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01 / 05
Grim Old Days: Peter Laslett’s The World We Have Lost

Blog Post | Human Development

Grim Old Days: Peter Laslett’s The World We Have Lost

Poverty and hardship long predated the factory age.

Summary: Before the Industrial Revolution, life in England was marked by widespread poverty, illiteracy, and relentless labor. Even children worked from as young as three. Most people lacked education, political voice, and basic comforts, enduring hunger, disease, and harsh living conditions that kept them in constant proximity to hardship and death. Peter Laslett’s The World We Have Lost reveals that the deprivations often blamed on early industrialization were in fact the norm long before factories and industry.


Peter Laslett’s book The World We Have Lost is an influential history of what life was like in England before the Industrial Revolution. Laslett makes clear that the infamous problems of the industrial era were preexisting, not innovations that first arose with the construction of factories: “The coming of industry cannot be shown to have brought economic oppression and exploitation along with it. It was there already.” His book brings into focus the poverty and hardship faced by preindustrial people and the fact that “we now inhabit a world wealthy on a scale quite unknown before industrialization.”

Laslett describes the dearth of schooling, observing that neither Isaac Newton’s nor William Shakespeare’s parents could read. Inventories from Kentish towns between the 1560s and 1630s show a steady increase from a fifth or less owning books to nearly a quarter, although such inventories were recorded only for prosperous households and thus probably overestimate the extent of book ownership. Leicestershire wills from the 1620s to 1640s show that only 17 percent of people with wills bequeathed books to their heirs, and even among the gentry that figure was only 50 percent.

The “inability to share in literate life cut most men off from even contemplating a share in political power.” And the idea of women attaining a political voice was more absurd still. Even James Tyrrell—an associate of John Locke, a critic of absolutism, and a believer in limited political authority—noted in 1681, “There never was any government where all the promiscuous rabble of women and children had votes.”

Illiteracy often not only limited women’s ability to engage with society but also increased women’s vulnerability. “An illiterate maidservant whose place was five or ten miles from home was cut off from her parents and her brothers and sisters,” effectively unable to send them messages and alert them if her employer physically abused her or sexually assaulted her (as was, sadly, common).

Instead of learning to read, many children began work at shockingly young ages. Laslett informs the reader that, as John Locke noted in 1697, poor children were expected to start working at age three, contributing in what capacity they could, often through apprenticeships. The apprentice’s contract typically went thus: “He shall not absent himself by night or by day without his master’s leave.” Some apprentices “stayed subordinate to a master in a master’s house for the whole of their lives,” far beyond the initial terms of their contract.

Not only could children start work at age 3, but by age 12, they were considered old enough to help run businesses. In 1699, at an alehouse in Harefield, Middlesex, run by Catherine and John Baily, 6 of their 10 children still living at home “were above the age of twelve, . . . old enough to help run the family establishment.”

In England grooms could legally be as young as 14 and brides as young as 12, although Laslett notes that thankfully that was relatively rare in practice. Early marriages did occur, though. In 1623, a London parish clerk wrote disapprovingly of the wedding of a 17-year-old boy working as a threadmaker to the 14-year-old daughter of a porter, calling them a “couple of young Fooles.”

A rather offensive (to modern sensibilities) form of divorce known as “wife-selling” sometimes occurred among those who could not afford a formal dissolution of marriage. The Ipswich Journal records such a sale occurring in 1789:

Oct. 29, Samuel Balls sold his wife to Abraham Rade in the parish of Blythburgh in his county for 1 [shilling]. A halter was put around her neck and she was resigned up to this Abraham Rade.

Such bizarre episodes “reveal something of the slightly quizzical attitude of ordinary people to the official marriage code,” with local customs and practices varying wildly. Upon settling down typically, a man tilled land with the aid of his wife and children. Picture the “hard-working, needy, half-starved labourers of pre-industrial times,” who toiled nonstop and yet never produced enough to live comfortably.

Here was an economy conspicuously lacking in those devices for the saving of exertion which are so marked a feature of our own everyday life. The simplest operation needed effort; drawing the water from the well, striking steel on flint to catch the tinder alight, cutting goose-feather quills to make a pen, they all took time, trouble and energy. The working of the land, the labour in the craftsmen’s shop, were infinitely taxing. [The peasantry would] shock us with their worn hands and faces, their immeasurable fatigue.

Those who didn’t work in agriculture were often servants. The percentage of workers employed as servants in the population varied from as low as 4 percent to as high as a third of the population in relatively wealthy times and places, such as London and parts of Norwich in the 1690s. “Everywhere work of all kinds varied alarmingly with the state of the weather and of trade, so that hunger was not very far away.” Many had no employment and begged. “Wandering beggars . . . were . . . a feature of the countryside at all times.”

Any increase in the cost of food staples could prompt social discord. “Right up to the time of the French Revolution and beyond, in Europe the threat of high prices for food was the commonest and most potent cause of public disorder.” Public panic about food was often warranted, as the threat of hunger was all too real. In 1698 in Scotland, contemporary accounts say, “[m]any have died for want of bread, and have been necessitate to make use of wild-runches draff and the like for the support of nature.” A runch is a common weed.

Laslett makes clear that England, being wealthier than much of Europe, saw relatively few famines by the late early modern period. Still, England’s harvest year of 1623–1624 was devastating, and in some locations, such as Ashton, the number of recorded burials was over two-and-a-half times the typical level. Numerous burials record the cause of the death as starvation. The deaths recorded in the Register of Greystoke in England, in 1623, put names to some of these victims of starvation, including, “A poor hungerstarved beggar child, Dorothy,” and “Thomas Simpson, a poor hungerstarved beggar boy,” as well as “Leonard . . . which child died for want of food,” and 4-year-old “John, son of John Lancaster, late of Greystoke, a waller by trade, which child died for want of food and means.”

Preindustrial people also froze. Indeed, in cold climates such as those of northern and western Europe, “the necessity of gathering round fires and sharing beds, make it obvious that the privacy now regarded as indispensable, almost as a human right,” was once rare, with the masses forced to sleep next to each other and their farm animals for body heat.

If there was one thing that was better about the past, it was perhaps that people were—by necessity—tougher. London’s suicide rate circa 1660 is estimated as somewhere between 2.5 and 5 per 100,000 people, low by modern standards.1 But on the whole, what Laslett calls “the world we have lost” is not a world we’d want back.

  1. According to the most recent data from Britain’s Office of National Statistics, London’s suicide rate now stands at 7.3 per 100,000 people, while England and Wales have a suicide rate of 17.4 per 100,000. According to the most recent year of OECD data, only one OECD country has a suicide rate of under 5 per 100,000: Turkey, at 4.8 per 100,000. (In recent years, only two or three OECD countries typically manage to keep suicides below the upper bound of the estimated level seen in 17th-century London).

Science | Agriculture

New Law Lets EU More Quickly Greenlight Gene-Edited Crops

“In a long-awaited step, the European Parliament yesterday passed a law that allows the expedited approval of many gene-edited crops without the rigorous review required for traditional transgenic varieties…

Scientists and seed companies hope the law will lead to faster adoption of crops with improved disease resistance, heat tolerance, and nutrition…

Under the rules, as finalized this week, approval will be faster for crops whose gene edit seems modest enough that it could have been made through conventional breeding—a simple base change in an existing gene, for example, rather than the addition a nonplant gene. Stricter oversight will remain for transgenic engineering or more substantial gene editing.”

From Science.

The Economist | Democracy & Autocracy

Global Democracy Is in Better Shape than You Think

“Grumbling about the health of democracy can sound abstract. But its decline shows up in wars, coups, contested elections and curbs on civil liberties across the world. EIU, our sister organisation, has tracked that slide since 2006. But the latest update to its democracy index suggests a modest break in the trend: the scores of nearly three-quarters of countries held steady or improved over the past year, and the global index rose by 0.02 points—one of the biggest increases since 2012…

The most improved region was Latin America and the Caribbean. After nine years of decline, scores rose in more than half the region’s countries, helped by higher political participation. That trend may happen elsewhere, too. Asia and sub-Saharan Africa have young populations, and recent protests in Nepal, Kenya and Madagascar have drawn large numbers into politics.”

From The Economist.

Blog Post | Housing

The End of the Housing Affordability Crisis

The decline of housing affordability has been a policy choice.

Summary: Americans have enjoyed extraordinary gains in material abundance, yet housing in recent decades stands out as a stubborn exception. Home prices in many parts of the United States have risen faster than incomes, placing growing pressure on renters and first-time buyers. The problem is not an inevitable market failure but the predictable result of supply constraints—especially land-use regulations—that can be reformed to increase affordability.


Americans have seen tremendous advances in the availability and abundance of material goods. As Marian L. Tupy and Gale Pooley from the Cato Institute have shown, the most basic necessity of food became eight times more affordable over the 100 years up to 2019, relative to average wages (the food inflation after 2019 set us back a little bit, but the long-run trends are still quite favorable). This increasing abundance is not limited to food alone, as a wide variety of finished goods have become much more affordable in recent decades.

These positive trends are well known for goods and even some services, such as cosmetic surgeries, but a common objection, both on social media and in real life, is: What about housing? That is a fair question, considering that Americans spend about 25 percent of their pre-tax annual income on housing, which has been a fairly constant share of their income for most of the past 125 years. Given the large share of the budget that housing costs represent, and the failure of housing to decline as a share of the budget as other necessities did, it is worth investigating the problem further.

On housing, the critics do have a point: Housing costs across the US and many other nations have quickly outpaced income growth in recent years. While we shouldn’t be nostalgic for the housing of the 1950s—houses were about half the size of today’s and had fewer amenities we now consider standard, such as air conditioning—nostalgia for the housing of 30 years ago might be justifiable.

Since 1994, two common measures of housing prices, the Case-Shiller Index and the US Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Median Sales Price data, have increased faster than most measures of income, including median family income and average wages. And unlike the change since the 1950s, the recent increase in housing prices can’t be primarily explained by houses getting bigger: The median square footage of new homes sold has increased only 16 percent since 1994 and has even been falling in the past decade.

Even more so, to the extent housing has become more expensive relative to wage growth in recent years, the trend could worsen over the next 30 years—unless we quickly change policy to allow the supply of housing to increase.

It may seem puzzling that housing could remain roughly the same share of income on average in the US, even as housing prices have increased faster than incomes in recent decades. This seeming puzzle can be resolved by thinking about two different kinds of households: renters and homeowners. While renters and homeowners may certainly be different in many ways—renters tend to be younger, poorer, and so on—there is a fundamental difference in how they experience increases in the price of housing. Renters are typically subject to new market-rate rents on a regular basis, often annually. However, if homeowners remain in the same house they are generally insulated from these changes, with only insurance and property taxes possibly increasing annually, not their principal and interest on the mortgage.

These intuitions are borne out in the data. According to the BLS Consumer Expenditure Survey, in 1984 the share of income that renters spent on housing was about 30.4 percent, which rose over the next four decades to 34.4 percent. Homeowners saw the opposite pattern, with the share of their income spent on housing falling from 27.7 percent in 1984 to 22.6 percent in 2024. The overall average has been fairly stable, but the experience of renters and homeowners has diverged.

The Facts of Housing Unaffordability

Historically, the rule of thumb in the United States is to spend no more than 30 percent of income on housing—though as we saw above, on average Americans spend less than that. But averages can obscure cost burdens for some households. According to an analysis of the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey data by Harvard’s Joint Center for Housing Studies (JCHS), fully one-third of US households spent over 30 percent of their income on housing, and 16 percent of households spent over half of their income on housing in 2024. The number of cost-burdened households has been steadily rising in recent years, as the price of both homes and rentals has increased faster than incomes in most of the US.

We can see the problem of rising home values relative to income by looking at another rule of thumb: Home prices should be in the range of three and five times a household’s annual income. In 1994, out of the United States’ 387 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs), 263 had median home prices that were less than three times the median household income (the data once again come from Harvard’s JCHS). Only 12 MSAs in 1994—mostly in California and Hawaii—had ratios above 5.0.

Fast-forward to 2024, when there were 114 MSAs above the 5.0 ratio of median home prices to income, and those were scattered all over the country. Instead of being in just California and Hawaii, they were also in previously affordable states such as Montana, Wisconsin, North Carolina, and Arkansas. In 2024, the number of MSAs with price-to-income ratios below 3.0 had dwindled to just 32, many of them in the dying Rust Belt. And you don’t even need to go back to 1994 to see the dramatic change. As late as 2019, there were still well over 100 MSAs with a price-to-income ratio below 3.0.

While the majority (241 MSAs) are still within the suggested range of three to five times a household’s income, many are pushing toward the upper end of that range. Given the trend—the median ratio crept up from 2.65 in 1994 to 4.27 in 2024—it is not unreasonable to expect the ratio to continue to increase, absent any changes in policy.

The challenge of housing affordability is not unique to the United States. Using the home-price-to-income ratio from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), since 1994 the US saw home prices increase by 20 percent more than incomes did, meaning that housing is more expensive in real terms. Some other countries were in a much worse situation: Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom all had over 80 percent increases in the ratio of housing prices to income. Not every country followed the same pattern, though. In New Zealand, the price-to-income ratio rose by 126 percent between 1994 and 2021. The ratio declined to 80 percent in 2024. And Japan’s price-to-income ratio fell by 25 percent from 1994 to 2024. However, even Japan has recently seen a modest increase in the ratio, by about 14 percent in the past decade. We’ll look at New Zealand and Japan in more detail below.

The Fix for Housing Affordability

But something can be done. While there have been several political solutions proposed, most of those focused on the demand side, such as subsidies to homeowners or renters. Those kinds of solutions are suboptimal because they increase demand, which will only further increase prices if supply does not also increase. The real problem is on the supply side: There is not enough new housing being built in the places people want to live and of the size people want. What is preventing additional building? In most of the US, it is land-use restrictions such as zoning and other policies that limit the density of new homes. Australia and countries across Europe have implemented similar policies that limit the construction of housing in various ways, primarily in the first half of the 20th century. Price increases did not show up immediately, because in most places restrictions were not binding constraints; there was plenty of land in favorable locations until recent decades.

A major restriction on the supply of housing comes in the form of single-family zoning, which prevents multifamily housing (everything from duplexes to skyscraper apartments) from being built in residential areas. A 2019 analysis by the New York Times found that about 75 percent of residential areas in US cities are reserved for single-family homes. In some cities that figure may reach over 85 percent. Of course, most families probably aspire to eventually own a single-family home, but the zoning laws force most land to be dedicated to this form of housing for everyone. That contributes to making housing unaffordable for many younger families today.

Land-use restrictions limit supply in ways that go beyond merely proscribing that most lots be reserved for single-family homes. For example, regulations will often require lots to be of a minimum size, which is counterproductive because land area is often the most expensive part of the property in urban settings, and the regulation forces families to purchase more land than they want. Regulations also set a maximum amount (a common range is 40–60 percent) of the lot that can be covered by the building itself, essentially forcing homes to have large lawns. Again, many families might want a large lot with a large lawn, but these regulations require it for everyone. The problem is that the less land dedicated to the home itself, the less land there is for other homes in the same area. These rules preclude single-family home types that were common in the past in large American cities, such as row houses or townhouses, which typically occupy most of the small lots they sit on.

Zoning Reforms Work

Would reforming land-use regulations really increase the supply of housing and make it more affordable? The available evidence indeed suggests it would.

One example of reform is New Zealand’s largest city, Auckland, which in 2016 reformed residential zoning to allow for more intensive housing—duplexes, triplexes, townhomes, and the like—on most residential land. This process is referred to as “upzoning.” The results were staggering: As documented in a paper published in the Journal of Urban Economics, construction boomed, with permits doubling in five years. The economists who studied this reform found that rents were 26–33 percent lower than they would have been without it. Rents kept skyrocketing in the rest of New Zealand but stabilized in the parts of Auckland that were upzoned. As mentioned above, New Zealand is notable for seeing its home-price-to-income ratio fall after 2021: As rents stabilized and incomes continued to grow, the ratio declined.

Another example comes from Houston, the fourth-largest city in the US. Houston has long been known as the shining example of a major US city that never adopted citywide zoning, even though some neighborhoods have private deed restrictions that incorporate features similar to zoning. But despite eschewing traditional zoning, Houston still has land-use regulations of various sorts. For example, like most cities, Houston prescribed a minimum lot size of 5,000 square feet. Because people would’ve been paying for more land than they needed, alternate forms of housing such as townhomes were less likely to be built.  First in 1998 and then in 2013, Houston reduced the minimum lot size to just 1,400 square feet in parts of the city. As Mercatus Center economist Emily Hamilton shows, there was a boom in construction following the reforms. Despite adding over 1 million people between 1970 and 2020, Houston still managed to have median home prices below the national average.

If Houston and Auckland demonstrate the power of local reform, Tokyo shows what is possible when a nation treats housing as essential infrastructure rather than a matter set by local competing interest groups. As urban scholar André Sorensen details in The Making of Urban Japan (2002), the country stripped municipalities of the power to block code-compliant projects, effectively turning zoning into a national “right to build” rather than a discretionary local negotiation. The results of this policy choice are astonishing. According to a 2016 analysis by the Financial Times, the city of Tokyo consistently builds more new housing each year than the entire state of California or the whole of England, despite having little empty land to spare. By removing the “veto points” that plague Western cities, Tokyo has achieved the status of a growing, vibrant mega-city where rents have remained flat for decades.

Allowing the Market to Increase Supply Keeps Housing Affordable

As families become richer and the population grows, there is increasing pressure on housing prices in desirable locales. The natural market response to increasing prices is to increase supply. Unfortunately, in much of the US and the rest of the developed world, governments have put artificial barriers in place to prevent this market response. While the housing shortage was created by the political process—through the establishment of zoning and other land-use regulations—the solution does not need to come from governments in the form of subsidizing demand. Instead, to unleash the forces of the market and human initiative, governments need to ease regulations on supply.

Land-use regulations are not the only interference in the market process that makes housing less affordable. Some forms of trade policy and protectionism can also harm home prices. For example, the National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) estimates that recent tariff increases for lumber and other inputs can add at least $10,000 to the average price of a home. Even more costly are building regulations, which the NAHB estimated could exceed $90,000 for a typical home in 2021 and were around 40 percent of the cost of multifamily housing such as apartment buildings. While not all of these regulations could be eliminated immediately, the best thing governments can do to address the affordability issue in housing is to figure out how they can get out of the way.

Bloomberg | Population Growth

Paraguay’s Policies Are Enabling Lower Inflation and Higher Growth

“Wedged between South American heavyweights Argentina and Brazil, Paraguay has long been ignored by the international community. Small, landlocked and poor, it was often seen as just a fly-over country.

So it’s a little surprising — to both those in the capital and in the region — that the country of 6.1 million people is suddenly having a moment…

Though roughly the size of California, Paraguay’s $47 billion economy is about 1% of the Golden State’s. But rapid growth and economic reforms in recent years helped the country win investment-grade credit status from Moody’s Ratings in 2024 and from S&P Global last year…

Last century, it was run as a dictatorship for 35 years — one of the longest in the region, whose fall in 1989 was followed by a tumultuous transition to democracy. But Paraguay’s embrace of sound fiscal and monetary policies after its 2003 financial crisis is now paying off, with single-digit inflation and annual growth averaging around 4% over the past two decades.”

From Bloomberg.