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American Poverty Is a Measurement Problem | Podcast Highlights

Blog Post | Poverty Rates

American Poverty Is a Measurement Problem | Podcast Highlights

Marian Tupy interviews Scott Winship about how bad measurement choices distort the picture of poverty and inequality in the United States.

Listen to the podcast or read the full transcript here.

Let’s start with the broader picture. It is my sense that popular narratives about the state of the American worker are much darker than the data support.

Am I terribly wrong in this assessment?

There are surveys that look at economic anxiety or insecurity among Americans. And if you look at a question that has been asked for 25 years or so, about how people feel about their own personal finances, about half the population says their finances are “excellent or good.” We might wish that number were higher, but the main thing is it’s not any lower than it was 25 years ago. It’s been pretty steady over time.

However, if you ask people how they think the American economy is doing, the share of people who say “excellent or good” is really low. So, there’s this misconception about how other people are doing, but if you ask people how they’re doing, they aren’t especially worried.

That is a finding in psychological literature that repeats itself time and time again. It’s called the optimism gap. When people are asked to reflect on their own lives, they are invariably much more optimistic than when they are asked about the situation in the country. The explanation for this phenomenon, according to psychologists, is that people are much better judges of what is happening in their own personal lives as opposed to what is happening to the country as a whole. In the latter case, their opinion is also swayed by the media, which is very negative.

There is also this myth that the American worker has not really seen real progress since the 1970s. What would you say to that?

I was born in 1973, so I don’t have a lot of memories in the 1970s, but it was a period of high inflation, worse than we’ve had in the last five years. And for a longer period of time, there was very high unemployment. There was a lot of terrorism and other violence. There were a lot of drug overdoses. Not a great decade, I think, by anybody’s standards.

People often claim that earnings have stagnated since the 1970s, particularly men’s earnings, but the numbers that I’ve published in the last year suggest that since 1973, earnings among men are up by something like 45 percent, and earnings among women are up by around 120 percent. Hourly wages, annual incomes, and family incomes are all either at all-time highs now or have been at some point in the last five years.

Another major part of your work has to do with mobility and opportunity in the United States. We are told that society is fundamentally stagnant: if you are born into unlucky circumstances, then you are stuck there.

So, how would you summarize your research on economic and social mobility in the United States?

There are two main ways that people talk about intergenerational mobility. One is comparing adult kids to their parents. The way to think about that is “if you start in the bottom fifth, are you able to make it to the middle fifth by the time you’re an adult?” That hasn’t gotten worse over time, but you’d be hard-pressed to find people who say it’s gotten better, either.

The other big way that people think about mobility is “Do you make more money at the same age than your parents did?” The conventional wisdom there is based on the work of Raj Chetty and his colleagues, who found that, if you were born in 1940, you had a 90 percent chance of ending up better off than your parents. For kids born in 1980, that had dropped to about a 50 percent chance. So, a big decline over time.

My colleagues and I are investigating that evidence right now. Preliminarily, it looks to us like if you use a better inflation adjustment, and if you take into account the fact that families have become smaller, it looks to us like in the United States, 70 percent of recent waves of adults are better off than their parents were, down from 90 percent.

Now, everything I said about mobility was comparing individual people to their parents. If you’re just asking how well new generations are doing compared to previous generations, the evidence is that Millennials and Gen Z are already better off at the same age than previous generations in terms of earnings and wealth.

However, student debt levels are higher in younger generations because college graduation rates are higher than they used to be. But for most people, that investment is going to pay off down the road. And Homeownership is lower. Now, I think the reason that homeownership is down for recent generations is that marriage rates have plummeted, and single young adults have never had high homeownership rates. There’s been a case of reverse causality there, where people say, “nobody’s getting married because they can’t afford a home,” but it’s never been the case that a majority of young parents have owned a home. They’ve always tended to be renters, and then after some time, they become homeowners.

What did you find out about income inequality in the United States?

Ten years ago, I was writing a ton on this. I was trying to push back on Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez, who were claiming that there was an incredible increase in the share of income that was being captured by the top 1 percent.

There were a number of problems with their analysis. They used pre-tax and pre-transfer incomes, which miss the effect of progressive taxation and the social safety net. There was a problem where a lot of teenagers and young adults who were living with parents with a summer job were classified as low-income Americans. There were also issues with how they treated capital gains. People strategically time when they receive these gains based on tax law and the state of the economy, so you might have 20 years of gains that show up in the data as one year, which, as you can imagine, tends to inflate the incomes at the top. They also only included taxable gains, and the main way that the middle class gets wealth is through homeownership, which didn’t show up in the data.

Eventually, Saez, Piketty, and Zucman improved on the earlier estimates and found smaller increases in inequality over time. So, the consensus now is that inequality has gone up, but by much less than everybody thought around the time of the financial crisis. And when you take into account redistribution through progressive taxation, there hasn’t been much of an increase in inequality since the 1960s.

You’re a mild-mannered scholar and might not want to endorse what I’m about to say, but reporting pre-tax and pre-transfer statistics seems like intellectual deceit. What does it matter what your pre-tax income is if the government ends up taking 40 to 50 percent of it? And what’s the point of talking about Americans at the very bottom of the income ladder not earning anything if they are getting tens of thousands of dollars in transfers?

Yeah, I agree. Folks on the left would point to the Piketty and Saez numbers and say, “Look how bad inequality is, we need more redistribution,” but they weren’t even counting the redistribution we currently do. If you don’t include redistribution, inequality wouldn’t fall even if we leveled incomes.

Even the official poverty statistics that the US government releases don’t include most of the ways that we have tried to reduce poverty over time. It doesn’t count food stamps, Medicaid, housing subsidies, or refundable tax credits, which are the major ways that we’ve tried to reduce poverty over the last 20 years.

That’s extraordinary.

It reminds me of the finding in the Gramm and Boudreaux book, The Triumph of Economic Freedom: Debunking the Seven Great Myths of American Capitalism. They found that once you account for taxes and transfers, the difference between the top quintile and the bottom quintile of American earners decreases from 16 to one to four to one.

One last thing on poverty. We have a relative poverty measure that tends to bump around between 12 percent and 8 percent since the 1960s. But I have seen a couple of papers suggesting that once you measure poverty by consumption, it falls to about 2 to 2.5 percent.

Why would there be such a huge difference between the official poverty rate and the consumption poverty rate? Are people simply not reporting their incomes?

I think a couple of things are going on.

First, you’re absolutely right that people underreport their incomes. If you look at the bottom fifth of families, for instance, people are spending 20 or 30 percent more than the incomes they report. And I’ve talked to folks on the left who say, “Oh, that’s because they’re going into debt.” Bruce Meyer and his colleagues have looked at that, and that doesn’t seem to be the case at all. It’s pretty well known that there’s a lot of underreporting both at the bottom and at the very top, and that underreporting has gotten worse over time.

The second issue is that most of the poverty measures out there, including the official ones, simply don’t count a bunch of sources of income. And they overstate inflation, so the poverty line becomes a more and more difficult threshold to get over. When you measure incomes more comprehensively and when you use a better price index, the income poverty trend tends to look a lot like the consumption poverty trend.

You could argue that poverty lines are ultimately pretty arbitrary. You can set them so that 2 percent of the population is poor, or you can set them so that 10 percent of the population is poor. The important thing is that you hold them constant over time. Rich Burkhauser, Kevin Corinth, and Jeff Larrimore have a paper where they say, All right, let’s take seriously when Lyndon Johnson said in 1963 that 20 percent of the population was in poverty. Let’s measure everything as best we can and see what that implies about poverty today. And it’s 2 percent.

Now, you run into people who say, “How can you believe poverty is at 2 percent? That’s completely unrealistic.” To which I say it’s arbitrary. If you prefer to start today with the official poverty rate of around 10 percent, we can go back to 1963 and see how many people lived under that line. It turns out that was 70 percent.

Good god.

Let me just repeat that for our listeners. If you decided that the poverty rate today in the United States is 10 percent, then, by that standard, 70 percent of Americans were poor in the 1960s?

That’s right.

Michael Green, who I believe is an investor of some kind, posted on his Substack that the real poverty line in the United States today should be $140,000. For reasons that are mysterious to me, The Free Press decided to republish that article on its website, which of course got everybody very excited. And then you stepped in. So, what does he get wrong?

He gets to this number two different ways.

The first thing he did was misinterpret the official poverty line. In the early 1960s, Lyndon Johnson wanted to start the war on poverty, and he wanted to say that a fifth of the population was poor. And there were a number of different researchers who had arrived at a poverty line of around $3,000 at the time. One of those researchers was a woman named Mollie Orshansky, who had gotten there by noting that nationally, Americans at the time spent about a third of their incomes on food. The US Department of Agriculture had this minimally adequate food budget, so she just took that and multiplied it by three, and that got you to a little over $3,000 for a family of four. Eventually, in 1969, they said, let’s just go with Mollie Orshansky’s numbers, except we’re going to adjust them for inflation moving forward. So, we’re not going to get into how much of people’s income they spend on food. We’re not going to change what an adequate diet is. We’re just going to take her line and adjust it for the cost of living over time. And that’s still the official poverty line today.

Green thought he understood how the poverty line was initially developed, and he said, “Okay, let’s look at how much Americans spend on food today.” And it turns out Americans today spend around 5 or 6 percent of their income on food. From there, Green said, “Okay, so let’s not multiply the original food budget by three. Instead, we should be multiplying it by 17. And clearly, if you multiply this number by 17 instead of 3, you get a much higher threshold.

It’s a ludicrous way of calculating poverty. We spend a smaller share of our incomes on food because we are richer, but Green has used that to argue we are poorer. It makes no sense.

The other way that he got to $140,000 was that he took these estimates of how much families of four need to spend on things like food, childcare, health care, housing, transportation, and some other things. He got these from this living wage calculator that someone has created online, which also had a bunch of problems with it. Maybe the biggest one was that he was using Essex County, New Jersey, to represent the United States. Turns out Essex County is one of the four or five richest counties in the country.

The key thing for Americans to understand is that, in general, wages are increasing faster than prices. However, certain parts of our spending, primarily education and healthcare, are becoming more expensive relative to wages.

So let’s finish by talking a little bit about the Baumol effect, which is basically that, even in industries where there is no growth in productivity, we still have to pay people higher wages because of productivity growth in other industries. Basically, nurses and teachers might not be getting much more productive over time, but we still need to pay them more, or we won’t have any nurses or teachers.

However, in the book that I co-wrote with Gale Pooley, Superabundance, we found that plastic surgery prices are dropping like a rock relative to income. So, how much of the inflation in healthcare is thanks to the Baumol effect as opposed to government subsidies? Would the Baumol effect be lessened if we had proper competition?

It’s a great question, and I don’t think there’s been enough research done on it. But clearly, government intervention has been incredibly important.

In every realm except for healthcare, insurance is essentially a tool to pay a little bit in regular amounts to avoid a giant cost that you have a low probability of ever having to pay. That’s why we have car insurance. There’s a small chance that you’re going to get in a big car accident, and rather than risking bankruptcy if that accident happens, you pay into an insurance policy that will take care of it.

In healthcare, largely because of government mandates, it’s not like that at all. Health insurance covers annual checkups, which are completely predictable. By including a bunch of things like that in health insurance coverage, you incentivize people to overconsume health care, which pushes up costs.

The analogy I make is imagine if the government mandated that car insurance had to cover paint jobs. Well, if I’m paying for insurance that includes an annual paint job and I’m not taking advantage of it, then I’m a sucker. Other people are getting these fancy paint jobs with their insurance coverage, so I will too. That’s going to increase the cost of car insurance, and it’s going to increase the cost of paint jobs. That’s what we’re getting in the healthcare sector.

World Bank | Poverty Rates

Paraguay Poverty Drops from 50 Percent to 16 Percent in 20 Years

“In the last 20 years, poverty in Paraguay has plummeted from over 50 percent to only 16 percent in 2025. In just two decades, a third of the population has escaped poverty, with another 300,000 rising out of poverty just in the last two years. 

Progress at this pace, scale, and duration does not happen by accident. Paraguay’s success is what happens when governments focus on productivity and jobs. Paraguay’s GDP growth has been nearly 5 percent per annum, among the fastest in Latin America. But for progress in poverty and shared prosperity, what drives growth matters. Labor income growth was the primary driver of poverty reduction in 2025, with the largest gains concentrated at the bottom of the income scale.”

From World Bank.

Blog Post | Water & Sanitation

If You Think New York City Life Is Bad Now

A grim tour of preindustrial New York

Summary: Many people today feel that life in New York has become uniquely difficult. Some imagine that the city was cleaner, safer, and more livable in the distant past. Historical reality tells a different story: Preindustrial New York was marked by extreme filth, unsafe water, rampant disease, pervasive poverty, and living conditions that made everyday life harsh and dangerous compared to contemporary times.


Discontent fueled the 2025 New York City mayoral election and Zohran Mamdani’s victory. A common theme echoed across the five boroughs: New York is a hard place to live. “We are overwhelmed by housing costs,” said Santiago, a 69-year-old retiree, outside a Mamdani rally. Those opposed to Mamdani had their own complaints. María Moreno, a first-time voter from the Bronx who supported Andrew Cuomo, lamented, “Now everything’s dirty, and our neighborhood does not feel safe.”

Today’s voters have legitimate grievances. The city’s housing costs, quality-of-life issues, and perceptions of disorder weigh heavily on residents’ minds. But it’s important to keep things in perspective. Different voters may romanticize different eras, but many seem to share a sense that if they could travel back far enough in time, they’d find a New York that was once clean, safe, and affordable. When Americans were polled in 2023, almost 20 percent said that it was easier to “have a thriving and fulfilling life” hundreds of years ago. Across the country, as one writer put it, people are engaged in an “endless debate around whether the preindustrial past was clearly better than what we have now.” In fact, Mamdani’s politics are grounded in an ideology that first arose from the frustrations of the early industrial era.

If Americans could go back in time to preindustrial New York City, however, they’d likely be horrified and possibly traumatized. Despite today’s real challenges, most New Yorkers would not trade places with their predecessors.

Long before the rise of factories and industry, New York City was a bustling port, founded by the Dutch as New Amsterdam in order to trade furs in the early seventeenth century. As early as 1650, local authorities enacted an ordinance against animals roaming the streets to protect local infrastructure—but to no avail. Then, in 1657, according to the Dutch scholar Jaap Harskamp:

New Amsterdam’s council attempted to ban the common practice of throwing rubbish, ashes, oyster-shells or dead animals in the street and leave the filth there to be consumed by droves of pigs on the loose. When the English took over the colony from the Dutch, pigs and goats stayed put. . . . Pollution persisted. The streets of Manhattan were a stinking mass. Inhabitants hurled carcasses and the contents of loaded chamber pots into the street and rivers. Runoff from tanneries where skins were turned into leather flowed into the waters that supplied the shallow wells. The (salty) natural springs and ponds in the region became contaminated with animal and human waste. For some considerable time, access to clean water remained an urgent problem for the city. . . . The penetrating smell of decomposing flesh was everywhere.

Into the early twentieth century, urban living in the United States felt surprisingly rural and agrarian, with an omnipresent reek to match. As late as the mid-nineteenth century, pigs roamed freely through New York City streets, acting as scavengers, and nearly every household maintained a vegetable garden, often fertilized with animal manure.

Indoor air quality was no better. A drawing from Mary L. Booth’s History of the City of New York depicts a seventeenth century New Amsterdam home with smoke from the fireplace swirling through the room. Indoor air pollution remains a serious problem today in the poorest parts of the world, as smoke from hearths can cause cancer and acute respiratory infections that often prove deadly in children. One preindustrial writer railed against the “pernicious smoke [from fireplaces] superinducing a sooty Crust or furr upon all that it lights, spoyling the moveables, tarnishing the Plate, Gildings and Furniture, and Corroding the very Iron-bars and hardest stone with those piercing and acrimonious Spirits which accompany its Sulphur.”

That said, before industrialization, though inescapable filth coated the interiors of homes, the average person owned few possessions for the corrosive hearth smoke and soot to ruin. By modern standards, New Yorkers—like most preindustrial people—were impoverished and lacked even the most basic amenities. According to historian Judith Flanders, in the mid-eighteenth century, “fewer than two households in ten in some counties of New York possessed a fork.” Many were desperately poor even by the standards of the day and could not afford housing. One 1788 account lamented how in New York City, “vagrants multiply on our Hands to an amazing Degree.” Charity records suggest that the “outdoor poor” far outnumbered those in almshouses.

Water quality was infamously awful. In seventeenth-century New Amsterdam, as Benjamin Bullivant observed, “[There are] many publique wells enclosed & Covered in ye Streetes . . . [which are] Nasty & unregarded.” A century later, New York’s water remained as foul as Bullivant had described. Visiting in 1748, the Swedish botanist Peter Kalm noted that the city’s well water was so filthy that horses from out of town refused to drink it. In 1798, the Commercial Advertiser condemned Manhattan’s main well as “a shocking hole, where all impure things center together and engender the worst of unwholesome productions; foul with excrement, frogspawn, and reptiles, that delicate pump system is supplied. The water has grown worse manifestly within a few years. It is time to look out [for] some other supply, and discontinue the use of a water growing less and less wholesome every day. . . . It is so bad . . . as to be very sickly and nauseating; and the larger the city grows the worse this evil will be.”

In 1831, a letter in the New York Evening Journal described the state of the water supply:

I have no doubt that one cause of the numerous stomach affections so common in this city is the impure, I may say poisonous nature of the pernicious Manhattan water which thousands of us daily and constantly use. It is true the unpalatableness of this abominable fluid prevents almost every person from using it as a beverage at the table, but you will know that all the cooking of a very large portion of the community is done through the agency of this common nuisance. Our tea and coffee are made of it, our bread is mixed with it, and our meat and vegetables are boiled in it. Our linen happily escapes the contamination of its touch, “for no two things hold more antipathy” than soap and this vile water.

In 1832, New York experienced a devastating outbreak of cholera, a bacterial disease that typically spread through contaminated water and killed with remarkable speed. A person could wake up feeling well and be dead by nightfall, struck down with agonizing cramps, vomiting, and diarrhea. The epidemic killed about 3,500 New Yorkers.

The initial actions taken to protect city water supplies were often private in nature. In fact, throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, private businesses generally supplied urban water infrastructure. Despite such efforts, drinking water remained generally unsafe, even after industrialization, until the chlorination of urban water supplies became widespread.

The pervasive grime took a visible toll on New Yorkers. Between drinking tainted water, eating contaminated food, inhaling smoke-filled air, and living with poor hygiene, the average resident sported visibly rotten teeth. One letter from 1781 described an acquaintance: “Her teeth are beginning to decay, which is the case with most New York girls, after eighteen.”

The dental practices of the time were often as horrifying as the effects of neglect. The medieval method of using arsenic to kill gum tissue, providing pain relief by destroying nerve endings, remained common until the introduction of Novocain in the twentieth century. As late as 1879, the New York Times ran a story with the headline “Fatal Poison in a Tooth; What Caused the Horrible Death of Mr. Gardiner. A Man’s Head Nearly Severed from His Body by Decay Caused by Arsenic Which Had Been Placed in One of His Teeth to Deaden an Aching Nerve—an Extraordinary Case.” The story detailed the gruesome demise of a man in Brooklyn, George Arthur Gardiner, who died “in great agony, after two weeks of indescribable suffering.”

Preindustrial New York City wasn’t uniquely miserable for its time. Life was harsh everywhere, and cities around the world contended with the same foul smells, filth, poor sanitation, and grinding poverty. Rural villages were no better. Peasant families often brought their livestock indoors at night and slept huddled together for warmth. In many cases, rural peasants were even poorer than their urban counterparts and owned fewer possessions. Farm laborers frequently suffered injuries and aged prematurely from backbreaking work, while fertilizing cesspits spread disease and filled the air with an inescapable stench.

Though they may have been slightly better off than their rural counterparts, the struggles of early New Yorkers are worth remembering. However daunting the problems of today may seem, a proper historical perspective can remind us of how far we’ve come.

This article was originally published in City Journal on 1/13/2026.

Bloomberg | Poverty Rates

Poverty in Argentina Fell to Lowest Since 2018 Under Milei

“Poverty in Argentina fell to the lowest level since the first half of 2018 in another victory for President Javier Milei, even as the disinflation process stalls.

In the second half of 2025, 28.2% of Argentines lived in poverty, down from 31.6% in the first half, according to data published Tuesday by Argentina’s statistics agency.

A combination of Milei’s austerity and a tightly controlled currency thwarted the pace of price increases in the second half of the year, combined with boosts to some social welfare spending, helping to bring more people out of poverty. The rate is defined locally as incomes that can afford the cost of a basic basket of goods and services.”

From Bloomberg.

Blog Post | Wealth & Poverty

Dinner With Dickens Was Slim Pickins

Claims that characters in "A Christmas Carol" were better off than modern Americans are pure humbug.

Summary: There have recently been widespread claims that Dickens’s working poor were better off than modern minimum-wage workers. Such comparisons rely on misleading inflation math and selective reading. The severe material deprivation of Victorian life—crowded housing, scarce possessions, and basic sanitation problems—dwarfs today’s standards. Modern Americans, even at the lower end of the income scale, enjoy far greater material comfort than the Cratchits ever did.


Christmas is often a time for nostalgia. We look back on our own childhood holidays. Songs and traditions from the past dominate the culture.

Nostalgia is not without its purposes. But it can also be misleading. Take those who view the material circumstances of Charles Dickens’s “A Christmas Carol” as superior to our own.

Claims that an American today earning the minimum wage is worse off than the working poor of the 19th century have been popular since at least 2021. A recent post with thousands of likes reads:

Time for your annual reminder that, according to A Christmas Carol, Bob Cratchit makes 15 shillings a week. Adjusted for inflation, that’s $530.27/wk, $27,574/yr, or $13.50/ hr. Most Americans on minimum wage earn less than a Dickensian allegory for destitution.

This is humbug.

Consider how harsh living conditions were for a Victorian earning 15 shillings a week.

Dickens writes that Mr. Cratchit lives with his wife and six children in a four-room house. It is rare for modern residents of developed nations to crowd eight people into four rooms.

It was common in the Victorian era. According to Britain’s National Archives, a typical home had no more than four rooms. Worse yet, it lacked running water and a toilet. Entire streets (or more) would share a few toilets and a pump with water that was often polluted.

The Cratchit household has few possessions. Their glassware consists of merely “two tumblers, and a custard-cup without a handle.” For Christmas dinner, Mr. Cratchit wears “threadbare clothes” while his wife is “dressed out but poorly in a twice-turned gown.”

People used to turn clothing inside-out and alter the stitching to extend its lifespan. The practice predated the Victorian era, but continued into it. Eventually, clothes would become “napless, threadbare and tattered,” as the historian Emily Cockayne noted.

The Cratchits didn’t out-earn a modern American earning the minimum wage. Mr. Cratchit’s weekly salary of 15 shillings in 1843, the year “A Christmas Carol” was published, is equivalent to almost £122 in 2025. Converted to U.S. dollars, that’s about $160 a week, for an annual salary of $8,320.

The U.S. federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour or $15,080 per year for a full-time worker. That’s about half of what the meme claims Mr. Cratchit earned. Only 1% of U.S. workers earned the federal minimum wage or less last year. Most states set a higher minimum wage. The average worker earns considerably more. Clerks like Mr. Cratchit now earn an average annual salary of $49,210.

Mr. Cratchit couldn’t have purchased much of the modern “basket of goods” used in inflation calculations. Many of the basket’s items weren’t available in 1843. The U.K.’s Office of National Statistics recently added virtual reality headsets to it.

Another way to compare the relative situation of Mr. Cratchit and a minimum-wage worker today is to see how long it would take each of them to earn enough to buy something comparable. A BBC article notes that, according to an 1844 theatrical adaptation of “A Christmas Carol,” it would have taken Mr. Cratchit a week’s wages to purchase the trappings of a Christmas feast: “seven shillings for the goose, five for the pudding, and three for the onions, sage and oranges.” Mr. Cratchit opts for a goose for the family’s Christmas meal. A turkey—then a costlier option—was too expensive.

The American Farm Bureau Federation found that the ingredients for a turkey-centered holiday meal serving 10 people cost $55.18 in 2025. At the federal minimum wage, someone would need to work seven hours and 37 minutes to afford that feast.

A minimum-wage worker could earn more than enough in a single workday to purchase a meal far more lavish than the modest Christmas dinner that cost Mr. Cratchit an entire week’s pay. And the amount of time a person needs to work to afford a holiday meal has fallen dramatically for the average blue-collar worker in recent years despite inflation. Wages have grown faster than food prices.

There has been substantial progress in living conditions since the 1840s. We’re much better off than the Cratchits were. In fact, most people today enjoy far greater material comfort than did even Dickens’s rich miser Ebenezer Scrooge.

This article was originally published in the Wall Street Journal on 12/23/2025.