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A Vindication of Bjorn Lomborg

Blog Post | Environment & Pollution

A Vindication of Bjorn Lomborg

Lomborg’s experience shows what happens when a researcher challenges a powerful narrative with inconvenient numbers.

Summary: When Bjorn Lomborg challenged environmental doomsday narratives, he was met not with open debate but with efforts to discredit and silence him. Two decades later, many of his core arguments have quietly entered the mainstream. The convergence of his views with those now voiced by leading figures offers a lesson about the cost of treating scientific disagreements as moral heresies rather than opportunities for empirical inquiry.


When the Danish scholar Bjorn Lomborg published The Skeptical Environmentalist in 2001, the reaction from the environmental establishment was not debate but an attempted excommunication. Scientific American devoted a special package to attacking the book as biased and error-ridden. Union of Concerned Scientists accused him of misrepresenting science and overstating good news.

In Denmark the response went further. The Danish Committees on Scientific Dishonesty decided that The Skeptical Environmentalist was “clearly contrary to the standards of good scientific practice” and “objectively” fell within the concept of scientific dishonesty. Disgracefully, the Committees based their finding on biased third-party critiques, presented no documentation of errors, and engaged in rank anti-Americanism, such as alluding to “powerful interests in the USA bound up with increasing energy consumption and with the belief in free-market forces.”  

The case generated international headlines and was treated as a formal stain on Lomborg’s integrity. A year later Denmark’s Ministry of Science threw out the initial decision on numerous counts. They found the original decision “dissatisfactory” and “emotional,” but most importantly the Ministry invalidated the decision because it was “not documented” and it was “completely void of argumentation” — something which a legally valid decision needs according to Danish law. The Ministry sent the case back to the Committees, which declined to reopen it.

The substance of Lomborg’s crime was simple. He took the environmental litany of doom and gloom and checked it against long-run data from the UN, the World Bank, and other official sources. He concluded that on most indicators human welfare had improved, many environmental trends were not as catastrophic as advertised, and that resources devoted to some flagship green causes would save more lives if redirected to basic health, nutrition and economic development. He accepted that global warming is real and largely man-made but argued that the standard policy mix of aggressive near-term emissions cuts was a poor investment compared with targeted adaptation, innovation and poverty reduction.

Lomborg did not claim private revelation. Inspired by the late Cato Institute Senior Fellow Julian Simon, he spent years compiling statistics and trend lines, ultimately drawing on some 3,000 mostly secondary sources. His method was explicit: quantify problems, rank them by costs and benefits, and ask where each extra dollar does the most good. The Copenhagen Consensus project that Lomborg leads extended this logic by convening economists to compare policies ranging from HIV prevention to trade liberalisation to climate mitigation, again with the aim of maximising welfare per dollar spent.

For this, he was branded a “denier,” portrayed as a tool of fossil fuel interests, and treated as someone whose views lay outside polite discussion. DeSmog today still amusingly describes him as a “climate crisis denier” and campaigns against funders that support his work. Scientific critiques often slid into attempts to discredit him personally, and one law review article documents how even his attempts to reply in detail were met with legal threats from critics rather than open exchange in the same pages.

Two decades later, the world looks more like Lomborg’s spreadsheets than like the early-2000s apocalypse rhetoric. Emissions are rising more slowly than feared, climate-related disaster deaths have fallen, and poor countries still face more immediate threats from malaria, malnutrition and lack of basic infrastructure. Into this landscape, Bill Gates has recently stepped with a climate memo that reads uncannily like a Lomborg column.

On 28 October 2025, ahead of the COP30 summit in Brazil, Gates published “Three tough truths about climate” on his Gates Notes site. There he argues that although climate change will have serious consequences, “it will not lead to humanity’s demise,” and that people “will be able to live and thrive in most places on Earth for the foreseeable future.” He warns that an obsessive focus on near-term emissions targets has crowded out more effective ways to help people and calls for “a strategic pivot” toward improving lives, particularly in poor countries.

The key line could have been lifted from a Copenhagen Consensus report: “The biggest problems are poverty and disease, just as they always have been,” and limited resources should go to interventions that deliver the greatest gains for the most vulnerable. That is Lomborg’s central thesis restated by one of the most influential philanthropists on the planet.

There is more than rhetorical convergence. The Gates Foundation has long supported the Copenhagen Consensus’ focus on development. It has donated over $3.5 million to partially fund policy prioritisations in the two Indian states of Rajasthan and Andhra Pradesh, a report of Best Buys for Africa for the African Academy of Sciences, and a stock-taking prioritisation of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals.

Such endeavours resulted in peer-reviewed economic research showing the 12 best investments for humanity. These 12 policies are described at length in Lomborg et al.’s book Best Things First, which was picked as one of the best books of 2023 by both Financial Times and The Economist. In other words, Gates has not only started to sound like Lomborg on climate and development; he has been funding Lomborg’s basic approach to global problem-solving for years.

Gates’ memo has sparked outrage among climate activists for soft-pedaling catastrophe, for questioning temperature as the main metric of success, and for insisting that health and prosperity are the best defences against a warmer world. Yet these are precisely the points Lomborg made when he argued that rich countries should not block poor ones from using reliable energy, that adaptation and growth can greatly reduce harm, and that chasing ever more expensive emissions cuts while neglecting cheap life-saving interventions is bad ethics as well as bad economics.

Lomborg’s vindication does not rest on perfection in every graph or forecast. (I have always argued that Lomborg ought to be trusted not because he gets everything right, but because—constantly checked by thousands of critics who wanted him to fail—he had every incentive to make fewer mistakes than those living in the epistemic bubble of environmental catastrophising.) It rests on three elements that his opponents tried to delegitimise but have failed to overturn.

First, he insisted on measuring long-run trends rather than reacting to headlines. That is why The Skeptical Environmentalist spent so many pages on fertility, food production, air and water quality, resource prices and disaster statistics. The message was that human ingenuity and market-driven growth had solved or mitigated many of the problems that earlier generations thought insoluble, and that policy should build on that record instead of assuming inevitable decline.

Second, he treated climate change as one serious problem among many, not as a singular moral crusade that trumps all other goals. His later book Cool It argued that some highly touted climate policies failed basic cost-benefit tests and that a mix of modest carbon pricing, technological innovation and targeted adaptation would do more good at lower cost. Gates now echoes this logic when he calls for innovation, cheap clean energy and continued investment in health and development, rather than pouring every available dollar into symbolic emissions cuts.

Third, Lomborg approached priorities as an empirical question, not as an expression of moral purity. The Copenhagen Consensus exercises rank policies by expected benefit per dollar, often putting vaccines, nutrition and basic education ahead of grand climate targets. That framework is nothing more than applied welfare economics. It is closer to the ethos of evidence-based public health than to the emotional politics that have dominated the climate debate.

That is what it means to say that Lomborg was driven by science rather than dogma or emotion. He did not deny problems. He asked how big they are, how fast they are changing, and what works best if we care about human flourishing. His opponents often responded not with better data but with attempts to brand him as illegitimate, to sic committees on him, and to deter others from asking similar questions.

The appearance of Bill Gates on Lomborg’s side of the argument underscores how fragile that strategy was. If climate change is not the end of the world but people will actually thrive, if poverty and disease remain the main killers, and if policy should be judged by lives improved rather than tons of carbon alone, then the core of Lomborg’s message stands.

There is a broader lesson. Modern societies claim to revere science, but too often turn scientific disputes into moral battles in which heretics must be shamed or silenced. Lomborg’s experience shows what happens when a researcher challenges a powerful narrative with inconvenient numbers. The attempt to punish him did not change the data. It only delayed a necessary conversation about trade-offs, priorities and the best use of scarce resources.

That conversation is now unavoidable. Gates has effectively cemented Lomborg’s main points, even as activists denounce them. Instead of pretending that never happened, we should recognise it for what it is: a belated vindication of the skeptical environmentalist who asked the right questions first.

This article was originally published in Quillette on 11/20/2025.

Blog Post | Environment & Pollution

What Climate Science Really Says | Podcast Highlights

Marian Tupy interviews Roger Pielke Jr. about the latest climate research and how to think clearly about climate change.

Listen to the podcast or read the full transcript here.

Today I’m joined by Dr. Roger Pielke Jr., a Professor Emeritus at the University of Colorado Boulder, Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, and author of influential books like The Honest Broker and The Climate Fix. He’s a leading voice on the politicization of science and climate policy, and his scholarship is known for being rigorous, data-driven, and impartial.

I want to spend most of our time talking about climate change and global warming, but let’s start by looking at the extremes in the climate change debate.

People who are critical of the dominant view that climate change is a crisis or even a problem will say things like CO2 concentrations in Earth’s atmosphere are much lower than they were in the distant past, or that CO2 is vital for life, it is plant food, so there is nothing to worry about. What is wrong with that point of view?

Science supports global greening and the fact that CO2 levels were higher in the past. Where that goes away from scientific understanding is the “nothing to worry about” part.

The late Steve Schneider, who was a famous climate scientist and climate activist, once said that the fundamental challenge of climate change is that outcomes could be very benign, or they could be very serious, and we won’t know the difference during the time that we need to prepare. So, both extremes—the apocalyptics and the “don’t worry, be happy” folks—are guilty of selectively interpreting evidence. The reality is that both outcomes are in the spectrum of possibilities, but smart decision-making has to consider that entire spectrum, not just one tail of the distribution.

Is there such a thing as an optimal amount of CO2 in the atmosphere?

The simple answer is, as a risk management problem, the emission of carbon dioxide through the burning of fossil fuels has risks associated with change. And those risks could be profound. So, limiting the rate of change is much more important than whether 425 parts per million is better than 350 or 575.

There is also the question of trade-offs. For example, by emitting more CO2 into the atmosphere, we are making the world much richer. So, even if we do emit a lot more CO2, society in the future will be much richer and much more technologically advanced than we are, and they’ll be able to take care of any problems.

Humans are a fantastically inventive species. And it’s absolutely true that fossil fuels, which have the side effect of emitting carbon dioxide, have been central to human progress. One data point, a trend that I don’t think many people are aware of, is that the carbon dioxide intensity of economic activity—carbon dioxide per unit of GDP—has been dropping for decades. So, as we’ve become wealthier, we’ve also become much less carbon-intensive. As a species, we really like getting more output for less input, and we like cleaner-burning fuels. So, if that trend were to continue, we do at some point go over the hump of increasing carbon dioxide emissions, and they start going down.

In fact, right now, over the last decade, emissions have plateaued. There are small increases, but they’re within the margin of error measurement. So, there is a background force of decarbonization that has nothing to do with climate policy. I know it’s not as fast as some would like, and it could be faster, but decarbonization is just a fundamental reality of human civilization.

Now let’s address the other side of the extreme: people who believe that climate change is an existential crisis, and to avert it, we need to shrink the global economy. What’s wrong with that picture?

The big problem with that view is that the vast majority of people on this planet have no interest in degrowth. There are not very many politicians able to win an election by campaigning on making people poorer. The reality is that any successful path to decarbonizing the economy has to be accompanied by greater growth and wealth for most people. There are 5 or 6 billion people who do not enjoy anything close to the energy consumption that people who are watching this podcast get to enjoy every day. So, the world’s going to consume more energy no matter what degrowthers say.

What do you think about the very out-there techno-optimist view, which is that we should aim to have the technological sophistication and wealth necessary to completely control the climate? That’s a kind of sci-fi scenario that I sometimes hear.

I think we should get as wealthy as possible and be able to make our way through a volatile environment as safely as possible. The idea that there’s going to be a control panel where we can perfect climate conditions is science fiction. I have no expectation we’ll ever be doing that. The track record of humans trying to influence ecosystems is horrible.

We hear about this with proposals to “geoengineer” the climate. And full disclosure, I signed onto a geoengineering non-use letter, because it’s the height of arrogance for us to think that we can control the climate system. It’s like gain-of-function research on viruses. Yeah, maybe you’ll learn something, but maybe you’ll kill 20 million people. So, I’m not a big fan of the “control panel” approach to climate.

I want to now turn to specific concerns that people have when it comes to climate change. Let’s start with the rising global temperatures and extreme heat. What does the latest research say about this problem?

What I normally do—and I think this is a good practice in any area where science and politics meet—is I start with assessments that have been put together by authoritative bodies.

In this case, that’s the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, which is a sprawling, massive thing. It’s got three working groups and many dozens of chapters and hundreds of authors. But it’s a touchpoint for assessing the science. The IPCC gets some things right and some things wrong. But in general, Working Group 1, with its focus on extreme events, has pretty much called things straight over the past 30 years.

When it comes to extreme heat, the IPCC says that there has been an increase in heat waves around the world. It’s been detected, to use their language, and they attribute that increase of heat waves to human causes, including increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere.

The World Health Organization has argued that with effective adaptation, the number of people who should die from excessive heat is zero. We have air conditioning, we have weather forecasts and good warnings. The challenge is that those adaptations to heat are not well implemented everywhere around the world. If places that are adapted to one level of temperature start seeing a greater frequency of heat waves, they will need to adapt.

The other factor is that ecosystems are far less adaptable than humans are. If it’s 110 outside, I can come inside in the air conditioning. Ecosystems can’t do that. So, material changes in the physical environment can have profound consequences for ecosystems.

Okay, now onto changes in precipitation patterns.

The extreme weather phenomenon the IPCC has the second-highest confidence in is an increase in heavy downpours, which they call “extreme precipitation.”

People have to be careful with that. And the IPCC, to its credit, is very careful. Extreme precipitation is not the same thing as flooding. Here in Boulder, Colorado, if we got 2 centimeters of rain today, that would be extreme precipitation, but it wouldn’t cause a flood. I wish we would get 2 centimeters of rain.

There has been a documented increase in the activity of the hydrological cycle around the world due to increasing temperatures. It hasn’t been detected everywhere, and the numbers are not super large in the context of natural variability, but they’ve been detected and attributed. However, the IPCC has low confidence that flooding has increased globally. Flooding is very difficult to document because we manage so many river basins. We change runoff patterns through urbanization and agricultural irrigation. So, flooding is much more confounded than precipitation itself.

Extreme weather events, especially hurricanes, cyclones, wildfires, and droughts.

We need to take these one by one.

I’ve studied tropical cyclones for 30 years, which includes hurricanes, and the IPCC gets this one right: there is no convincing evidence that there are more hurricanes or more intense hurricanes over the period of record. The IPCC is clear on that, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in the US is very clear on that.

Hurricanes have become a kind of poster child of climate change. They’re very photogenic. Al Gore had one coming out of a smokestack in his famous movie. However, hurricanes are probably one of the worst places to look for any signals of climate change. There are only 60 to 80 hurricanes on planet Earth in any given year. That’s a small number of events when you compare it to the millions and millions of temperature measurements we take every year.

Flooding, as I said, has no detection or attribution. Drought, for most metrics of drought, again, no detection or attribution. The one distinction that the IPCC makes is soil moisture deficits, basically dry land, which is associated with warming more than it is with precipitation. Winter storms, again, no detection or attribution there.

You have to be careful with wildfires because the wildfire record is very confounded by human land management. While we might be able to tease out trends in wildfires, attributing causality is much more difficult. There are some published studies out there that say that warming, particularly in, say, the western United States, has led to an increase in fire-prone conditions. There is also good research that says before the human settlement of North America, the intensity and scale of wildfires were much, much greater than anything we’ve seen, so we actually have a fire deficit.

Moving swiftly onto ocean warming and acidification.

I’m glad you brought those up. Despite all the arguments that have been made over the decades about the surface air temperature and the location of thermometers and things like that, it turns out that the best place to look for a signal of warming is the oceans. Over the last several decades, there have been very good temperature measurements showing that most of the energy imbalance caused by our emission of greenhouse gases is actually going into the oceans.

Onto acidification. So about half of the carbon dioxide we emit is taken up by the oceans, and that changes the chemistry of the oceans. On the one hand, it’s a good thing that the oceans are absorbing carbon dioxide because then there’s less of a radiative effect in the atmosphere. But on the other hand, it means we’re changing the chemistry of the ocean, and that will have impacts on sea life. If you go through all that math, this is one place that takes you to net zero. To stop changing the chemistry of the ocean, we couldn’t just reduce emissions to the amount that the oceans are taking up; we would have to reduce emissions to zero.

My next concern, melting ice and glaciers, is also tied to the rising sea levels and so forth. So maybe you can talk about that.

Runoff from glacial melt and also melt from Greenland, and to some degree from Antarctica, is contributing to sea level rise. That’s tightly associated with warming and has been attributed to human causes. There are also other factors beyond warming. Something I was fascinated to learn about from one of my colleagues at the University of Colorado was that when we put particulates in the atmosphere, and it precipitates out in snow, it changes the albedo—basically, the snow is a little darker because it has soot in it—and the snow melts faster.

Understood. Let’s talk a little bit about the different climate change scenarios. How much warming have we experienced? What are the worst and the best-case scenarios? And what does the most likely scenario mean for the planet?

That’s a great question.

Using a preindustrial baseline of 1850 to 1900, the world has already warmed about 1.5 degrees Celsius.

The projections are, as you say, scenarios. They’re a function of what we think the global population will be, how big the economy will be, where we’re going to get our energy from, and how we apply that energy in the economy. Last December, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change said that the world is headed to 2.2 to 2.5 degrees Celsius by 2100. It just so happens that it aligns very nicely with a paper I did with Justin Ritchie and Matt Burgess.

I call this one of the best-kept secrets in all of climate science.

It wasn’t so long ago that those same types of projections were looking at 4, 5, 6 degrees Celsius by 2100. They’ve come down dramatically, not because of anything to do with the physical science of climate, but because our expectation for future emissions has come down dramatically. There was an assumption that coal, the most carbon-intensive fuel, was going to fuel everything around the world. And it turns out we’re not going in that direction.

Another big factor, and one that really hasn’t made its way into climate projections yet, is the changing projections of the global population. The leading climate scenarios still have 12 or 13 billion people on the planet in 2100. And demographers are now seriously talking about the global population peaking under 10 billion and then going down to maybe 7 billion in 2100. Once that gets factored in, projected temperature ranges are going to drop further.

Climate change has morphed from something that was plausibly extreme—I don’t think existential threat was ever the right language, but possibly extreme—to something that looks a lot more manageable. It’s a troublesome condition that will require a lot of action, but it’s not going to be the end of the world.

So, you actually had a paper some time ago where you nailed the trajectory of global warming with great precision. And that fantastic performance didn’t protect you in American academia. Meanwhile, people who wheel out the RCP 8.5 scenario, where everything is run on coal, get columns in major newspapers.

What on Earth is going on?

Extreme results are a lot more attractive to journals. And if you use an extreme climate scenario, you’re going to get extreme results. Journals like to put out press releases, and so the more shocking the headline, the more likely it is that it’s going to get picked up. At the same time, climate advocacy for decades now has focused on the notion of an existential threat, and extreme studies feed that notion.

Another factor is that the climate community updates its scenarios only every 10 to 20 years. Imagine doing economic policy with data from 2006 in 2026. It’s crazy. The energy system modelers update their energy scenarios every year. That’s one reason why it’s easy, I would say, to come up with better projections than you find in the IPCC, because they’re still using scenarios from two decades ago. If you use a more updated scenario, as we did, for energy consumption, population, and GDP, you’ll be much more accurate than one that was based on 2005 data.

It seems to me that the extreme environmentalist viewpoint has begun to come to an end. The break really came in 2022 with the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the resulting spike in energy prices.

Do you agree with that?

Yeah, I think that’s right. The price shock in Europe following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was an eye-opener. People really do want action on the environment and on climate, but they don’t want to do it at the expense of their monthly utility bill.

I don’t think that the extreme environmental movement is going to completely disappear. The concern about overpopulation never really ended; it kind of faded away. I think that’s the best model for extreme environmentalism focused on climate. There will continue to be a segment of people, particularly in the scientific community, who emphasize apocalyptic scenarios and existential threats, but policymakers around the world have become much more focused on the security of energy, the price of energy, and energy access. For a long time, energy policy was discussed as if it were a subset of climate policy, and climate policy was the dominant framing. I think that has now reversed. Climate policy is now rightly viewed as a subset of energy policy. But don’t make any mistake: the radical wings on either side are going to remain with us.

The Human Progress Podcast | Ep. 78

Roger Pielke: What Climate Science Really Says

Roger Pielke Jr. joins Marian Tupy to discuss the latest climate research and how to think clearly about climate change.

Cambridge University Press | Conservation & Biodiversity

Khulan Return to Former Mongolian Range After Long Absence

“The Asiatic wild ass, or khulan, Equus hemionus, is native to the arid landscapes of Central and East Asia. Although the Mongolian Gobi supports the largest population, the species remains threatened by habitat fragmentation, competition with livestock, illegal hunting and climate change. Historically, the khulan ranged widely across Mongolia, including the Eastern Steppe. However, the construction of the fenced Trans-Mongolian Railway in the mid 20th century created a near-continuous barrier to movement, leading to the species’ local extinction east of the railway. In 2019, a pilot conservation initiative removed sections of the fence and documented the first confirmed crossing of the Trans-Mongolian Railway by a khulan in over 6 decades. To assess the current status of khulan east of the railway, we combined GPS data from 29 collared individuals in the South Gobi with distance sampling and opportunistic field surveys. We recorded two confirmed crossings near the Zamiin–Uud border during the winters of 2023 and 2024. Additionally, during field surveys in 2024 we observed 384 khulan in four groups east of the railway. These findings provide the first confirmed evidence of khulan recolonization within their historical range and establish a baseline for future conservation efforts.”

From Cambridge University Press.

The Guardian | Conservation & Biodiversity

Melbourne Zoo Hopes to Safeguard Victorian Grassland Earless Dragon

“The dragons’ lair looks deceptively ordinary: a pair of pale green portables, tucked behind the reptile enclosure at Melbourne zoo.

But the plain exterior belies its hidden treasures. Inside, dozens of Victorian grassland earless dragons, blissfully unaware of their status as Australia’s most imperilled reptile, are basking on rocks, gobbling up crickets or lapping up ‘dew’, expertly misted by their keeper Zac Harkin.

For 50 years these critically endangered creatures were thought extinct. But following their rediscovery in 2023, Zoos Victoria is not taking any chances.

The new dragon conservation centre at Melbourne zoo has room to accommodate hundreds, housed as singles or pairs in open-air glass condos, each one furnished with living plants and artificial burrows made of PVC piping.”

From The Guardian.