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Cardwell’s Cage and How to Break Free

Blog Post | Innovation

Cardwell’s Cage and How to Break Free

History's cycle of progress and stagnation can be broken.

Summary: Throughout history, cities and nations have repeatedly sparked extraordinary—but relatively brief—periods of innovation. Cardwell’s Law is the idea that creative peaks are historically short-lived. Can any society sustain innovation over the long term? The conditions that support progress are fragile, but by identifying and safeguarding them, we can break out of this historical cage.


Donald Cardwell, a British historian of science and technology, famously observed that “no nation has been very creative for more than an historically short period.” Known as Cardwell’s Law, this dictum haunts many people concerned about the future of innovation. Can the United States, or any other country, break free of the cage of Cardwell’s Law and create an environment that fosters innovation indefinitely?

To better understand this challenge, it helps to zoom in from the level of nations to that of cities, which often function as engines of innovation. While intended to describe whole societies, Cardwell’s Law scales down well to the level of individual urban centers. After all, city-states were the first states and served as the sites of institutional experimentation. And for a long time, it was cities, not larger nations, that commanded loyalty.

A grim message from my otherwise uplifting book, Centers of Progress: 40 Cities That Changed the World is that a city’s creative peak tends to be—as Cardwell noted—brief. As the British science writer Matt Ridley observed in the foreword to the book, “Global progress depends on a sudden series of bush fires of innovation, bursting into life in unpredictable places, burning fiercely, and then dying rapidly.”

Are there any exceptions to that rule? Have any cities managed to maintain longer-than-expected golden ages of innovation, and what can we learn from them?

The cities from earlier eras that I profiled in my book tend to be featured for their achievements over longer periods of time. That is, unfortunately, because in the distant past, progress was often painfully slow—not because someone had cracked the code to break Cardwell’s Law.

Writing, for example, developed over multiple generations, as simple pictographs that accountants invented for record-keeping purposes evolved into a symbolic script and eventually into highly abstract, cuneiform characters. The birthplace of writing was Uruk, an ancient Sumerian city. The most noteworthy part of Uruk’s history lasted for many centuries, but only because the city’s great achievement took generations to accomplish. We should hardly want to emulate a society that advanced at such a pace.

In contrast, when we turn to modern history, the pace of progress accelerates—but the creative window narrows. Manchester, the so-called workshop of the world, led the way during the Industrial Revolution, but only for a few decades. Houston’s heyday helping drive forward space exploration also only lasted a few decades. Today, the youngest living person to have walked on the moon is 89. Tokyo went from being a world capital of technology in the 1980s to decades of economic stagnation. The San Francisco Bay Area that birthed Silicon Valley and the digital revolution has lost its crown, with many technological breakthroughs now occurring elsewhere. In the modern era, the golden age of innovation in any locale tends to last only a few decades, or even less.

To understand why this pattern repeats so consistently, consider the underlying conditions that support—or sabotage—sustained innovation. The economic historian Joel Mokyr, in an illuminating 1993 essay, describes the narrowness of the path that societies must walk to promote creativity, a veritable tightrope where one wrong move can lead to everything crashing down. “In retrospect, the most surprising thing is perhaps that we have come this far,” he concludes.

What causes the downfall of centers of progress, making Cardwell’s Law so seemingly prophetic? While world-changing innovations have come from an extraordinarily diverse set of places, from Song–era Hangzhou to post–World War II New York, sites of creativity almost always share certain key features. It is the loss of those factors that spells their doom. These feature are: conditions of relative peace, openness to new ideas, and economic freedom.

Free enterprise and healthy competition encourage innovation, and the freedom to trade across borders plays an important role by increasing that competition. At the same time, free exchange across borders must not be confused with the total dissolution of borders: vast empires under centralized control tend to stagnate technologically, and complete integration of countries under a global government would in all likelihood be a disaster. A certain type of international competition can be beneficial—just not the kind of rivalry that leads to war.

War redirects creative energies toward making deadlier weapons and away from technologies aimed at improving living standards. And, of course, losing a war can lead to a society’s complete destruction.

Moreover, war prevents innovators from collaborating across borders, and even thinkers within the same country often cannot put their heads together due to the secrecy inherent in war. While some credit WWII with speeding up the creation of the computer, a case can be made that the conflict actually delayed the computer’s invention by preventing collaboration between many innovators, from Konrad Zuse in Berlin to Alan Turing in Great Britain. Even in peacetime, innovation can be stifled when freedom and openness are curtailed.

In short, progress is threatened when peace is lost to war, openness is stifled by the suppression of speech, and freedom is undermined by restrictive or authoritarian laws.

Hong Kong provides a recent and illustrative example of how quickly the conditions for progress can disappear. During its whirlwind economic transformation in the 1960s, Hong Kong rose from one of the poorest countries in the world to one of the wealthiest. It accomplished this feat through policies of “noninterventionism”: simply allowing Hong Kongers to freely compete and collaborate to enrich themselves and their society. But the city’s proud tradition of limited government, the rule of law, and freedom has been abruptly extinguished by a harsh and unrelenting crackdown from the Chinese Communist Party.

Despite sobering examples such as that of Hong Kong, there is reason for hope. Centers of progress are often short-lived, but the fact that throughout history most societies remained creative for only a short time should not discourage us. To defy Cardwell’s Law, all that is needed is a clear-eyed willingness to learn from the mistakes of the past and to fiercely protect the conditions needed for further progress.

This article was published at Econlib on 5/17/2025.

Blog Post | Economics

Progress and the Price System | Podcast Highlights

Marian Tupy interviews Brian Albrecht about how prices coordinate markets, discipline firms, and drive human progress.

Listen to the podcast or read the full transcript here.

Today, I’m joined by Dr. Brian C. Albrecht, chief economist at the International Center for Law & Economics and author of the Economic Forces newsletter. Brian writes about competition, regulation, how markets work, why prices matter, and why good intentions often produce bad policy. His work matters because human progress depends not only on innovation, but also on the institutions and incentives that let useful ideas spread, compete, and improve ordinary lives.

Brian, we’re trying to alert our listeners to the economic underpinnings of modernity: why the last 200 years are so fundamentally different from the previous 300,000 years that Homo sapiens has been on the planet. Online, you’re described as one of the chief defenders of price theory. Why does this amorphous idea matter for the great enrichment and for human progress?

One thing that makes the modern world unique is that markets are a huge part of our lives. Markets let us coordinate across time and place in a way we couldn’t have imagined 300 years ago. And price theory is about studying prices: what causes them to move, how they coordinate behavior, when policies affect them productively or destructively.

Can you talk about prices as a signaling mechanism, and draw out the distinction between prices emerging spontaneously under free markets versus politicians trying to set prices?

I take a line from Alex Tabarrok that a price is a signal wrapped in an incentive. Hayek used the example of tin. Users of tin don’t need to know where a shortage came from or whether there’s a new usage; they see the price go up. That allows coordination across time and place. I can decide whether to hold off on tin production or do something else with my factory because tin is more expensive—all that coordination comes from a simple signal.

Thinkers try to distinguish free market prices from others. What does the price of my electricity bill convey? It’s not set by the same forces as the grocery store, where Krogers, Albertsons, Walmart, and Costco bid for chicken from the wholesaler. There’s gradation, and at the other extreme is not allowing prices at all: a government edict, a ration.

The other aspect of prices is incentives. If you own a grocery store and set the price of bananas too low, you sell out and leave money on the table. That’s a signal to raise prices tomorrow. But when the government sets prices, the Politburo chief isn’t making that money. What incentive do they have to set prices in a way that conveys information?

So it’s not just free market prices that give a signal; a government-regulated price like electricity, with taxes and green levies on top, still allows people to adjust. But at some point you get a situation like we did in Eastern Europe, where I grew up, where prices are so divorced from reality that the system collapses.

That’s an extreme example. Less extreme is just shortages. Mayor Mamdani in New York is known for wanting subsidized government-led grocery stores, but those have been tried elsewhere. It’s not that the system collapsed; there are just shortages in these stores.

In public debates, politicians often ignore scarcity and tradeoffs. Why is it so difficult for people to accept that there are scarcities and tradeoffs?

People accept scarcity in situations where they face the feedback themselves.

Any time you go to the grocery store, you’re confronted with scarcity. In other parts of life, that feedback isn’t as tight. In a large organization, you make budgeting decisions that don’t affect you. If you spend extra on the company card, how tight is that feedback?

The government has more insulation because it doesn’t have shareholders. Local governments might have tighter feedback because they’re more responsive to voters. Totalitarian regimes don’t have any feedback.

Right now, we are in the middle of the conflict in Iran. The price of gas has gone way up, and some people have suggested that we should cap the prices of gasoline. But we’ve been here before in the 1970s. What does the 1970s episode have to teach us about what to do when gas prices are going up because of geopolitical conflict?

Every few generations, you need to relearn the lessons of price controls.

The stories from the 1970s are generally known. There were gas lines and energy caps on different things across the economy. It all circles back to the core idea that when you cap prices, people aren’t able to adjust to reality. There’s less supply than there was before the conflict, and price controls don’t change that; they just hide it. In the 1970s, scarcity showed up as gas lines. At other points in time, it showed up as different types of shortages.

Tyler Cowen has written that we’ve forgotten the lessons people learned in the 1970s about price, wage, and rent controls and are now beginning to relearn them. As an economist, do you think that economic understanding is so counterintuitive that, unless taught, the default position is some sort of diktat socialism? If every generation needs to be retaught, then human nature must be the opposite. Have you thought about that?

I’ve thought about it in the context of Hayek’s idea about the micro and macrocosm. His point is that our brain evolved to think about our day-to-day lives and families rather than larger systems. Modernity, especially through markets, but also through things like the internet and social media, brings those larger systems into contact with our brains, which developed in the microcosm, and that’s a fundamental tension we have to keep dealing with.

Another thing that makes economics tricky is that some parts are intuitive and some parts are not. When I tell my students there are tradeoffs, everyone nods. When I ask whether they’d buy more or fewer bananas if the price rises, everyone answers correctly. There’s an intuitive part we think we understand, and then we think we can make the jump ten steps down the road. Economics would almost be easier to teach if it were completely unintuitive. When you go into quantum physics, nothing’s intuitive, so you don’t even try to intuit it; you look at the experiments and the math.

There’s an idealistic vision of the future where AI and robots give us everything we need, eliminating scarcity. Is that kind of future possible, or are human desires infinite?

I was working this morning on a paper about how when we get more stuff, we discover desires we didn’t even realize we had. There was an LLM released that was only trained on text up to about 1930. You ask it what a computer is, and it says a computer is a person who computes because it’s predicting what a person in 1930 would think. They can’t imagine what we think of as a computer, so they don’t know that desire is possible.

That’s how human desires are infinite. Each time I don’t have to worry about where my water comes from, I can buy something fancier and worry about the next thing. Some of that may be resources, some social status. So far, as soon as we can take care of something without worrying about it, another desire appears. I can’t think of a good reason that would end.

The fundamental scarcity that isn’t settled is time. Even if AI does all the work, time with my kids is still scarce. And once there’s scarcity, there are tradeoffs. I’m excited for what AI will do, but the core principle of scarcity doesn’t go out the window.

Let’s talk about your work on monopolies and market concentration. A lot of people seem confused about the difference between firm size and monopoly power. They look at big companies like Apple, Walmart, or Amazon and say that they are monopolies. But those two terms aren’t identical, are they?

A monopoly, in the strictest sense, means one seller. The term grew out of times when you truly had one seller; the king said only one person could do something. In economics, it doesn’t need to be one seller, but rather one big player in a market. With one dominant player, you could imagine that company being a monopolist, or at least having market power. But what if you’re a small player in many markets? Amazon isn’t the biggest in retail or groceries, but add up enough, and it’s a very big company. Companies can be big because they’re diversified. “Monopoly” is a weird term for that.

Another distinction: the East India Company’s monopoly privileges came from politics, but companies often get big by winning a market. If you provide lower-cost or higher-quality goods, you’ll win the market and become a bigger company. That’s fundamentally different from the old-school idea of a player who’s there because they stole something and have power over you.

Right, so people often misunderstand what it means to be a monopoly. Still, people feel uncomfortable when JetBlue wants to take over Spirit. They feel concentration will result in high prices. How often do big companies raise prices rather than lower them?

In the broad sweep, the way to get rich is to lower prices.

The retailer everyone’s talking about is Costco. Costco has low prices. Combined with a membership fee that people happily pay, they get a lot of customers. No one says Costco’s profit comes from crazy high prices. They came in and lowered prices, maybe not on every item, but as a bundle. Before that, it was Walmart. Way back it was A&P. Even in tech, Microsoft and Apple lowered the price of computers and became big. That’s the default way most companies make money: find a cost saving, lower prices, attract more customers, and get profits over the long run.

And it protects you against competition, right?

Yeah, for sure. If I were born in 1920, maybe my job would be to open a corner shop selling lollipops as a retailer, but in today’s world, I can’t compete with the scale of Costco or Walmart. I could compete on a different margin, a gentler boutique experience, for instance, but it’s harder. The flip side is that I get to talk about economics all day instead of operating that corner store. These cost savings help consumers directly through lower prices and indirectly by freeing up resources for people to produce other stuff and move into services.

Now, when it comes to mergers, people are often concerned about collusion. What if all the sellers get together as one legal entity and collude to raise prices? We can separate winning the market by being more efficient versus winning by convincing everyone to stop competing, but mergers sit in between. Is the merger like Walmart, getting scale efficiencies and lowering prices, or like collusion? In most situations, it’s like Walmart, with real efficiencies and synergies. But in airlines or other situations, it can be more collusive, and that’s case-by-case.

To me, that’s why international competition is so important. Even if United takes over American, JetBlue, and Spirit and we end up with one company, so long as they’re exposed to international competition, it’s harder to collude and raise prices.

That’s a real benefit of international trade: if there are pockets of waste from implicit collusion or inefficient mergers, a constant force of external competition is a disciplining force. We want that pressure because it’s what lets us lower costs, improve quality, and generate progress in the longer run.

Let’s stick with airlines. Here’s something that freaks me out. The internet has a lot of information on my income and yours. At some point, between companies knowing our spending patterns and how much we can afford, they’ll discriminate the prices of plane tickets. If Brian is twice as rich as I am and he logs onto American Airlines, his price will be twice as high as mine because the company knows he can pay twice as much. How do you feel about that future?

Let me talk through the economics.

We can work out that the only way that price discrimination works is that you’re able to lower prices for the marginal consumer. Why do you not lower prices in general? Because you’re worried you’ll have to lower prices for the people you were making profit from. If someone says they won’t pay $100 but will pay $50, why not do that? Because the next person will say the same, and soon everyone will beg for $50.

Price discrimination lets you set different prices for different people and lower prices for consumers who wouldn’t otherwise buy the good. If willingness to pay is a proxy for income, you lower prices for poorer people and raise them for richer people. How you think about those tradeoffs depends on the situation, but there’s no disputing that the only way price discrimination works is if you lower prices for some and possibly raise prices for others.

If poorer people would get a price cut, and the rich pay more, why does the left oppose price discrimination so much?

I’ve tried to push that line, though it’s a little bit tongue-in-cheek. The only way price discrimination is profitable for firms is if it gets new people in the door, which means lowering prices for some people, who tend to be poorer. We should take that seriously as one of its benefits.

Also, who knows where technology ends up. There may be ways for people to hide their identity, or third-party sellers where you call and say, “Hey Brian, buy this ticket for me.”

That is in some sense wasteful. People respond to the threat of theft by installing locks, which reduce theft but are themselves a waste of resources. So there could be a role for policy there. Maryland just passed a law trying to ban this sort of price discrimination for grocery retailers. It had stuff like you cannot use tracking information to lower prices in the store, which isn’t something anyone does, but they’re imagining a future where that happens. In the meantime, it’s not a first-order priority.

Free-market economists emphasize competition over regulation. You just talked about a policy response, a regulation. Should an ordinary person rely on competition as a better way of handling these important issues?

People say the reason they feel safe at the grocery store is food regulation. But it’s not really true. It’s mostly because of competition. The Walmarts of the world try very hard to keep their products safe because they have to in order to keep customers coming back. Competition is a facet of the world that we rely on every day.

If you go to a different country, or even a different US city, you often ask whether the tap water is safe to drink. But people never ask that when opening a Coca-Cola. I remember traveling through Zimbabwe during the hyperinflation in 2008. You couldn’t buy anything, but we found a shack in the middle of nowhere selling ice-cold Coca-Cola. I drank it without thinking twice.

That’s a great example, and I’m ashamed I hadn’t thought of that connection because I’ve written on the importance of brands. Brands have to fight to protect against knockoffs. I can go into a McDonald’s anywhere in the world and expect some level of quality. The power of these big brands is that they keep their quality good enough that you trust what you’ll get and reach a price point that lets them be anywhere in the world.

To circle back to price theory, I try to understand how this is possible: the incentives, rule of law, institutions, and competition that make it possible. That’s what I try to do in my research.

Blog Post | Employment

Evolving Markets Drove the Remote Work Revolution

Free choices—not mandates—have made flexible work a lasting reality.

Summary: Remote and hybrid work have become a durable feature of the modern workplace, with most remote-capable employees choosing flexible arrangements that benefit both workers and employers. Evidence suggests these models can improve productivity, job satisfaction, health, and employee retention while reflecting voluntary market decisions rather than government mandates. As with many past workplace improvements, adoption has largely preceded legal recognition, suggesting that policy should remove barriers to flexible work instead of attempting to direct it.


Back in 2020, I noted, “The dramatic rise in telework amid the pandemic is a radical experiment, but its effects will be long-lasting.” I was right. Rates of full-time, in-office work plummeted during the pandemic, and while many employers have since shifted from fully remote work to hybrid work schedules, hybrid work levels have remained stable since 2022. In 2025, 78% of full-time remote-capable U.S. employees are either hybrid or fully remote, with hybrid as the most common arrangement.

What is sustaining this transformation of the workplace? The inconvenient answer for those who see government action as the source of progress is that this transformation is thanks to freely chosen, mutually beneficial decisions by employers and employees rather than any top-down mandate. 

The proof is in how durable these patterns have been. Millions of workers and employers continue to choose them because they work. Roughly half of the U.S. workforce consists of employees who are capable of working remote or hybrid jobs. The most common arrangement sees workers commute two days a week and work remotely the other three. Most workers appreciate the flexibility, with a mere 6% of remote-capable workers saying they prefer to work on-site full-time.

An analysis from the Bureau of Labor Statistics found that across industries, the rise in remote work and total factor productivity growth may be positively correlated, and many employees report higher productivity at home. Some research also suggests that hybrid and fully remote work may have positive effects on individual employee productivitysatisfaction, and physical health, as well as employee retention.

Historically, most improvements for workers have followed a similar pattern—wherein the market dictates employer-employee relationships, not government—despite a popular narrative to the contrary. The economist Benjamin Powell observed that legal labor standards, working-hour limits, and the introduction of a minimum wage in the United States and other wealthy countries after industrialization largely mirrored policies that employers had already implemented of their own accord. Legislation merely codified preexisting norms instead of prompting a change in industry practices. 

Economist Price Fishback similarly noted, for example, “State laws limiting the number of working hours for women … passed after many employers had substantially reduced hours for women. Recent studies have found that the laws had relatively little effect.” 

A century ago, the Ford Motor Company pioneered limiting the workweek to five days. Ford’s example soon inspired manufacturers across the country and around the world to adopt the Monday-to-Friday workweek. That occurred because employers discovered that productivity increased, while employees valued the extra leisure time. As the economist Ludwig von Mises put it, “The nineteenth century’s labor legislation by and large achieved nothing more than to provide ratification for changes which the interplay of market factors had brought about previously.”

Today, remote and hybrid work often benefits both employers and employees, and this work flexibility rise occurred in spite of many outdated government rules that hinder such arrangements. These rules are in desperate need of reform. For example, various federal tax rules discriminate against remote work arrangements, while differing state rules can subject remote workers to double taxation, and occupational licensing rules limit workers’ options to move between states. If anything, the government has stood in the way of the great workplace transformation toward remote and hybrid work.

Calls to legally mandate remote or hybrid work are a misguided attempt to give the government credit for a shift that has already happened independently of government action. Premier Jacinta Allan of Victoria, Australia, announced that her state government will enshrine a legal right for employees, in both the private and public sectors, who can perform their job from home to do so at least two days a week. The law comes into effect in September.

The legal change will benefit few employees, as 65% of Victorians are already hybrid or remote, but it will create more bureaucratic headaches by adding unnecessary red tape for employers and employees alike. “WFH [work from home] is already happening, and there is no reason to legislate a one-size-fits-all approach,” cautioned Andrew McKellar, the chief executive of the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

This represents perhaps the first example of a legal entitlement to work from home, coming long after the market has already made such arrangements widespread. “If you can do your job from home, we’ll make it your right—because we’re on your side,” said Allan. In reality, it is employers and employees exercising their freedom in the market, not political mandates, that have made the flexibility of remote and hybrid work widely available today.

This article was originally published at RealClearMarkets on 6/23/2026.

Bloomberg | Financial Market Development

Moody’s Lifts Argentina Debt Rating in Fresh Boost to Milei

“Moody’s Ratings upgraded Argentina’s credit score, giving the nation its third sovereign upgrade in less than three months and further validating President Javier Milei’s economic overhaul plan.

The South American nation was raised to B3 from Caa1, with a positive outlook. While the upgrade still leaves it deep into speculative territory, all three major credit-rating firms now rate Argentina above the highly distressed category, a milestone for a country that spent years among the riskiest sovereign borrowers in global markets…

The move follows Fitch Ratings’ decision in May to lift Argentina to B1 and a similar move by S&P Global Ratings in June, with all of the firms citing Milei’s success in restoring fiscal accounts and bringing inflation down from triple-digit levels. Argentina’s sovereign bond spread over their US counterparts now stands at nearly 400 basis points, the lowest in eight years as the country looks to put years of economic crisis and debt defaults behind it.”

From Bloomberg.