of today’s world are freer and enjoy more material benefits than at any time since the beginning of civilization. If we were to think there was a golden era of the past in which we’d rather live, P.J.’s famous quip sobers us up with one word: dentistry.

The point is not that the past lacked virtues, but that we often overlook the quiet improvements that make life much better. Extreme poverty has disappeared for much of the world. In 1981, 42 percent of the world’s population lived on less than $3 per day. Today, that has fallen to less than 10 percent. And in the developed world, incomes and gross domestic product (GDP) per capita continue to grow nearly every year.

Innovation doesn’t just make us richer. Medical breakthroughs are removing barriers to longer, better lives: Smallpox has been eradicated; polio is on the ropes; HIV is now treatable for many; and vaccines prevent millions of deaths every year. Since 1990, the global mortality rate for children under five has fallen more than 50 percent, enabling millions more children every year to survive to adulthood. 

Time, they say, is our most precious resource, and medical innovation, better nutrition and more comfortable living conditions are creating much more of it. Since 1900, global life expectancy has more than doubled from about 32 years to more than 73 years today. And just recently we learned that life expectancy in the United States likely reached another record high of nearly 80 years in 2025.

Have these data been cherry-picked? Jump into these extensive datasets and explore trends in longevity, income and wealth, medicine, nutrition, violence and tolerance, the environment and more. Decide for yourself. It won’t take long for you to be convinced that human well-being has never been greater in a world that is freer and more peaceful than ever before.

Engine of Prosperity

The tremendous progress of the past 300 years has created the extraordinary living standards and conditions we enjoy today. Before this, the human condition had barely changed for thousands of years.

Freedom and openness, exemplified by the ideas of the Enlightenment and the values of the American Revolution, created the conditions under which this improvement could occur. As absolute government gave way to self-government that better protected citizens’ rights and liberties and as freedom allowed entrepreneurs to reap the benefits of their hard work and novel ideas, an incentive structure was created that encouraged individual initiative and innovation.

Meanwhile, freedom and individual liberty engendered the openness by which innovation and progress could flourish: open trade, freer migration and greater receptiveness to new ideas and experimentation. The experience of these last few centuries is a vindication of Adam Smith’s contention that “little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice”. 

Smith’s formula captured the essential conditions for sustained progress. Peace provides a positive environment for trade, migration and the sharing of ideas. Easy taxes ensure that entrepreneurs, workers and investors retain enough of the rewards of their efforts to encourage risk-taking innovation. And a tolerable administration of justice preserves the individual rights and freedoms on which markets depend.

As with today’s living standards, this can also be confirmed with data. In the Economic Freedom of the World: 2025 Annual Report, co-published in the United States by the Fraser Institute and the Cato Institute, the degree of economic freedom is calculated and compared for 165 countries. Economic freedom is measured by reference to the size of government, the protection of property rights, monetary soundness, the freedom to trade and the amount of regulation.

Based on the 2023 data used in the report, the correlation between freedom and income is compellingly strong. The world’s countries are divided into quartiles from least free to most free. Measured by per capita GDP, people in the 25 percent most-free countries earn on average in excess of six times more than people in the 25 percent least-free countries.

And the advantages of living in a free country go well beyond money. Compared to those in the least-free quartile, those in the most-free quartile live an average of 17 years longer and work nearly 17 percent less. In the least-free quartile, the poverty rate is 25 times higher, and the rate of infant mortality is nearly 10 times higher compared to the most-free quartile.

Cognitive Dissonance

So, if things are so good, why are we reluctant to believe it? Why are we willing to listen to populists on both sides when they tell us that things are bad and life is getting tougher?

The first reason is that there’s a market for bad news. If The New York Times proclaimed on its front page: “115,000 People Worldwide Escaped from Extreme Poverty Yesterday”, would it sell more newspapers? Probably not. Or at least not as well as a political scandal, natural disaster or other tragedy. But that astounding statistic is, in fact, the average daily drop in extreme poverty over the past 25 years.

Second, without a doubt, life can be difficult. It’s natural to focus on one’s daily challenges and not consider how well off we are in the context of history. Even today, certainly the best time to be alive, earning a living and raising children aren’t easy. And as well off as we may be, there will always be someone more fortunate or some item of consumption that’s out of our reach. This makes us feel worse off.

Many middle-class Americans, while living better than their parents and grandparents, can feel strapped by the high costs of housing, health care for their families and higher education for their children. Ironically, the challenge of accessing these key products has stimulated government interventions that have greatly increased their costs and exacerbated accessibility challenges.

In each of these sectors, policies have been pursued that have restricted supply (for example, through licensing requirements, zoning and land-use regulations or accreditation) while subsidizing demand through a variety of mechanisms. Any economics undergraduate should recognize that simultaneously restricting supply and subsidizing demand will generate price inflation. Yet when it does, the policy response is often not to unwind these counterproductive approaches but to double down and further subsidize demand. Thus, policies that are well-intentioned at best—or politically motivated at worst—can create what is perceived as an affordability “crisis”.

Do No Harm

To believe things are getting worse when they have, in fact, never been better is a classic misdiagnosis. And like a medical misdiagnosis, it risks ill-advised treatment when a popular groundswell for government intervention encourages populist leaders happy to oblige. Yet such policies will always have the opposite effect—exacerbating the problems they’re intended to address. 

By far the most worrisome dynamic is that these interventions could move us away from the freedom and openness that have been the source of our prosperity and well-being, compromising the beautiful trendline of progress and rising wealth that has persisted for more than two centuries. And the continuation of that trend is not a foregone conclusion. This misdiagnosis fuels zero-sum thinking that motivates attacks on the very things—such as freer trade and migration—that have contributed substantially to our benefit.

Already, this is happening. The index of global economic freedom highlighted in the Economic Freedom of the World: 2025 Annual Report hit an all-time peak in 2019. It has since declined sharply, particularly in the wake of the heavy-handed policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. (But the rise of economic populism and discontent in developed economies has likely also played a part.) The index of economic freedom in the United States has steadily eroded since 2000 and has dropped sharply since 2017.

But beyond any index, we can see these threats clearly in the policy environment, particularly in the backlash against immigration in much of the West, the turn against open trade and the imposition of high and erratic tariffs in the United States. The US political arena has also experienced a stoking of class warfare, attacks on entrepreneurs as “oligarchs” and agitation for the imposition of wealth taxes. Antipathy toward technology companies exists on both extremes of the political spectrum. And this sentiment is spreading to technology itself, as exemplified by the growing resistance to artificial intelligence (AI) and attendant infrastructure such as data centers.

It’s nothing short of dangerous when public sentiment turns against innovation and innovators and against the very openness and freedom that have created our wondrous modern world. And it’s ironic when this is driven by misperceptions about the true state of the world and the economy. As Daniel Hannan, a notable British advocate for openness and trade, observed, “Open markets lifted billions from poverty, added decades to our lives, gave us powers that previous generations attributed to wizards or gods. And we never noticed.”

It’s time for us to take notice and to defend the principles that have brought us to this point. This is how the upward march of progress and prosperity will continue, creating the brightest possible futures for those who come next.

This article originally appeared in International Banker on 9/15/2026.

Blog Post | Income & Inequality

Solving the Conundrum of Status Competition

A free-market economy does not abolish the competition for status, but it gives people more places to compete.

Summary: Prosperous societies can produce more educated, ambitious people than established prestige systems can accommodate. When recognition depends on a narrow set of institutions, status competition intensifies and frustration grows. Independent platforms, new institutions, and emerging industries can create alternative paths to achievement. Economic and technological dynamism can therefore ease the pressures of status competition by expanding the arenas in which people can succeed.


The Democratic Socialists of America are having a moment. The group’s membership passed 120,000 members in July, overtaking the Eugene Debs-era Socialist Party of the early 20th century as the largest socialist organization in American history. New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani is a democratic socialist, and DSA candidates won a handful of primary elections over the summer. The DSA’s rise is often attributed to inequality, resentment, or ambition. But critics have pointed out that many DSA members are highly educated or come from wealthy families, so something else must be at play. 

People compete for more than income. They compete for reputation, recognition, influence, and rank. The economist Fred Hirsch described such goods as “positional” in his Social Limits to Growth (1976). More food, housing, or energy can make many people better off simultaneously. Status works differently. Simply handing out more titles within a single hierarchy does not create more prestige, because relative rank within any given ladder is zero-sum.

Joseph Schumpeter identified a related problem in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942). He argued that prosperous societies would educate more people than established prestige systems could absorb. Many would acquire the education and expectations associated with elite positions without obtaining them. Some, he thought, would respond by turning against the source of that prosperity—the free-market system. Schumpeter’s prediction has not aged badly. 

Status competition is most consequential when many people depend on the same hierarchy for recognition, income, or professional identity, especially when alternatives are scarce and exit is costly.

Academia illustrates the mechanism. Scholars compete for jobs, tenure, publications, grants, and recognition within the same institutional system. Years of specialized training can make exit difficult. A scholar who has invested a decade acquiring specialized skills may have few opportunities to obtain comparable income and standing elsewhere.

Relative advantage can be pursued by improving one’s own position or by reducing the standing or opportunities of competitors. The first can involve producing research, teaching, or discovery. The second can involve challenging a rival’s competence or fitness for membership without producing an equivalent intellectual contribution. That does not mean criticism is illegitimate or that every dispute is driven by status. Ideological disagreements can be sincere, and institutions need mechanisms for identifying error and misconduct. The narrower point is that institutional arrangements affect incentives. When one hierarchy controls a large share of available rewards, the potential payoff from influencing membership and advancement within it increases.

For much of the 20th century, journalism operated in a similar way. A small number of newspapers, magazines, and television networks controlled access to national audiences. Losing a position at an important publication could mean losing both income and public visibility.

The internet changed that. Journalists and commentators can now reach audiences through newsletters, podcasts, YouTube, and other platforms. A writer rejected by a newspaper can publish directly on Substack or a personal website and promote work via social media. A broadcaster without a network contract can still reach millions on X or YouTube. Competition for status remains and has arguably grown harsher, but failure in one hierarchy no longer determines a person’s prospects elsewhere.

Academia is beginning to experience the same change. Scholars can reach readers through subscription platforms, podcasts, and online lectures. Preprint servers allow research to circulate before journals approve it. Private laboratories and research institutes offer employment outside conventional departments. Organizations such as Arcadia Science and the Arc Institute are experimenting with funding scientists rather than rigid project proposals, providing multi-year support to follow promising questions without the constraints of predefined deliverables.

Alternative teaching institutions are also emerging outside legacy university systems. The University of Austin—founded as an independent, tenure-free institution dedicated to open inquiry—enrolled its first undergraduate class in 2024. Meanwhile, Peterson Academy bypasses campus infrastructure entirely, offering low-cost, recorded university-level courses that have attracted more than 80,000 subscribers. These institutions remain small, but they do not need to replace established universities to matter. They need only provide credible alternatives for some students, teachers, or scholars.

Those alternatives remain incomplete. Scientific research can require laboratories, equipment, teams, and funding that individuals cannot access or provide independently. Credentials still matter in medicine, law, and other professions. Capital requirements and network effects can also concentrate opportunities.

Government policy can strengthen or weaken this concentration. When research funding, accreditation, licensing, or other forms of authorization channel people through the same institutions and evaluation systems, policy can reinforce common hierarchies. Dispersing authority among independent funders, accreditors, jurisdictions, and institutions can create more routes to advancement.

The objective should not be to eliminate hierarchy. Reputation conveys information. Organizations need ways to identify competence. Competition for recognition can motivate effort and discovery. Relative rank cannot become abundant in the way food or energy can. The objective should be to multiply independent arenas in which people can succeed.

That is one reason economic and technological dynamism matters beyond higher income. New firms, industries, technologies, and institutions create new occupations and forms of achievement. The automobile created the mechanic and the highway engineer. Software created the programmer and the product manager. Each of these technologies built ladders that did not exist before.

Stagnation creates fewer such openings, and collectivist policies tend to yield stagnation, whether they come from the left or the right. Ambitious people must compete for a more fixed set of positions, making success or failure within existing institutions more consequential. A free-market economy does not abolish the competition for status, but it gives people more places to compete.

This article originally appeared in The Dispatch on 9/15/2026.

Reason | Economic Freedom

New York City Moves to Cut Small-Business Red Tape

“New York City government isn't known for cutting red tape. But this week, New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani (yes, the democratic socialist) announced more than 50 reforms that would eliminate unnecessary regulations and high permitting and licensing fees for small businesses.

The reforms, unveiled on Monday, cover a variety of small business issues, from outdoor dining rules to pawnbroker licenses. During a speech in the Bronx, Mamdani announced that the city would work with the state to eliminate the frozen dessert permit, which requires restaurants that already have food permits to 'seek out a superfluous second permit for what they're already doing.'

He also said the current state of regulatory affairs for barbershops is 'anti-fade,' as shop owners must obtain three different permits to operate their business. Mamdani announced the city would work with the state to streamline those permits as well. Among dozens of other reforms, the Mamdani administration will also reduce street fair vendor permit fees, speed up restaurant inspections, and cut equipment registration fees from $110 to $0 for 12 months…

In addition to these proposed regulatory changes, Mamdani signed an executive order on Monday creating a task force of city agencies that will continue to identify opportunities for reform.”

From Reason.