01 / 05
COVID-19 Should Make Us Grateful for Technology

Blog Post | Health & Medical Care

COVID-19 Should Make Us Grateful for Technology

Imagine a pre-modern pandemic.

“In a way, everything is technology,” noted one of the world’s greatest economic historians, Fernand Braudel, in his monumental study Civilization and Capitalism. “Not only man’s most strenuous endeavors but also his patient and monotonous efforts to make a mark on the external world; not only the rapid changes . . . but also the slow improvements in processes and tools, and those innumerable actions which may have no immediate innovating significance but which are the fruit of accumulated knowledge,” he continued.

Yes, land, labor, and capital (that’s to say, the factors of production) are important components of economic growth. In the end, however, human progress in general and global enrichment in particular are largely dependent on invention and innovation. That is surely even clearer now that humanity’s hopes for the end of the pandemic and for our liberation from the accompanying lockdown rest on further scientific breakthroughs within the pharmaceutical industry. Let’s take a brief look at the impact of technology on health care, food supply, work, and sociality in the time of COVID-19.

Healthcare

The impact of modern technology is surely most keenly felt and anticipated within the sphere of human health care. Consider some of the worst diseases that humanity has had to face in the past. Smallpox, which is thought to have killed an estimated 300 million people in the 20th century alone, originated in either India or Egypt at least 3,000 years ago. Smallpox variolation, it seems, was practiced in China in the tenth century, but it was not until the late 18th century that Edward Jenner vaccinated his first patient against the disease. Smallpox was fully eradicated only in 1980.

Similar stories could be told about other killer diseases. Polio, which can be seen depicted in Egyptian carvings from the 18th dynasty, is of ancient origin. Yet the disease wasn’t properly analyzed until the year of the French Revolution, with Jonas Salk’s vaccine appearing only in 1955. Today, polio is close to being eradicated (just 95 cases were reported in 2019).

Malaria, probably humanity’s greatest foe, is at least 30 million years old (the parasite has been found in an amber-encased mosquito from the Paleogene period). It was only after the discovery of the New World that knowledge about the fever-reducing benefits of the bark of the cinchona tree spread to Europe and Asia. Quinine was first isolated in 1820, and chloroquine was introduced in 1946. Artemisinin drugs, which we still use, were discovered in the late 1970s. That’s to say that humanity lived with deadly diseases for millennia without fully knowing what they were, how they were transmitted, and how they could be cured. The fate of humanity, our ancestors thought, fluctuated under the extraneous influence of the “wheel of fortune” and there was nothing that anyone could do about it. One day you were alive and next day you were not.

Contrast that glacial pace of progress, and the fatalistic acceptance of disease and death, with our response time to the current pandemic. The Wuhan Municipal Health Commission reported the existence of a cluster of cases of “pneumonia” in Wuhan on December 31. On January 7 the Chinese identified the pathogen (novel coronavirus) responsible for the outbreak. On January 11 China sequenced the genetic code of the virus, and the next day it was publicly available. That enabled the rest of the world to start making diagnostic kits to identify the disease.

To take one example, the first COVID-19 infection in South Korea was identified on January 20. On February 4, the first test kit (made by Kogene Biotech) entered production. On February 7, the test kit was available at 50 locations around the country. Other countries followed suit.

The World Health Organization, which declared COVID-19 a global pandemic on March 11, may have acted too late. Still, it is noteworthy that just two months expired between the first sign of trouble and the time when the entire world put measures in place to retard the spread of the disease. In the meantime, we have learned a lot about governmental incompetence and regulatory overreach. But we have also learned a great deal about the spread and symptoms of the disease. Instead of starting from scratch, medical specialists in Europe and America can draw on the expertise of their colleagues in the Far East. Before the telegraph appeared midway through the 19th century, it took up to a month for a ship to carry information from London to New York. Today, we learn about the latest COVID-19 news (good and bad) and research in seconds.

By mid April, thousands of highly educated and well-funded specialists throughout the world were using supercomputers and artificial intelligence to identify promising paths toward victory over the disease. Some 200 different programs are underway to develop therapies and vaccines to combat the pandemic. They include studies of the effectiveness of existing antiviral drugs, such as Gilead’s Remdesivir, Ono’s protease inhibitor, and Fujifilm’s favipiravir. The effectiveness of generic drugs, such as hydroxychloroquine and chloroquine, is also being evaluated. Takeda is hard at work on convalescent plasma (TAK-888) in Japan, while Regeneron works on monoclonal antibodies in the United States. New vaccines, such as Moderna’s mRNA-1273, Inovio’s INO-4800, and BioNTech’s BNT162, are under development.

We don’t know which of these treatments (if any) will work, but here is what we can be sure of: There has never been a better time for humans to face and defeat a global pandemic. The world is richer than ever before, and money is what enables us to sustain a massive pharmaceutical industry and pay for highly sophisticated medical research and development.

Coronavirus may be deadly, but it is not the bubonic plague, which had a mortality rate of 50 percent. Luckily, it is a far milder virus that has reawakened us to the danger posed by communicable diseases. Once the immediate crisis is behind us, researchers will collect billions of data from dozens of countries and analyze the different governmental responses to the pandemic. That knowledge will be deployed by governments and the private sector to ensure that best practices are adopted, so that next time we are better prepared.

Food

When the Black Plague struck Europe in 1347, the disease found the local population ripe for slaughter. Following the close of the Medieval Warm Period at the end of the 13th century, the climate turned cold and rainy. Harvests shrunk and famines proliferated. France, for example, saw localized famines in 1304, 1305, 1310, 1315–17, 1330–34, 1349–51, 1358–60, 1371, 1374–75, and 1390. The Europeans, weakened by shortages of food, succumbed to the disease in great numbers.

The people of yore faced at least three interrelated problems. First, the means of transport and the transportation infrastructure were awful. On land, the Europeans used the same haulage methods (carts pulled by donkeys, horses, and oxen) that the ancients had invented. Similarly, much of Europe continued to use roads built by the Romans. Most people never left their native villages or visited the nearest towns. They had no reason to do so, for all that was necessary to sustain their meager day-to-day existence was produced locally.

The second problem was the lack of important information. It could take weeks to raise the alarm about impending food shortages, let alone organize relief for stricken communities.

Third, regional trade was seldom free (France did not have a single internal market until the Revolution) and global trade remained relatively insignificant in economic terms until the second half of the 19th century. Food was both scarce and expensive. In 15th-century England, 80 percent of ordinary people’s private expenditure went for food. Of that amount, 20 percent was spent on bread alone. Under those circumstances, a local crop failure could spell the destruction of an entire community. (Those who think that COVID-19 exposed the fragility of modern society should look up the Great Famine.)

By comparison, by 2013 only 10 percent of private expenditure in the United States was spent on food, a figure that is itself inflated by the amount Americans typically spend in restaurants. Speaking of restaurants, while most have been forced to close their doors, the restaurateurs use apps to deliver excellent food at reasonable prices. Moreover, months into the COVID-19 pandemic, the shops are, generally, well stocked and regularly replenished by the largely uninterrupted stream of cargo flights, truck hauling, and commercial shipping. Due to the miracle of mobile refrigeration, fresh produce continues to be sourced from different parts of the United States and abroad. Shortly before writing this piece, I was able to buy oranges from California, avocados from Mexico, and grapes from Chile in my local supermarket. Globalization may be under pressure from both the left and the right of the U.S. political spectrum, but should the pandemic impair U.S. agricultural production, many will be forced to acknowledge the benefits of the global food supply and our ability to import food from COVID-19-unaffected parts of the world.

This extensive and, at this point, still sturdy supply chain is, of course, a technological marvel. Computers collate information about items on the shelf that are in short supply, adjust the variety and quantity of items shipped between stores, fill new orders, etc. And so, commerce that’s still allowed to go on goes on. So does charity. Feeding America, a network of more than 200 food banks, feeds tens of millions of people through food pantries, soup kitchens, shelters, etc. Since 2005, the organization has been using a computerized internal market to allocate food more rationally. Feeding America uses its own currency, called “shares,” with which individual food banks can bid on the foods that they need the most. Grocery-delivery services bring food to the doorsteps of those who cannot or do not want to leave their homes. The old and the infirm can also use phones, emails, and apps to call upon volunteers to do their shopping and delivery.

Work

The nature of work has changed a lot over the last 200 years or so. Before the industrial revolution, between 85 percent and 90 percent of the people in the Western world were farm laborers. Their work was excruciatingly difficult, as witnessed by one 18th-century Austrian physician who observed that “in many villages [of the Austrian Empire] the dung has to be carried on human backs up high mountains and the soil has to be scraped in a crouching position; this is the reason why most of the young people are deformed and misshapen.” People lived on the edge of starvation, with both the very young and the very old expected to contribute as much as they could to the economic output of the family (most production in the pre-modern era was based on the family unit, hence the Greek term oikonomia, or household management). In those circumstances, sickness was a catastrophe: It reduced the family unit’s production, and therefore its consumption.

The industrial revolution allowed people to move from farms to factories, where work was better paid, more enjoyable, and less strenuous (which is largely why people in poor countries continue to stream from agricultural employment to manufacturing jobs today). Moreover, wealth exploded (real annual income per person in the United States rose from $1,980 in 1800 to $53,018 in 2016). That allowed for ever-increasing specialization, which included a massive expansion of services catering to the desires of an ever-more-prosperous population.

The service sector today consists of jobs in the information sector, investment services, technical and scientific services, health care, and social-assistance services, as well as in arts, entertainment, and recreation. Most of these jobs are less physically arduous, more intellectually stimulating, and better paid than either agricultural or manufacturing jobs ever were. Crucially, many of these service-sector jobs can be performed remotely. That means that even in the midst of the government-imposed economic shutdown, some work (about a third, estimates suggest) can go on. The economic losses from COVID-19, in other words, will be astronomical, but not total.

My own organization, for example, shut its doors in mid March. Since then, everyone has been scribbling away at home or appearing on news shows around the world via the Internet. All of us are in regular contact via the phone, Zoom, and Microsoft Teams. Other organizations are doing the same. As we already discussed, a great deal of shopping is taking place online. Shipping and delivery companies are expanding, with Amazon hiring 100,000 additional workers in the United States. Home entertainment, of course, has grown tremendously, with Netflix adding millions of new customers and expanding its offerings with thousands of new films and television shows. With over 30 million American children stuck at home, online learning companies are booming, and educators from high-school teachers to college professors continue to perform their jobs remotely. Telehealth is expanding, allowing patients to see their doctors in a safe and convenient way. Even minor medical procedures, such as eye exams, can be conducted remotely, and multiple companies will deliver your new specs to your front door. Banking and finance are still going on, with many people taking advantage of low interest rates to refinance their mortgages. Finally, the often unfairly maligned pharmaceutical industry is expanding as we all wait and hope for the release of a COVID-19 vaccine or effective therapeutic treatment.

Sociality

Aristotle observed that “man is by nature a social animal” and noted that without friends we would be unhappy. But the role of sociality (that is to say, the tendency to associate in or form social groups) goes much deeper than that. As William von Hippel explained in his 2018 book The Social Leap, sociality is the mechanism by which Homo sapiens came about. When early hominids were forced down from the trees (perhaps as a result of a climatic change that dried up African forests), they became more vulnerable to predators. To cover longer distances between the fast-disappearing trees while maintaining a modicum of protection against other animals, our ancestors developed bipedalism, which allowed them to free their upper body to carry weapons such as sticks and stones.

Even more important was the invention of cooperation. While a stick-wielding ape is slightly better-off than an unarmed one, a group of armed apes is much better at dispatching predators. Individuals in more cooperative bands survived to adulthood and bred more often, resulting in more-cooperative species. Furthermore, since living alone was tantamount to a death sentence, selfish apes who didn’t care about being ostracized for not pulling their weight died off, resulting in a desire for communal cooperation and a deep-rooted fear of rejection by the group.

The early hominids had brains more like those of chimps than those of modern humans. That’s because the evolutionary pressures that created the former — such as predation and food scarcity — could be overcome without tremendous intelligence. These pressures to survive were part of the physical landscape — a challenging but static environment that didn’t require a lot of cognitive ability to navigate. The environmental pressure that resulted in modern humans was the social system itself. The social landscape is much more dynamic than the physical one. Once they had banded together in groups, our ancestors were forced to forge relationships with, and avoid being exploited by, individuals with divergent and constantly shifting interests. Those who couldn’t keep up with the increasingly complex social game either died or were unable to mate.

This new pressure created a positive evolutionary cycle: Banding together created more complex social systems, which required bigger brains; bigger brains needed to be fed; and the best way to get more food was more cooperation and a more sophisticated social system. The main cognitive development that evolved from this evolutionary cycle is known as the “theory of mind.” In short, the theory of mind is the ability to understand that other minds can have different reasoning, knowledge, and desires from your own. While that seems basic, the theory of mind distinguishes us from all other life on Earth. It allows us to determine whether an affront, for example, was intentional, accidental, or forced. It allows us to feel emotions such as empathy, pride, and guilt — abilities that are keys to a functioning society.

So sociality and human beings are inseparable, as we have all been clearly reminded by the sudden restrictions on our ability to interact with others. As we sit at home, working away on our computers or watching television, most of us feel a tremendous sense of isolation (“social distancing”) from our family, friends, and colleagues. The urge to be around others is innate to us. It is who we are.

Dissatisfied with impersonal modes of communication, such as email and texting, we have rediscovered the need for a face-to-face interaction with our fellow humans. To that end, we utilize digital platforms such as Zoom, Google Hangouts, Facebook Live, and FaceTime to catch up on the latest news in other people’s lives, or simply to complain about the misery of loneliness and the pathetic inadequacy of our public officials (of both parties). Throughout the nation, people engage in virtual happy hours, dinners, book clubs, fitness classes, religious services, and group meditation. As my Cato Institute colleague Chelsea Follett recently wrote, “Technology has made it easier than ever to hold a physically-distanced ‘watch party’ synchronized so that viewers in different locations see the same part of a movie at the same time. For those who like to discuss movies as they watch, technology also enables a running group commentary of each scene in real time.” In the saddest of cases, technology enables people to say goodbye to dying friends and relatives. In a very real sense, therefore, technology keeps us sane (or, at the very least, saner).

Technology, then, allows us to cope with the challenges of the pandemic in ways that our ancestors could not even dream about. More important, technology allows our species to face the virus with grounds for rational optimism. In these dark days, remember all the scientists who are utilizing the accumulated store of human knowledge to defeat COVID-19 in record time and all the marvelous (not to say miraculous) ways the modern world keeps us well fed, psychologically semi-balanced, and (in many cases) productively engaged.

This originally appeared in National Review.

Blog Post | Economics

Progress and the Price System | Podcast Highlights

Marian Tupy interviews Brian Albrecht about how prices coordinate markets, discipline firms, and drive human progress.

Listen to the podcast or read the full transcript here.

Today, I’m joined by Dr. Brian C. Albrecht, chief economist at the International Center for Law & Economics and author of the Economic Forces newsletter. Brian writes about competition, regulation, how markets work, why prices matter, and why good intentions often produce bad policy. His work matters because human progress depends not only on innovation, but also on the institutions and incentives that let useful ideas spread, compete, and improve ordinary lives.

Brian, we’re trying to alert our listeners to the economic underpinnings of modernity: why the last 200 years are so fundamentally different from the previous 300,000 years that Homo sapiens has been on the planet. Online, you’re described as one of the chief defenders of price theory. Why does this amorphous idea matter for the great enrichment and for human progress?

One thing that makes the modern world unique is that markets are a huge part of our lives. Markets let us coordinate across time and place in a way we couldn’t have imagined 300 years ago. And price theory is about studying prices: what causes them to move, how they coordinate behavior, when policies affect them productively or destructively.

Can you talk about prices as a signaling mechanism, and draw out the distinction between prices emerging spontaneously under free markets versus politicians trying to set prices?

I take a line from Alex Tabarrok that a price is a signal wrapped in an incentive. Hayek used the example of tin. Users of tin don’t need to know where a shortage came from or whether there’s a new usage; they see the price go up. That allows coordination across time and place. I can decide whether to hold off on tin production or do something else with my factory because tin is more expensive—all that coordination comes from a simple signal.

Thinkers try to distinguish free market prices from others. What does the price of my electricity bill convey? It’s not set by the same forces as the grocery store, where Krogers, Albertsons, Walmart, and Costco bid for chicken from the wholesaler. There’s gradation, and at the other extreme is not allowing prices at all: a government edict, a ration.

The other aspect of prices is incentives. If you own a grocery store and set the price of bananas too low, you sell out and leave money on the table. That’s a signal to raise prices tomorrow. But when the government sets prices, the Politburo chief isn’t making that money. What incentive do they have to set prices in a way that conveys information?

So it’s not just free market prices that give a signal; a government-regulated price like electricity, with taxes and green levies on top, still allows people to adjust. But at some point you get a situation like we did in Eastern Europe, where I grew up, where prices are so divorced from reality that the system collapses.

That’s an extreme example. Less extreme is just shortages. Mayor Mamdani in New York is known for wanting subsidized government-led grocery stores, but those have been tried elsewhere. It’s not that the system collapsed; there are just shortages in these stores.

In public debates, politicians often ignore scarcity and tradeoffs. Why is it so difficult for people to accept that there are scarcities and tradeoffs?

People accept scarcity in situations where they face the feedback themselves.

Any time you go to the grocery store, you’re confronted with scarcity. In other parts of life, that feedback isn’t as tight. In a large organization, you make budgeting decisions that don’t affect you. If you spend extra on the company card, how tight is that feedback?

The government has more insulation because it doesn’t have shareholders. Local governments might have tighter feedback because they’re more responsive to voters. Totalitarian regimes don’t have any feedback.

Right now, we are in the middle of the conflict in Iran. The price of gas has gone way up, and some people have suggested that we should cap the prices of gasoline. But we’ve been here before in the 1970s. What does the 1970s episode have to teach us about what to do when gas prices are going up because of geopolitical conflict?

Every few generations, you need to relearn the lessons of price controls.

The stories from the 1970s are generally known. There were gas lines and energy caps on different things across the economy. It all circles back to the core idea that when you cap prices, people aren’t able to adjust to reality. There’s less supply than there was before the conflict, and price controls don’t change that; they just hide it. In the 1970s, scarcity showed up as gas lines. At other points in time, it showed up as different types of shortages.

Tyler Cowen has written that we’ve forgotten the lessons people learned in the 1970s about price, wage, and rent controls and are now beginning to relearn them. As an economist, do you think that economic understanding is so counterintuitive that, unless taught, the default position is some sort of diktat socialism? If every generation needs to be retaught, then human nature must be the opposite. Have you thought about that?

I’ve thought about it in the context of Hayek’s idea about the micro and macrocosm. His point is that our brain evolved to think about our day-to-day lives and families rather than larger systems. Modernity, especially through markets, but also through things like the internet and social media, brings those larger systems into contact with our brains, which developed in the microcosm, and that’s a fundamental tension we have to keep dealing with.

Another thing that makes economics tricky is that some parts are intuitive and some parts are not. When I tell my students there are tradeoffs, everyone nods. When I ask whether they’d buy more or fewer bananas if the price rises, everyone answers correctly. There’s an intuitive part we think we understand, and then we think we can make the jump ten steps down the road. Economics would almost be easier to teach if it were completely unintuitive. When you go into quantum physics, nothing’s intuitive, so you don’t even try to intuit it; you look at the experiments and the math.

There’s an idealistic vision of the future where AI and robots give us everything we need, eliminating scarcity. Is that kind of future possible, or are human desires infinite?

I was working this morning on a paper about how when we get more stuff, we discover desires we didn’t even realize we had. There was an LLM released that was only trained on text up to about 1930. You ask it what a computer is, and it says a computer is a person who computes because it’s predicting what a person in 1930 would think. They can’t imagine what we think of as a computer, so they don’t know that desire is possible.

That’s how human desires are infinite. Each time I don’t have to worry about where my water comes from, I can buy something fancier and worry about the next thing. Some of that may be resources, some social status. So far, as soon as we can take care of something without worrying about it, another desire appears. I can’t think of a good reason that would end.

The fundamental scarcity that isn’t settled is time. Even if AI does all the work, time with my kids is still scarce. And once there’s scarcity, there are tradeoffs. I’m excited for what AI will do, but the core principle of scarcity doesn’t go out the window.

Let’s talk about your work on monopolies and market concentration. A lot of people seem confused about the difference between firm size and monopoly power. They look at big companies like Apple, Walmart, or Amazon and say that they are monopolies. But those two terms aren’t identical, are they?

A monopoly, in the strictest sense, means one seller. The term grew out of times when you truly had one seller; the king said only one person could do something. In economics, it doesn’t need to be one seller, but rather one big player in a market. With one dominant player, you could imagine that company being a monopolist, or at least having market power. But what if you’re a small player in many markets? Amazon isn’t the biggest in retail or groceries, but add up enough, and it’s a very big company. Companies can be big because they’re diversified. “Monopoly” is a weird term for that.

Another distinction: the East India Company’s monopoly privileges came from politics, but companies often get big by winning a market. If you provide lower-cost or higher-quality goods, you’ll win the market and become a bigger company. That’s fundamentally different from the old-school idea of a player who’s there because they stole something and have power over you.

Right, so people often misunderstand what it means to be a monopoly. Still, people feel uncomfortable when JetBlue wants to take over Spirit. They feel concentration will result in high prices. How often do big companies raise prices rather than lower them?

In the broad sweep, the way to get rich is to lower prices.

The retailer everyone’s talking about is Costco. Costco has low prices. Combined with a membership fee that people happily pay, they get a lot of customers. No one says Costco’s profit comes from crazy high prices. They came in and lowered prices, maybe not on every item, but as a bundle. Before that, it was Walmart. Way back it was A&P. Even in tech, Microsoft and Apple lowered the price of computers and became big. That’s the default way most companies make money: find a cost saving, lower prices, attract more customers, and get profits over the long run.

And it protects you against competition, right?

Yeah, for sure. If I were born in 1920, maybe my job would be to open a corner shop selling lollipops as a retailer, but in today’s world, I can’t compete with the scale of Costco or Walmart. I could compete on a different margin, a gentler boutique experience, for instance, but it’s harder. The flip side is that I get to talk about economics all day instead of operating that corner store. These cost savings help consumers directly through lower prices and indirectly by freeing up resources for people to produce other stuff and move into services.

Now, when it comes to mergers, people are often concerned about collusion. What if all the sellers get together as one legal entity and collude to raise prices? We can separate winning the market by being more efficient versus winning by convincing everyone to stop competing, but mergers sit in between. Is the merger like Walmart, getting scale efficiencies and lowering prices, or like collusion? In most situations, it’s like Walmart, with real efficiencies and synergies. But in airlines or other situations, it can be more collusive, and that’s case-by-case.

To me, that’s why international competition is so important. Even if United takes over American, JetBlue, and Spirit and we end up with one company, so long as they’re exposed to international competition, it’s harder to collude and raise prices.

That’s a real benefit of international trade: if there are pockets of waste from implicit collusion or inefficient mergers, a constant force of external competition is a disciplining force. We want that pressure because it’s what lets us lower costs, improve quality, and generate progress in the longer run.

Let’s stick with airlines. Here’s something that freaks me out. The internet has a lot of information on my income and yours. At some point, between companies knowing our spending patterns and how much we can afford, they’ll discriminate the prices of plane tickets. If Brian is twice as rich as I am and he logs onto American Airlines, his price will be twice as high as mine because the company knows he can pay twice as much. How do you feel about that future?

Let me talk through the economics.

We can work out that the only way that price discrimination works is that you’re able to lower prices for the marginal consumer. Why do you not lower prices in general? Because you’re worried you’ll have to lower prices for the people you were making profit from. If someone says they won’t pay $100 but will pay $50, why not do that? Because the next person will say the same, and soon everyone will beg for $50.

Price discrimination lets you set different prices for different people and lower prices for consumers who wouldn’t otherwise buy the good. If willingness to pay is a proxy for income, you lower prices for poorer people and raise them for richer people. How you think about those tradeoffs depends on the situation, but there’s no disputing that the only way price discrimination works is if you lower prices for some and possibly raise prices for others.

If poorer people would get a price cut, and the rich pay more, why does the left oppose price discrimination so much?

I’ve tried to push that line, though it’s a little bit tongue-in-cheek. The only way price discrimination is profitable for firms is if it gets new people in the door, which means lowering prices for some people, who tend to be poorer. We should take that seriously as one of its benefits.

Also, who knows where technology ends up. There may be ways for people to hide their identity, or third-party sellers where you call and say, “Hey Brian, buy this ticket for me.”

That is in some sense wasteful. People respond to the threat of theft by installing locks, which reduce theft but are themselves a waste of resources. So there could be a role for policy there. Maryland just passed a law trying to ban this sort of price discrimination for grocery retailers. It had stuff like you cannot use tracking information to lower prices in the store, which isn’t something anyone does, but they’re imagining a future where that happens. In the meantime, it’s not a first-order priority.

Free-market economists emphasize competition over regulation. You just talked about a policy response, a regulation. Should an ordinary person rely on competition as a better way of handling these important issues?

People say the reason they feel safe at the grocery store is food regulation. But it’s not really true. It’s mostly because of competition. The Walmarts of the world try very hard to keep their products safe because they have to in order to keep customers coming back. Competition is a facet of the world that we rely on every day.

If you go to a different country, or even a different US city, you often ask whether the tap water is safe to drink. But people never ask that when opening a Coca-Cola. I remember traveling through Zimbabwe during the hyperinflation in 2008. You couldn’t buy anything, but we found a shack in the middle of nowhere selling ice-cold Coca-Cola. I drank it without thinking twice.

That’s a great example, and I’m ashamed I hadn’t thought of that connection because I’ve written on the importance of brands. Brands have to fight to protect against knockoffs. I can go into a McDonald’s anywhere in the world and expect some level of quality. The power of these big brands is that they keep their quality good enough that you trust what you’ll get and reach a price point that lets them be anywhere in the world.

To circle back to price theory, I try to understand how this is possible: the incentives, rule of law, institutions, and competition that make it possible. That’s what I try to do in my research.

The Human Progress Podcast | Ep. 82

Brian Albrecht: Progress and the Price System

Economist Brian Albrecht explains how prices coordinate markets, discipline firms, and drive human progress.

Ramp | Adoption of Technology

Business AI Adoption Crossed 50 Percent in March

“Ramp AI Index shows business AI adoption crossed 50% for the first time in March, reaching 50.4% of businesses. A year ago, it was 35%. Half of businesses on Ramp now pay for AI.

Anthropic continued its surge, growing from 24.4% to 30.6% of businesses — a 6.3-percentage-point gain, surpassing last month’s record monthly gain.”

From Ramp.

IEEE Spectrum | Science & Technology

Contract Bots Could Soon Be On Both Sides of Negotiations

“Walmart and Maersk are using AI agents to maintain and negotiate deal terms with so-called tail-end vendors, the many small suppliers whose low-value transactions nevertheless make up the bulk of a company’s contracts. Any large firm, especially one with expansive supply-chain and logistical needs, manages thousands of these kinds of relationships. As outlined in Procurement in the Age of Automation by the supply chain management experts Remko Van Hoek and Mary Lacity at the University of Arkansas, an AI bot can run 2,000 negotiations at the same time, all day and night, while allowing vendors time for bid preparation and counteroffers.

Say, for instance, a big-box retailer wants to replace outdoor furniture in front of its store parking lots. It puts out a call for bids and gets some offers. The Pactum AI system can use its large language models to analyze this requisition—and all previous requisitions of this type.

The language models aren’t generating new negotiation clauses here. Rather they are assembling information and identifying vendors. Data can be brought in from internal or external sources on factors like relationship strength and current market pricing, all using client-set parameters. A chatbot then sends a note to bidders with offered terms: maybe three varying options. Any acceptable? The vendor says yes or no. Next there’s either more negotiation, or, if terms are agreed within a target spectrum, the purchasing flow proceeds.”

From IEEE Spectrum.