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The “ADHD Epidemic” Is Just an Overdiagnosis Epidemic

Blog Post | Mental Health

The “ADHD Epidemic” Is Just an Overdiagnosis Epidemic

Screen time gets the blame, but the increase in diagnoses comes more from subjective criteria interacting with financial incentives.

Summary: The rapid rise in ADHD diagnoses reflects expanding diagnostic criteria and financial incentives as much as any increase in impairment. Traits such as distractibility, high activity, and shifting attention often represent ordinary developmental or cognitive variation, especially among children expected to conform to rigid classroom routines. Digital media reshapes attention rather than simply damaging it, strengthening some abilities while weakening others. More reliable diagnoses require tighter criteria, independent assessments, and systems that do not create perverse financial incentives.


The sharp increase in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) diagnoses—nearly doubling among American children between 1997 and 2022, and more than tripling among adults from 2012 to 2023—has been chalked up to better screening, increased awareness, and the corrosive effects of smartphones and social media on developing brains. None of these factors holds up well under scrutiny.

The diagnostic category itself has been steadily widened by the institutions that define it and the financial structure that rewards every participant for applying the ADHD label. As we have argued in our Cato Institute analysis of how the American healthcare system rewards psychiatric overdiagnosis, subjective diagnostic criteria interact with a payment system that rewards diagnosis to produce predictable inflation across psychiatric categories. The result is labeling ordinary behavior as pathological. ADHD is among the cleanest case studies of that pattern.

Foraging minds in an industrial classroom.

Human cognition was shaped over hundreds of thousands of years in small foraging bands, where attentional flexibility was an asset rather than a liability. A child who scanned the horizon, registered novel stimuli, and shifted focus rapidly between threats and opportunities was a child more likely to survive. Sustained, narrowly channeled attention to a single abstract task for hours at a time was simply not part of the ancestral environment, and the cognitive machinery to produce such concentration on demand was never uniformly selected for. What we now call distractibility is, in another light, vigilance. Most animals, including ancestral humans, evolved to be constantly on the lookout for novelty and threat.

Mass schooling, which emerged in the 19th century in part to prepare children for industrial labor, asks something quite different. It asks 6- and 7‑year-olds to sit still in rows, suppress physical movement, attend to a single voice for extended stretches, and produce written output on a fixed schedule. Most children adapt. The variance in how easily they do so is enormous, and the children at the lower tail of conformity to that demand have come to define the diagnostic category.

Boys end up there more often than girls, for reasons that are not mysterious. Boys, on average, are more physically active, take longer to develop self-control, and are more drawn to rough play. The same pattern shows up in other mammals and tracks the effects of testosterone on brain development. Put boys in a room and tell them to sit still for six hours, and a predictable share of them will fail, not because they are mentally ill but because they are boys. The youngest children in any classroom are also more likely to be diagnosed with ADHD than their older peers, a finding so robust across studies and countries that it points to ordinary developmental variation rather than disease.

The evolutionary frame also provides a more nuanced understanding of the fear that screen time in childhood harms brain development and attention span. The brain is plastic, especially in childhood, and it adapts to the environment it is given. That plasticity is precisely what allowed generations raised under modern industrialized education systems to develop the sustained attention style that schools reward, despite it being so far from our environment of evolutionary adaptedness. But a generation that grows up navigating fast-moving feeds, switching between applications, and processing rapid streams of visual information will predictably develop a different attentional profile than one raised on books and chalkboards.

That does not mean the learning or attention span of youth raised on digital technology is impaired. Heavy media multitaskers and habitual users of touchscreen devices do tend to perform worse on tasks that demand sustained, narrowly focused attention and inhibitory control. But they also tend to perform better on tasks that demand rapid visual search, parallel processing of multiple objects, and flexible reallocation of attention. Action video game play, in particular, has been shown to enhance visual selective attention, processing speed, and the spatial resolution of vision. These effects transfer beyond the trained task, improving general abilities to track several moving things at once, spot relevant objects in a crowded scene, and pick out a target faster when surrounded by distractions.

These cognitive trade-offs elucidate how neural plasticity gives rise to different forms of intelligence. The brain has a finite budget of computational and metabolic resources, and the cortex reallocates them in response to the demands placed on it. The clearest demonstrations come from sensory deprivation: In people who lose their sight, the visual cortex does not simply lie fallow but is recruited for auditory and tactile processing, including Braille reading, with measurable gains in those domains. Congenitally deaf individuals show analogous repurposing of the auditory cortex for vision and smell. Every brain is continuously specializing toward whatever it does most, and different cognitive skillsets have different trade-offs.

A brain trained on rapid feeds and parallel streams gets better at rapid visual search, switching, and parallel processing while getting worse at slow, serial, endogenous focus. A brain trained on long books and chalkboards makes the opposite trade. The picture is not simply that screens damage children’s brains or lower their intelligence. Claims of generalized cognitive harm typically rest on measures of a single attentional style, the one schools happen to demand, and ignore the capacities that grow on the other side of the ledger. Calling the resulting attentional profile ADHD, treating it as a chronic illness, and medicating it accordingly is a category error. The trade-offs are real, but the diagnostic system measures only the deficits because only the deficits are reimbursable.

From hyperkinetic boys to inattentive adults.

The diagnostic category we now call ADHD has been progressively widened almost from the moment it entered the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the reference text published by the American Psychiatric Association that defines the criteria for every recognized psychiatric condition in the United States. The DSM-II, published in 1968, listed the condition as “hyperkinetic reaction of childhood” and described it in a single sentence, focused on the restless, disruptive child, almost always identified as a boy, who would supposedly grow out of the condition by adolescence. The DSM-III, in 1980, renamed it attention deficit disorder, with or without hyperactivity, and for the first time treated inattention as a stand-alone presentation rather than a symptom of restlessness. That single revision opened the category to a far larger population of children, especially girls, whose attentional patterns had previously been invisible to the diagnostic system.

The DSM-III‑R, in 1987, folded the subtypes back together and introduced the current acronym, ADHD. The DSM-IV, in 1994, separated the disorder again into three presentations—predominantly inattentive, predominantly hyperactive-impulsive, and combined—and explicitly extended the diagnosis into social, academic, and vocational contexts beyond childhood. Studies comparing the DSM-III‑R and DSM-IV criteria directly found that prevalence rose from 9.6 to 17.8 percent under one set of comparisons and from 7.3 to 11.4 percent under another, almost entirely on the strength of newly identified inattentive cases. The DSM‑5, in 2013, raised the age-of-onset requirement from 7 to 12 and lowered the symptom threshold for adults.

Each revision expanded the population eligible for diagnosis, and, with it, the population eligible for stimulant prescriptions, academic accommodations, and disability protections. The trajectory runs in one direction. There is no edition of the DSM in which the criteria for ADHD became more restrictive.

The incentive problem.

Layered atop the definitional and developmental story is a set of economic incentives that quietly lower the threshold for diagnosis. A growing share of these diagnoses now comes from primary care clinicians rather than specialists, reflecting how rapidly ADHD treatment has migrated into routine primary care, and how the expansion of telehealth lowered the friction of obtaining a prescription.

One of the clearest examples of incentives for overdiagnosis comes from how we finance education. When special-education funding is tied to specific diagnoses, schools have a built-in reason to identify more students with ADHD, because the label unlocks additional resources. Researchers have documented systematic differences in diagnosis and treatment that align with funding formulas rather than with underlying disease rates, a pattern consistent with third-party financial incentives shaping who gets labeled. Clinicians do not work in isolation; they respond to expectations from schools, families, and the broader system. Once stakeholders recognize that a diagnosis unlocks services, pressure to apply the label tends to grow.

Primary care clinicians typically practice in fee-for-service systems, where assigning a diagnosis makes the encounter billable and enables reimbursement for follow-up visits and medication management. Patients have their own incentives to seek the diagnosis, including academic accommodations, workplace protections, and access to performance-enhancing stimulants such as Adderall. In an environment where the condition is defined by subjective criteria rather than objective tests, it is unsurprising that some individuals exaggerate or feign symptoms to obtain those benefits.

The pattern is by now familiar. As we documented in our analysis of Medicaid-funded autism therapy, the broadening of autism criteria, combined with open-ended reimbursement, produced an explosion in spending on applied behavior analysis that far outpaced any plausible change in the prevalence of disabling autism. The broadening of ADHD criteria has produced a parallel surge in stimulant prescriptions, and our recent piece against the campaign to formalize “social media addiction” anticipates the same trajectory if that diagnosis is formalized. In each case, subjective diagnosis and financial incentives that reward diagnosis push the boundaries of illness outward.

What this should teach us.

The growth in diagnoses is best understood as the cumulative output of several systems, each behaving in a way its incentives reward. Definitions expand because there is little institutional pressure to keep them tight. Clinicians diagnose because diagnosis is what the system pays for. Schools refer because referrals bring resources. Patients seek labels because labels bring access to special accommodations. The aggregate effect is a steady erosion of the line between ordinary human variation and clinical disease.

That erosion has costs. Children whose ordinary inattentiveness is medicated as a chronic condition, adults who organize their identities around a label, and patients with severely impairing ADHD whose treatment resources are diluted across an ever-larger pool all bear those costs. The path to more reliable diagnoses runs through more reliable incentives: tighter criteria, independent assessments, and payment structures that do not reward expanding the definition of illness. Policymakers should stop structuring schools, insurers, and healthcare systems so that people must acquire a medical diagnosis to receive help, accommodations, or reimbursement.

Children today have greater safety, resource availability, and tools for education than any cohort in human history. It is the schoolroom that asks kids to sit still for hours and the diagnostic system that pathologizes the ones who cannot that are the more unusual and pathological features of modernity. A more honest accounting would distinguish severely impairing attentional disorders from the wider band of ordinary human variation. It would recognize that the temperaments now most likely to be medicalized are, in a different setting, the temperaments that helped aid survival and human progress.

This article originally appeared in The Dispatch on 5/13/2026.

Fierce Biotech | Mental Health

Psychedelic Drug Wins Third Phase 3 Anxiety Trial

“Definium Therapeutics has scored a third straight phase 3 win for its LSD formula, with the psychedelic significantly alleviating anxiety symptoms and setting up an FDA filing next year.

While the Panorama trial did compare Definium’s DT120 ODT to placebo, the study also pitted the 100 μg dose against a 50 μg dose, which is meant to still be psychoactive but not produce any therapeutic benefit. Panorama enrolled 245 patients.

DT120 easily trounced placebo as it did in the phase 3 Voyage trial a month ago, reducing scores on the Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale (HAM-A) by 9.8 points at week 12 after treatment compared to 4.7 points for the placebo.

This 5.1-point difference between the 100 μg dose and placebo beat the 3.6-point placebo-adjusted mark seen in the 52-patient 50 μg dose arm, though the 50 μg group was not powered for statistical analysis. In the previous Voyage trial, 100 µg DT120 scored a 5.4-point placebo-adjusted reduction in HAM-A score.

DT120 also notched a phase 3 win in major depressive disorder in June. The drug is given in a single eight-hour session during which patients are monitored by a chaperone who guides them through the effects.”

From Fierce Biotech.

Blog Post | Mental Health

The Young Are Betrayed by the Politics of Doom

Young people are being taught to confuse despair with intelligence.

Summary: Contemporary culture often mistakes despair for wisdom, teaching young people to view democracy, technology, climate, and the future itself through an apocalyptic lens. Although serious risks demand honesty, exaggerated pessimism can cultivate helplessness and discourage constructive action. Young people therefore need proportionate realism that acknowledges danger while affirming human agency and the possibility of progress.


Adults tell them that democracy is dying, capitalism is exploitation, technology is dehumanizing, climate change is collapse, Russia is at the door, and the next generation will be poorer, angrier, and less free. To question this doom script is to risk being accused of naivety, complacency, or moral failure. Then the same adults wonder why the young seem anxious about the future.

This is not seriousness. It is a culture teaching helplessness and calling it maturity.

None of that means young people should be fed cheerful propaganda. The world plainly has serious problems. Wars happen. Institutions fail. Technologies can be misused. Climate change is real. Families struggle. Many young people face housing costs, mental-health pressures, and a political arena that often feels both hysterical and strangely small.

Then again, hard problems do not become easier because we learn to describe them in the darkest possible language. A culture that turns every difficulty into apocalypse and every risk into proof of collapse should not be surprised when the young start to believe the future is something to fear rather than shape.

The strange part is that the lesson of darkness is being taught to the generation with more tools at its fingertips than any before it. A teenager with an internet connection can now reach lectures, books, markets, networks, design tools, translation systems, coding assistance, and increasingly powerful AI. Young people can learn, build, publish, trade, code, design, organize, and create in ways that would have sounded absurdly utopian a few decades ago.

AI matters here because it is not just another technology story. It is increasingly likely to reshape just about everything: science, medicine, education, energy, defense, productivity, and the nature of work itself. It also changes who gets to play. More young people can now move from reading about problems to working on them.

That is why Sebastian Mallaby’s The Infinity Machine, his biography of Sir Demis Hassabis — the British AI researcher and entrepreneur, who co-founded Google DeepMind and now serves as its chairman and as Alphabet’s chief scientist — is useful. It is not a book of cheap optimism. It is full of danger, rivalry, and uncertainty. But it also reminds us of something our public culture too often forgets: the future is not simply something that happens to people. It is something people build.

Hassabis is a useful figure because his story is not really about gadgets or hype. It is about a habit of mind. Go, the ancient board game, was supposed to be too intuitive for machines. Protein folding was one of biology’s great unsolved problems. Both looked, to many people, like frontiers that might not move for a very long time. Both did move, because people stopped treating the frontier as an impregnable wall and started treating it as a problem to be attacked.

AlphaFold is the cleanest example. Protein folding was not solved by fatalism, committee rhetoric, or moralized despair. It was solved by imagination, computation, persistence, and institutional ambition — work for which Hassabis and his DeepMind colleague, John Jumper, shared the 2024 Nobel Prize in Chemistry. A decades-old scientific problem moved because better tools arrived — and because people knew what to do with them.

That is the habit of mind worth passing on to the young. Not that every problem is easy. Not that every technology is good. Not that progress is automatic. But that hard problems are not made easier by dressing up despair as wisdom. They are challenges to understand, test, and solve.

The contrast, which can also be found inside the younger generation, is already striking. Some young founders, engineers, and researchers are acting like doers: building tools, testing ideas, attacking problems, and drawing confidence from the fact that they can influence the world around them. Others have been taught to see the future mainly as a threat. Agency is not a cure for anxiety. But it is surely healthier than a public culture that keeps rehearsing helplessness.

It is worth remembering that public discourse does not merely describe reality. It changes how people behave inside it. It tells them what is possible, what is hopeless, what is shameful, and what is worth attempting. Pessimism is therefore never just a mood. Repeated often enough, it becomes an instruction — and then a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Tell people long enough that democracy is dead, and they may stop behaving like citizens. Tell them capitalism is only exploitation, and they may miss the dignity of building a more prosperous future. Tell them technology is only a threat, and they may leave its development to worse people. Tell them the future is already lost, and the most talented among them may decide not to waste their gifts trying to improve it.

That is where our public culture has become so damaging. Alarm is rewarded. Proportion is treated as complacency. Refuse to panic and you are assumed not to understand the stakes. We have become so used to emergency that possibility now must apologize for itself.

Negativity is therefore not a mark of seriousness. Often it is the opposite. It strips people of the agency that serious action requires.

That is not a left-versus-right problem in any simple sense. The establishment version says: trust our institutions, committees, experts, regulations, and emergency powers, or the world falls apart. The anti-establishment version turns the same darkness inside out: every institution is captured, every expert bought, every compromise cowardice, every failure proof that the system must burn.

One side uses fear to preserve authority. The other uses fury to destroy trust. Both flatter the teller. Both feed the appetite for heroes and villains. Both leave the young smaller than they need to be.

That is what I call the consensus trap. Once pessimism starts to sound profound, doubt becomes expensive. Before long, the crowd has not merely reached a conclusion. It has built a moral identity around it. The more constructive voices — the Steven Pinkers, Matt Ridleys, and Hans Roslings of this world — are left homeless, too positive for the establishment and too practical for the rage of the insurgents.

The result is a culture that misprices risk, opportunity, and timing. It overreacts to dangers that are theatrical or ideologically useful. It underreacts to dangers that are slow, boring, or inconvenient. And it misses opportunities, because opportunity rarely arrives with the emotional force of a threat.

Humanity nonetheless has a remarkable record of solving problems once treated as permanent. Filthy cities became cleaner. Child mortality fell. Famine declined. Vaccines, sewers, electricity grids, antibiotics, trade, education, and technological learning changed the conditions of human life. Not by magic. Not without mistakes or new problems. But because human beings, often when under massive pressure, produced solutions.

Progress was not made by those who explained, with great sophistication, why nothing could be done. It was made by those who tried anyway. In the long contest between doers and cannot-doers, it is not hard to see which side has built the better world.

The burden of proof should therefore fall more often on the doom-mongers. Not because pessimists are always wrong. They are not. But because hysteria should not automatically pass for seriousness.

Young people do not need propaganda, sedation, or TED-talk optimism. They can see the risks. What they do not need is an adult world that turns every difficulty into apocalypse, helps cultivate anxiety, and then congratulates itself on being realistic.

Instead, young people — along with the rest of us — need proportion: a more honest account of both danger and human ingenuity.

The future is still open. Every generation has had its doom-mongers, convinced that decline was irreversible, technology would ruin us, morals were collapsing, and the next crisis would be the one from which we never recovered. Yet humanity kept adapting. Not because pessimists were always wrong about every danger. They were not. But because they so often underestimated the adaptability and inventiveness of human beings — and of society itself.

The task is not to promise each new generation that everything will be fine. It is to stop telling them, directly or indirectly, that nothing can be done. To teach the young to fear the future rather than shape it is not realism. It is betrayal.

Wall Street Journal | Mental Health

Psychedelic Outperforms Placebo in Late-Stage Trial

“Shares of Definium Therapeutics jumped more than 10% Wednesday morning after the biotech company said its experimental psychedelic drug helped reduce anxiety. DT120, a fast-dissolving tablet form of lysergide, was tested in a late-stage trial of 214 people with generalized anxiety disorder. Those taking the drug saw anxiety levels drop by more than those on placebo, Definium said.”

From Wall Street Journal.