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Thanksgiving Dinner Will Be 8.8 Percent Cheaper This Year

Blog Post | Food Prices

Thanksgiving Dinner Will Be 8.8 Percent Cheaper This Year

Be thankful for the increase in human knowledge that transforms atoms into valuable resources.

Summary: There has been a remarkable decrease in the “time price” of a Thanksgiving dinner over the past 38 years, despite nominal cost increases. Thanks to rising wages and innovation, the time required for a blue-collar worker to afford the meal dropped significantly, making food much more abundant. Population growth and human knowledge drive resource abundance, allowing for greater prosperity and efficiency in providing for more people.


Since 1986, the American Farm Bureau Federation (AFBF) has conducted an annual price survey of food items that make up in a typical Thanksgiving Day dinner. The items on this shopping list are intended to feed a group of 10 people, with plenty of leftovers remaining. The list includes a turkey, a pumpkin pie mix, milk, a vegetable tray, bread rolls, pie shells, green peas, fresh cranberries, whipping cream, cubed stuffing, sweet potatoes, and several miscellaneous ingredients.

So, what has happened to the price of a Thanksgiving Day dinner over the past 38 years? The AFBF reports that in nominal terms, the cost rose from $28.74 in 1986 to $58.08 in 2024. That’s an increase of 102.1 percent.

Since we buy things with money but pay for them with time, we should analyze the cost of a Thanksgiving Day dinner using time prices. To calculate the time price, we divide the nominal price of the meal by the nominal wage rate. That gives us the number of work hours required to earn enough money to feed those 10 guests.

According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the blue-collar hourly wage rate increased by 240.2 percent – from $8.96 per hour in October 1986 to $30.48 in October 2024.

Remember that when wages increase faster than prices, time prices decrease. Consequently, we can say that between 1986 and 2024 the time price of the Thanksgiving dinner for a blue-collar worker declined from 3.2 hours to 1.9 hours, or 40.6 percent.

That means that blue-collar workers can buy 1.68 Thanksgiving Day dinners in 2024 for the same number of hours it took to buy one dinner in 1986. We can also say that Thanksgiving dinner became 68 percent more abundant.

Here is a chart showing the time price trend for the Thanksgiving dinner over the past 38 years:

The figure shows that the time price of a Thanksgiving dinner for a blue collar worker has gone down since 1986.
The figure shows that the time price of a Thanksgiving meal has decreased, while population, the nominal price of the meal, and hourly earnings have all increased.

The lowest time price for the Thanksgiving dinner was 1.87 hours in 2020, but then COVID-19 policies struck, and the time price jumped to 2.29 hours in 2022.

In 2023, the time price of the Thanksgiving dinner came to 2.09 hours. This year, it came to 1.91 hours – a decline of 8.8 percent. For the time it took to buy Thanksgiving dinner last year, we get 9.6 percent more food this year.

Between 1986 and 2024, the US population rose from 240 million to 337 million – a 40.4 percent increase. Over the same period, the Thanksgiving dinner time price decreased by 40.6 percent. Each one percentage point increase in population corresponded to a one percentage point decrease in the time price.

To get a sense of the relationship between food prices and population growth, imagine providing a Thanksgiving Day dinner for everyone in the United States. If the whole of the United States had consisted of blue-collar workers in 1986, the total Thanksgiving dinner time price would have been 77 million hours. By 2024, the time price fell to 64.2 million hours – a decline of 12.8 million hours or 16.6 percent.

Given that the population of the United States increased by 40.4 percent between 1986 and 2024, we can confidently say that more people truly make resources much more abundant.

An earlier version of this article was published at Gale Winds on 11/21/2024.

World Bank | Income Inequality

High-Inequality Economies Have Declined by More Than One-Third

“A measure that captures prosperity should account for both the level of welfare and level of inequality. A measure that captures inequality, such as the Gini index, is an example of a measure of inclusivity. The World Bank reports the number of economies with high levels of inequality, defined as those with a Gini index greater than 40. Based on this, the number of economies with high inequality has declined by more than a third in the past three decades.”

From World Bank.

World Bank | Income & Inequality

Global Progress Lifts Six Nations Into Higher Income Classifications

“Since 1987, the global income classification landscape has changed significantly, with the share of economies classified as low-income declining from 30% to 11%. These shifts have not been evenly distributed, however, with some countries moving across income groups much faster than others. This year’s update to the World Bank Group Country Income Classifications shows six countries moved to a higher income category, but each has a different story to tell: a country emerging from economic crisis, an export powerhouse outpacing its peers, and an economy that turned out to be 10% larger than previously thought are just three of them…

This year, none of the countries assessed moved down. Five moved from lower-middle to upper-middle income: Jordan, Micronesia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam. One moved from low to lower-middle income: Togo. They reached the same thresholds through very different paths.”

From World Bank.

Blog Post | Income & Inequality

Was COVID Also an Inequality Pandemic?

COVID slowed but couldn’t stop the fall in global inequality.

Summary: Recent debates have framed global inequality as rapidly worsening, particularly in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Evidence from the Inequality of Human Progress Index indicates that, despite temporary setbacks, long-term declines in inequality across multiple dimensions of wellbeing have largely persisted, with global disparities remaining well below 1990s levels.


Affordability fears, talk of a “K-shaped” economy, and claims of a new Gilded Age have pushed inequality to the center of today’s policy debates. Calls for a worldwide wealth tax and other unprecedented measures are not treated as radical but as inevitable—across academianon-profitsthe press, and international organizations, including the United Nations.

The COVID-19 pandemic seemed to clinch the case. As economies contracted and progress in poorer countries stalled, it was easy to assume that decades of convergence between developed and developing countries had come to an end. The authors of one Oxfam paper, for example, proclaimed during the pandemic that “unparalleled action [is] needed to combat unprecedented inequality in the wake of COVID-19.”

New research suggests a more nuanced reality. The updated Inequality of Human Progress Index assesses how the pandemic affected progress toward a more prosperous and equal world.

The pandemic clearly slowed improvement in global living standards and interrupted the pace at which countries were becoming more equal. It did not, however, cancel out the long-term, positive trends. Even under the strain of COVID-19, its attendant lockdowns, and other forceful policy responses, global inequality across key measures of well-being remained lower than it was a generation ago.

The index looks beyond income alone. It measures inequality across eight dimensions that shape everyday life, including lifespan, child survival, nutrition, education, internet access, environmental safety, income, and political freedom. The index, which I co-authored with George Mason University economist Vincent Geloso, seeks to offer a fuller view of gaps in global development, taking into account more aspects of human well-being than any prior index of inequality.

The data show a substantial decline in global inequality over the past three decades as rising prosperity allowed poor countries to narrow gaps with rich ones. That pattern held through 2019. During the pandemic years of 2020 and 2021, progress slowed sharply and, in some areas, stalled or modestly reversed. Yet the earlier gains were not erased.

This distinction is important. COVID-19 was a severe shock. Life expectancy fell worldwide. School closures disrupted education. Economic activity and international trade declined, with especially devastating effects on low-income countries. The index reflects these setbacks. Inequality stopped falling at its earlier pace and, in some measures, edged upward slightly after years of progress. Still, the overall level of global inequality remained far below where it stood in the 1990s.

In a few areas, improvement continued even during the crisis. Internet access expanded rapidly, especially in poorer countries, reducing inequality in access to information to its lowest level on record. Faster regulatory approvals amid the pandemic helped bring more people online. In Kenya, for example, Alphabet’s high-altitude internet balloons were finally cleared in 2020, allowing rural areas to gain internet access for the first time. The project had been stalled in regulatory review for nearly two years before the crisis prompted action.

Not all the data were encouraging. Inequality in political liberty ticked up during the pandemic as many countries took a turn toward greater authoritarianism. Even with the long-term shift toward electoral democracy intact, the setback shows the importance of protecting political liberty during emergencies.

For all the turmoil, the damage across different measures of well-being was thankfully limited.

These findings complicate popular claims that the world is experiencing a runaway increase in inequality. Calls for a global wealth tax, massive new aid commitments, or other significant expansions of state redistribution often rest on the premise that trade and free enterprise have failed to deliver shared gains. The data suggest otherwise.

If anything, the pandemic highlighted how sensitive progress can be to disruptions in markets. Countries with greater economic freedom generally proved more resilient. In contrast, prolonged lockdowns and restrictions often imposed heavy costs on poorer populations, particularly in countries where remote work and online schooling were not viable options for most people.

The broader lesson is that global convergence is neither automatic nor guaranteed, but instead depends on certain conditions such as undisturbed markets, even as long-term progress has proven more robust than critics often assume.

Mistaken narratives about global inequality have real consequences. They shape public opinion and influence policymakers to embrace sweeping interventions. A more accurate assessment of recent history suggests a need for caution.

COVID-19 tested the global economy in ways few events in modern history have. It slowed human progress and exposed vulnerabilities. At the same time, it demonstrated the durability of the long-term trend toward lower global inequality. Preserving and strengthening the policies and institutions that made that progress possible, including economic and political freedoms, remains a better bet than assuming they have already failed. The gains of recent decades have left the world both better off and more equal.

This article was published in the Orange County Register on 2/1/2026.

Demography | Personal Income

Generational Progress on Income Growth Continues in US

“Whether each generation of Americans continues to economically surpass the previous one has recently been called into question. We construct a posttax, posttransfer income measure from 1963 to 2023 based on the Current Population Survey Annual Social and Economic Supplement that allows us to consistently compare the economic well-being of five generations of Americans at ages 36–40. We find that Millennials had a real median household income that was 20% higher than that of the previous generation, a slowdown from the growth rate of the Silent Generation (36%) and Baby Boomers (26%), but similar to that of Generation X (16%). The slowdown for younger generations largely resulted from stalled growth in work hours among women. Progress for Millennials younger than 30 has also remained robust, though largely due to greater reliance on their parents. Additionally, lifetime income gains for younger generations far outweigh their higher educational costs.”

From Demography.