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Javier Milei and the Future of Latin America | Podcast Highlights

Blog Post | Economics

Javier Milei and the Future of Latin America | Podcast Highlights

Chelsea Follett interviews Daniel Raisbeck about the recent election of Javier Milei and what it means for the future of Argentina and the rest of Latin America.

Listen to the full podcast episode or read the full transcript here.

What are some of the most promising events in Latin America today?

Of course, the election of Javier Milei. He took office on December 10th, and it’s all quite encouraging. He had a large decree that repealed many laws and modified others to liberate the Argentine economy, which is currently one of the most regulated economies in the world.

It will depend, of course, on congress and the courts which can potentially block many of his initiatives. Here at Cato, my colleague Gabriel Calderon and I have focused on his main proposal: the dollarization of Argentina’s economy. In general, we think it’s a very good policy, but in that respect, I’ve been disappointed with the beginning of Milei’s government. We can discuss that further if you like.

First, let’s set the stage. Could you describe the situation in Argentina before Milei?

Well, the main problem was inflation, which was around 140 percent at the time of his election in November. And, of course, this is caused by the central bank. Argentina’s central bank is particularly irresponsible even within a Latin American context. Argentina also has one of the most regulated economies in the world. Forty percent of the population is living in poverty, and its economy hasn’t grown in over a decade.

This is especially sad because Argentina was incredibly successful in the 19th century. Its 1853 constitution was drafted based on the ideas of a classical liberal author called Juan Bautista Alberdi, who basically called for free trade, unrestricted industry, free immigration, and infrastructure to connect the country. And that’s what they did. It wasn’t immediate; it took a few decades, but from 1880 to 1916, you had this very successful export model that made Argentina into one of the richest countries in the world. Then, in 1916 and 1920, with everything that was happening in the world, nationalism took hold in Argentina and eventually morphed into Peronism, which is the standard, prototypical Latin American corporatist ideology. There has been a very clear decline ever since.

Could you talk more about Milei’s political beliefs?

Milei describes himself as a classical liberal or a libertarian and even as an anarcho-capitalist. He was actually trained as a neoclassical economist, but he relatively recently became an adherent of the Austrian School. And he’s been very open about it. He has never tried to soften his stances to appease some section of the electorate. He is also very talented at explaining economic concepts like the causes of inflation or the effects of regulation in a way that the public can understand.

Can you talk a little bit about the classical liberal tradition in Argentina?

Argentina has many classical liberal economists. At a per capita level, it’s probably the highest percentage in Latin America. They also have a long tradition of think tanks beginning in the 1950s. One particular think tank was started by a gentleman called Alberto Benegas Lynch, who corresponded with Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek. So, Argentina has a rich intellectual tradition in the Austrian School.

You mentioned dollarization. Could you talk more about this policy?

Dollarization means granting the US dollar legal tender or at least getting rid of exclusive legal tender for a national currency. Panama was born dollarized in 1904, and more recently, Ecuador dollarized in 2000 amid a crisis similar to what Argentina is facing now. El Salvador dollarized in 2001 after facing a similar crisis the previous decade.

When you dollarize, you end up with inflation levels akin to those of the United States. That might seem high from a US perspective after the last few years, but when you have 140 percent inflation in Argentina, 7 or 8 percent isn’t so bad. And even with all the problems with the US Federal Reserve, when you compare that to other countries, the dollar is a good option. By taking away the power of local politicians to interfere in the monetary sphere, you get rid of a huge problem. Now, that doesn’t solve all other problems. The governments can still run deficits and have debt problems. But when you have dollarization, those debt problems don’t really affect the private sector and regular citizens. Whereas with a national currency, a debt crisis usually leads to the deterioration of the currency and a loss in purchasing power.

Maintaining that purchasing power is why nobody is thinking about dedollarizing in these countries. Even in Ecuador, when the left-wing strongman Rafael Correa was at the peak of his power and popularity, with 60 percent or above in approval ratings, the dollar was always more popular than he was. That’s also why we think it’s important for Milei to dollarize and dollarize quickly. If the Peronists come back to power, they could overturn a lot of his deregulatory measures, but dollarization would be very difficult for any future government to reverse.

How hopeful are you that he’ll be able to implement dollarization?

Milei had to join forces with former President Mauricio Macri’s party to win the election, and many people in that party do not favor dollarization. Luis Caputo, the person that Milei put in charge of the finance ministry, who was also one of Macri’s finance ministers, has previously spoken out against dollarization. More recently, he has taken the view that the fiscal issue is more important and that dollarization will be a consequence of stabilizing the economy.

Caputo’s plan involves liquefying the debt through inflation. But the thing with liquefying the government debt is that you’re also liquefying everyone’s savings and salary. So, it’s a bold and even dangerous alternative. I also think that dollarization involves a similar process because once the market realizes you’re serious about dollarizing, the obvious thing would be for inflation to begin to fall and for interest rates to come down, but without destroying purchasing power even more. And I think that would be the better scenario.

It’s not clear if this decision was made out of political necessity or if Milei actually believes in what Caputo is doing. Dollarization is a niche policy that only three small countries have accomplished. Even though it’s been terribly successful, especially in bringing down inflation, relatively few economists understand dollarization and how to bring it about.

What other policies has Milei proposed?

His decree and omnibus law aim to deregulate broad swaths of the Argentine economy. One example is they got rid of price controls for rents that dated back to the 1970s. Another one is the Open Skies policy, which allows airlines from abroad to enter the market and even control flights within the country. Previously, they had a scheme to undercut the low-cost airlines in favor of the national airline, which is heavily subsidized. Milei even said he is privatizing the national airline by handing it over to the workers and cutting subsidies. But there’s a wide scope of reforms. These are just some highlights.

Let’s talk about Latin America as a whole. What are some of the biggest obstacles to the region becoming more prosperous?

One that is not well known is the lack of trade within the region. There is a mostly common language and very similar institutions and historical backgrounds, so you would think Latin America is an ideal region for trade. But trading between countries is very difficult. It’s also very difficult to migrate from one Latin American country to another. For instance, Colombia, where I’m from, restricts how many foreigners companies can hire. And this is standard across the region.

Another major problem is that there hasn’t been a very strong classical liberal element in Latin American politics. In the Anglosphere, you had Thatcherism and Reaganism and these types of movements, but the Latin American right has traditionally been very protectionist and corporatist. A right-wing government in Latin America, especially after the era of military dictatorships, might not bring about a humanitarian collapse like in Venezuela, but at the same time, these governments don’t allow their economies to grow. And, of course, if you don’t grow, you won’t be able to lift people out of poverty. That’s the big problem in Latin America: anemic economic growth. And it’s a question of how conscious people are that you need freedom to have that economic growth.

So that’s also why Milei is interesting. He is, of course, breaking from the leftist model but also from the crony capitalist, protectionist, and interventionist right.

We usually try to end on a positive note. What are you the most optimistic about concerning the region’s future?

I’m not going to be terribly original here, but five years ago, if someone had told me that, in a few years, there would be an openly libertarian or anarcho-capitalist president of Argentina, I wouldn’t have believed them. And this is where we are. And I think the lesson is that sometimes it might seem very difficult to enact freedom-oriented reforms, but it can be done. It is being done now. And it’s being done by someone who was very radical in his approach. He wasn’t moderating his principles to convince centrists. He was straightforward. And I think that’s a very positive example to follow.

Science | Agriculture

New Law Lets EU More Quickly Greenlight Gene-Edited Crops

“In a long-awaited step, the European Parliament yesterday passed a law that allows the expedited approval of many gene-edited crops without the rigorous review required for traditional transgenic varieties…

Scientists and seed companies hope the law will lead to faster adoption of crops with improved disease resistance, heat tolerance, and nutrition…

Under the rules, as finalized this week, approval will be faster for crops whose gene edit seems modest enough that it could have been made through conventional breeding—a simple base change in an existing gene, for example, rather than the addition a nonplant gene. Stricter oversight will remain for transgenic engineering or more substantial gene editing.”

From Science.

The Economist | Democracy & Autocracy

Global Democracy Is in Better Shape than You Think

“Grumbling about the health of democracy can sound abstract. But its decline shows up in wars, coups, contested elections and curbs on civil liberties across the world. EIU, our sister organisation, has tracked that slide since 2006. But the latest update to its democracy index suggests a modest break in the trend: the scores of nearly three-quarters of countries held steady or improved over the past year, and the global index rose by 0.02 points—one of the biggest increases since 2012…

The most improved region was Latin America and the Caribbean. After nine years of decline, scores rose in more than half the region’s countries, helped by higher political participation. That trend may happen elsewhere, too. Asia and sub-Saharan Africa have young populations, and recent protests in Nepal, Kenya and Madagascar have drawn large numbers into politics.”

From The Economist.

Blog Post | Housing

The End of the Housing Affordability Crisis

The decline of housing affordability has been a policy choice.

Summary: Americans have enjoyed extraordinary gains in material abundance, yet housing in recent decades stands out as a stubborn exception. Home prices in many parts of the United States have risen faster than incomes, placing growing pressure on renters and first-time buyers. The problem is not an inevitable market failure but the predictable result of supply constraints—especially land-use regulations—that can be reformed to increase affordability.


Americans have seen tremendous advances in the availability and abundance of material goods. As Marian L. Tupy and Gale Pooley from the Cato Institute have shown, the most basic necessity of food became eight times more affordable over the 100 years up to 2019, relative to average wages (the food inflation after 2019 set us back a little bit, but the long-run trends are still quite favorable). This increasing abundance is not limited to food alone, as a wide variety of finished goods have become much more affordable in recent decades.

These positive trends are well known for goods and even some services, such as cosmetic surgeries, but a common objection, both on social media and in real life, is: What about housing? That is a fair question, considering that Americans spend about 25 percent of their pre-tax annual income on housing, which has been a fairly constant share of their income for most of the past 125 years. Given the large share of the budget that housing costs represent, and the failure of housing to decline as a share of the budget as other necessities did, it is worth investigating the problem further.

On housing, the critics do have a point: Housing costs across the US and many other nations have quickly outpaced income growth in recent years. While we shouldn’t be nostalgic for the housing of the 1950s—houses were about half the size of today’s and had fewer amenities we now consider standard, such as air conditioning—nostalgia for the housing of 30 years ago might be justifiable.

Since 1994, two common measures of housing prices, the Case-Shiller Index and the US Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Median Sales Price data, have increased faster than most measures of income, including median family income and average wages. And unlike the change since the 1950s, the recent increase in housing prices can’t be primarily explained by houses getting bigger: The median square footage of new homes sold has increased only 16 percent since 1994 and has even been falling in the past decade.

Even more so, to the extent housing has become more expensive relative to wage growth in recent years, the trend could worsen over the next 30 years—unless we quickly change policy to allow the supply of housing to increase.

It may seem puzzling that housing could remain roughly the same share of income on average in the US, even as housing prices have increased faster than incomes in recent decades. This seeming puzzle can be resolved by thinking about two different kinds of households: renters and homeowners. While renters and homeowners may certainly be different in many ways—renters tend to be younger, poorer, and so on—there is a fundamental difference in how they experience increases in the price of housing. Renters are typically subject to new market-rate rents on a regular basis, often annually. However, if homeowners remain in the same house they are generally insulated from these changes, with only insurance and property taxes possibly increasing annually, not their principal and interest on the mortgage.

These intuitions are borne out in the data. According to the BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey, in 1984 the share of income that renters spent on housing was about 30.4 percent, which rose over the next four decades to 34.4 percent. Homeowners saw the opposite pattern, with the share of their income spent on housing falling from 27.7 percent in 1984 to 22.6 percent in 2024. The overall average has been fairly stable, but the experience of renters and homeowners has diverged.

The Facts of Housing Unaffordability

Historically, the rule of thumb in the United States is to spend no more than 30 percent of income on housing—though as we saw above, on average Americans spend less than that. But averages can obscure cost burdens for some households. According to an analysis of the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey data by Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies (JCHS), fully one-third of US households spent over 30 percent of their income on housing, and 16 percent of households spent over half of their income on housing in 2024. The number of cost-burdened households has been steadily rising in recent years, as the price of both homes and rentals has increased faster than incomes in most of the US.

We can see the problem of rising home values relative to income by looking at another rule of thumb: Home prices should be in the range of three and five times a household’s annual income. In 1994, out of the United States’ 387 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), 263 had median home prices that were less than three times the median household income (the data once again come from Harvard’s JCHS). Only 12 MSAs in 1994—mostly in California and Hawaii—had ratios above 5.0.

Fast-forward to 2024, when there were 114 MSAs above the 5.0 ratio of median home prices to income, and those were scattered all over the country. Instead of being in just California and Hawaii, they were also in previously affordable states such as Montana, Wisconsin, North Carolina, and Arkansas. In 2024, the number of MSAs with price-to-income ratios below 3.0 had dwindled to just 32, many of them in the dying Rust Belt. And you don’t even need to go back to 1994 to see the dramatic change. As late as 2019, there were still well over 100 MSAs with a price-to-income ratio below 3.0.

While the majority (241 MSAs) are still within the suggested range of three to five times a household’s income, many are pushing toward the upper end of that range. Given the trend—the median ratio crept up from 2.65 in 1994 to 4.27 in 2024—it is not unreasonable to expect the ratio to continue to increase, absent any changes in policy.

The challenge of housing affordability is not unique to the United States. Using the home-price-to-income ratio from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), since 1994 the US saw home prices increase by 20 percent more than incomes did, meaning that housing is more expensive in real terms. Some other countries were in a much worse situation: Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom all had over 80 percent increases in the ratio of housing prices to income. Not every country followed the same pattern, though. In New Zealand, the price-to-income ratio rose by 126 percent between 1994 and 2021. The ratio declined to 80 percent in 2024. And Japan’s price-to-income ratio fell by 25 percent from 1994 to 2024. However, even Japan has recently seen a modest increase in the ratio, by about 14 percent in the past decade. We’ll look at New Zealand and Japan in more detail below.

The Fix for Housing Affordability

But something can be done. While there have been several political solutions proposed, most of those focused on the demand side, such as subsidies to homeowners or renters. Those kinds of solutions are suboptimal because they increase demand, which will only further increase prices if supply does not also increase. The real problem is on the supply side: There is not enough new housing being built in the places people want to live and of the size people want. What is preventing additional building? In most of the US, it is land-use restrictions such as zoning and other policies that limit the density of new homes. Australia and countries across Europe have implemented similar policies that limit the construction of housing in various ways, primarily in the first half of the 20th century. Price increases did not show up immediately, because in most places restrictions were not binding constraints; there was plenty of land in favorable locations until recent decades.

A major restriction on the supply of housing comes in the form of single-family zoning, which prevents multifamily housing (everything from duplexes to skyscraper apartments) from being built in residential areas. A 2019 analysis by the New York Times found that about 75 percent of residential areas in US cities are reserved for single-family homes. In some cities that figure may reach over 85 percent. Of course, most families probably aspire to eventually own a single-family home, but the zoning laws force most land to be dedicated to this form of housing for everyone. That contributes to making housing unaffordable for many younger families today.

Land-use restrictions limit supply in ways that go beyond merely proscribing that most lots be reserved for single-family homes. For example, regulations will often require lots to be of a minimum size, which is counterproductive because land area is often the most expensive part of the property in urban settings, and the regulation forces families to purchase more land than they want. Regulations also set a maximum amount (a common range is 40–60 percent) of the lot that can be covered by the building itself, essentially forcing homes to have large lawns. Again, many families might want a large lot with a large lawn, but these regulations require it for everyone. The problem is that the less land dedicated to the home itself, the less land there is for other homes in the same area. These rules preclude single-family home types that were common in the past in large American cities, such as row houses or townhouses, which typically occupy most of the small lots they sit on.

Zoning Reforms Work

Would reforming land-use regulations really increase the supply of housing and make it more affordable? The available evidence indeed suggests it would.

One example of reform is New Zealand’s largest city, Auckland, which in 2016 reformed residential zoning to allow for more intensive housing—duplexes, triplexes, townhomes, and the like—on most residential land. This process is referred to as “upzoning.” The results were staggering: As documented in a paper published in the Journal of Urban Economics, construction boomed, with permits doubling in five years. The economists who studied this reform found that rents were 26–33 percent lower than they would have been without it. Rents kept skyrocketing in the rest of New Zealand but stabilized in the parts of Auckland that were upzoned. As mentioned above, New Zealand is notable for seeing its home-price-to-income ratio fall after 2021: As rents stabilized and incomes continued to grow, the ratio declined.

Another example comes from Houston, the fourth-largest city in the US. Houston has long been known as the shining example of a major US city that never adopted citywide zoning, even though some neighborhoods have private deed restrictions that incorporate features similar to zoning. But despite eschewing traditional zoning, Houston still has land-use regulations of various sorts. For example, like most cities, Houston prescribed a minimum lot size of 5,000 square feet. Because people would’ve been paying for more land than they needed, alternate forms of housing such as townhomes were less likely to be built.  First in 1998 and then in 2013, Houston reduced the minimum lot size to just 1,400 square feet in parts of the city. As Mercatus Center economist Emily Hamilton shows, there was a boom in construction following the reforms. Despite adding over 1 million people between 1970 and 2020, Houston still managed to have median home prices below the national average.

If Houston and Auckland demonstrate the power of local reform, Tokyo shows what is possible when a nation treats housing as essential infrastructure rather than a matter set by local competing interest groups. As urban scholar André Sorensen details in The Making of Urban Japan (2002), the country stripped municipalities of the power to block code-compliant projects, effectively turning zoning into a national “right to build” rather than a discretionary local negotiation. The results of this policy choice are astonishing. According to a 2016 analysis by the Financial Times, the city of Tokyo consistently builds more new housing each year than the entire state of California or the whole of England, despite having little empty land to spare. By removing the “veto points” that plague Western cities, Tokyo has achieved the status of a growing, vibrant mega-city where rents have remained flat for decades.

Allowing the Market to Increase Supply Keeps Housing Affordable

As families become richer and the population grows, there is increasing pressure on housing prices in desirable locales. The natural market response to increasing prices is to increase supply. Unfortunately, in much of the US and the rest of the developed world, governments have put artificial barriers in place to prevent this market response. While the housing shortage was created by the political process—through the establishment of zoning and other land-use regulations—the solution does not need to come from governments in the form of subsidizing demand. Instead, to unleash the forces of the market and human initiative, governments need to ease regulations on supply.

Land-use regulations are not the only interference in the market process that makes housing less affordable. Some forms of trade policy and protectionism can also harm home prices. For example, the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) estimates that recent tariff increases for lumber and other inputs can add at least $10,000 to the average price of a home. Even more costly are building regulations, which the NAHB estimated could exceed $90,000 for a typical home in 2021 and were around 40 percent of the cost of multifamily housing such as apartment buildings. While not all of these regulations could be eliminated immediately, the best thing governments can do to address the affordability issue in housing is to figure out how they can get out of the way.

Bloomberg | Population Growth

Paraguay’s Policies Are Enabling Lower Inflation and Higher Growth

“Wedged between South American heavyweights Argentina and Brazil, Paraguay has long been ignored by the international community. Small, landlocked and poor, it was often seen as just a fly-over country.

So it’s a little surprising — to both those in the capital and in the region — that the country of 6.1 million people is suddenly having a moment…

Though roughly the size of California, Paraguay’s $47 billion economy is about 1% of the Golden State’s. But rapid growth and economic reforms in recent years helped the country win investment-grade credit status from Moody’s Ratings in 2024 and from S&P Global last year…

Last century, it was run as a dictatorship for 35 years — one of the longest in the region, whose fall in 1989 was followed by a tumultuous transition to democracy. But Paraguay’s embrace of sound fiscal and monetary policies after its 2003 financial crisis is now paying off, with single-digit inflation and annual growth averaging around 4% over the past two decades.”

From Bloomberg.